New Rule of Law in Canada and B.C.

SAMPLE MOTION RECORD

Court File No.: A-123-18

 

FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

BETWEEN:

Zoltan Andrew Simon

Appellant

(Respondent to the Crown

Respondent’s motion)

and

Attorney General of Canada

 

(representing the Minister of National Revenue,

both in their representative capacity)

 

Respondent

(Respondent/Applicant

in the FC and FCA)

 

  

RESPONDENT’S MOTION RECORD

 

Submitted by the appellant on August 20, 2018

Pursuant to sections 365, 366, 367 and 369(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, sections 40(3) and 52 of the Federal Courts Act [and to serve as applications for Rescission of the vexatious litigant order and for Leave to Appeal if declared a vexatious litigant]

 

VOLUME 1 

 

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Applicant               ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

(self-represented litigant)                         Department of Justice Canada

72 Best Crescent,                                      Edmonton Regional Office, Prairie Region

Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6                             EPCOR Tower

Telephone: none                                       300, 10423 – 101 Street NW

FAX: (403) 341-3300                                  Edmonton, AB   T5H 0E7

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com                 

                                                                Wendy Bridges and Keelan Sinnott,

                                                                Counsel for the Respondent

                                                                Telephone: (780) 495-7801

                                                                Fax: (780) 495-3319

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Respondent’s Motion Record)

VOLUME 1:

Table of Contents................................................................................ 1

All affidavits and other material to be used by the respondent on the motion

that is not included in the moving party’s motion record:

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on February 9, 2017 ........................... 4

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on June 28, 2017............................... 7

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on January 8, 2018............................ 11

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on March 22, 2018............................ 20

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on March 28, 2018............................ 25

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on April 30, 2018..............................32

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on June 7, 2018...............................37

Affidavit of Zoltan Andrew Simon sworn on July 3.......................................40

The portions of any transcripts on which the respondent intends to rely..........N/A

Written representations......................................................................44

      PART I – Aconcise statement of fact...................................................44

PART II – A statement of the points in issue...............................................46

PART III – Aconcise statement of submissions.............................................50

PART IV – Aconcise statement of the order sought, including any order

      concerning costs..........................................................................68

PART V – Alist of the authorities to be referred to.......................................74

Other filed material not contained in the moving party’s motion record that is necessary for the hearing of the motion: Documentary evidence showing that there is no record in the Province of British Columbia and the Federal Court regarding the appellant’s alleged debt as a ground for CRA’s seizure.......................................................................................... 77

APPENDIX A: The provisions of any statutes or regulations cited or relied on..... 80

            Canada Act 1982: The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada

            Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 (a.k.a. Canadian Charter of Rights and

            Freedoms): sections 8, 11, 12, 15 (1), 52 (1)................................. 80

     

            Canada Revenue Agency Act,S.C. 1999, c. 17, sections 3, 5(1)(a), 6,

            42 (1)..................................................................................84

 

            Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77: 19...................................... 88

 

            Court Order Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 78: section 1 under “debts,

            obligations and liabilities”, 9 (1) and (2), 22 (1) and (2).................... 90

 

            Court Order Interest Act, RSBC 1996, c 79: sections 5, 7(1).................92

 

            Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: sections 19, 21, 22(1), 126(1),

            322(2) to (4), 337, 346(1), 361(1), and 380(1)............................. N/A

 

            Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50: sections 3(b),

            32...................................................................................... 94

 

            Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.): section 113..................... 97

 

            Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, SC 1994, c 31: s. 4...... 99

     

            Family Maintenance Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, Chapter 127: 1(1)

            under “attachment order” and “debtor”, 17(3) under “debtor” and

            “maintenance order”, 18(1)..................................................... N/A

 

            Family Maintenance Enforcement Act Regulation, B.C. Reg. 346/88:

            6.1(1)................................................................................ 101

 

            Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, RSC 1985,

            c 4 (2nd Supp.): 23(1) from “garnishable monies” to “Minister”, “support

            order” and “support provision”, 24, 26, 32, 37, 41, 45, 49 .............. 103

 

            Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations,

            SOR/88-181: 3(a) to (f), 6(1), 8, 9, Schedule 2.............................. 109

 

            Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7: 2(1) (“final judgment”), 16(1),

            17 (1), 17(3)(b), 17(4), 18(1), 18.1, 19, 39(1) and (2), 40 (1), (2), (3)

            and (4), 52 (a), 57................................................................. 115

 

            Federal Courts Jurisdiction Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 135: 1 (1)(a)

            and (c)................................................................................ 121

 

            Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: 1.1 (1) and (2), 69, 221(1), 76 (a) 

            and (b), 221(1),  300 (a), 301, 357 (3), 382.2, 449(1), (2) and (3), 

            456(1) to (3)......................................................................... 122

 

            Financial Administration Act, RSC 1985, c F-11: 38(2), 67(a), 68(2),

            69(1), 155 (1) and (2), 155.1(3) ................................................ 133

 

            Frustrated Contract Act, RSBC 1996, c 166: 1(1), 2, 3, 8, 9(1) and (2)... 135

 

            Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52 in Revised Statutes of

            Canada, 1985 (Volume V): 118(2) ............................................... 137

 

            Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27: 4(1), 124(1),

            145(1)(a) and (b) (“under this Act”), 145(3), 146 (1) and (2).............. 139

 

            Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227:

            132(4), 135(a) ...................................................................... 147

 

            Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp.): 223(1)(a) to (d), (2), (3)

            and (12), 223.1(1) and (2), 224(1), 224.1 ..................................... 150

 

            Interest Act, RSC 1985, c I-15: 3, 4, 5 .......................................... 154

 

            Interpretation Act, RSBC 1996, c 238: 8, 12, 14 (1) .......................... 156

 

            Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: 8(1), 11, 12, 13, 15(2)(a) ........... 158

 

            Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266: 3(5), 6(3) and (4), 9(1) ................... 162

 

            Limitation Act, SBC 2012, c 13: 1 at “limitation period”, 14, 21(1) & (3).. 166

 

            Supreme Court Act, RSBC 1996, c 443............................................. 169

 

            Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009: 1-3 (1).......................... 171

 

APPENDIX B: A book of the authorities to be referred to that have not been

                           included in another party’s book of authorities...................... 173

 

                           Please refer to page 74 for the list itself.

 

                           (The fist part is at the end of this volume, ending with the

                           landmark Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi case. The

                           continuation of the authorities is bound separately in Vol. 2)

...................................................................................................

[Several pages omitted. The next numbered page is 44 below.]

 

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE APPELLANT (Here Respondent)

PART I – A concise statement of fact

  1. The Crown, based on hearsay or/and an unspecified document, has been harassing and accusing the appellant since 2007 by claiming that he had been owing to the government of Canada or British Columbia an amount of originally c. $38,150. The Government of Canada started to garnish Z.A. Simon’s account with the CRA (Canada Revenue Agency) on 2 June 2008 when his credit amount of $3,441.68 has been taken, or apparently simply disappeared because the CRA sent it to a ministry of British Columbia, instead of his person and address.

  2. The Crown, since 2007, has been unable to prove that a garnishing order issued by a court against him, or a ministerial certificate is filed and registered in the Federal Court, required by section 146 of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act). A Schedule 2 of the Family Support Ordersand Agreements Garnishment Regulations has never been served on him by the Minister of Justice.

  3. Thus, CRA garnisheed unlawfully and unconstitutionally the said account of Z.A. Simon on June 2, 2008, without a lawful garnishment procedure constituting a seizure and a cruel or unusual infringement of his section 8 and 12 Charter rights.

  4. No court has ever clarified the factual basis, particularly the existence or non-existence of his alleged contract with a minister, in light of section 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules that is silent about any contract of the sponsors in the family class. The courts remained in darkness regarding the facts, apparently accepting the false allegations of Mr. Witten and Ms. Brown in the autumn of 2014 in the BCSC: these Counsel falsely claimed that all of the 193 factual allegations of Z.A. Simon had been unacceptable and, therefore, untrue.

  5. Two years later, counsel Ms. Brown and Mr. Weintraub falsely submitted in the Supreme Court of British Columbia that all of the 347 factual allegations were unacceptable. The Honourable Mr. Justice Ball assumed the credibility of both counsel but pleadings cannot be struck on the ground of credibility between the parties, without applying the “plain and obvious” test, or any test.

  6. Earlier, during the appeal of Madam Justice Donegan’s Oral Reasons, the 3-justice division of the Court of Appeal of BC heard my facts and arguments in about 30 minutes but did not want to hear the submissions of the two Crown counsel (who were obviously unable to answer the 20 to 60 serious question of law or yield any valid argument or evidence for defence). Thus, the torts and the lack of their defence could not end up in any court record. After hearing me, the justices simply jumped up and left the courtroom. In ten minutes, they returned and pronounced their decision against me. Although one of them may have had a headache, a dental appointment, or his child’s wedding party, they made a procedural error in the conduct of the hearing. I should have complained at the Canadian Judicial Council against their conduct but I have never did that. I still trust in the possibility that one day the courts of BC would be able to solve these issues by a civilized way.)

  7. At least four Crown counsel, including Ms. Bridges, have habitually disobeyed many sections Federal Courts Rules regarding proper pleading and disclosure. She has mislead the Supreme Court of Canada by falsely submitting on June 18, 2012 in writing that Z.A. Simon’s complaints had been against the Government of British Columbia and not that of Canada, although the FCA’s court order a few months earlier clearly confirmed the Federal Court’s jurisdiction in the matters.

  8. Counsel representing the AGC and the CRA has never made any disclosure at any court: an indicia of lack of respect towards the courts and Parliament’s will.

  9. Counsel representing the AGC and AGBC as respondents, repeatedly failed to obey the filing deadlines in the past. Counsel to the AGC, Ms. Alison Brown, served and filed her responses with an unexplained delay of two weeks in 2014 and in 2017 while Mr. Witten (Counsel to the AGBC) delayedby a month in 2014, without any explanation. The BC court registries always accepted their documents but often did not accept the appellant’s proper documents for filing and failed to inform him in time about the orders, resulting in unfair or tainted court procedures.

  10. Due the recurring procedural torts of the Edmonton Registry’s administrators in or about 2012, Z.A. Simon had to defend himself by motions. The Registry returned him some of them unfiled. Once the Registry cut out dozens of pages from his documents by a sharp tool despite the rule and practice of striking out pages or paragraphs following a court order by simply crossing them out by straight lines.

  11. One of Z.A. Simon’s motions was the result of the Registry’s refusal to file his document, allegedly filed and served lately. The following court order of the Honourable Justice Evans was to his favour and against the Registry by stating that the days of the Christmas recess shall not be reckoned when calculating the deadline, pursuant to subsection 6 (3) of the Rules.   

  12. Following Z.A. Simon’s Notice to Admit, Ms. Brown (Counsel to the AGC) admitted in writing in the fall of 2014 that the word “contract” of the family class sponsors appeared five times in the text of the federal CIC policy named IP 2. On the other hand, the IP 2 was false and fraudulent in order to mislead every public servant of Canada because the legislation contradicted such alleged contracts.

  13. On 3 July 2018, Ms. Bridges, Counsel to the AGC, served a Notice of Motion on the instant appellant. Thus, the appellant was pressed by the Rules to serve and file a Responding Motion to her motion within ten days. It meant extreme mental pressure for a self-represented litigant. In our case, the Crown served the notice of motion on the appellant on July 4 but did not file it in the Registry of the Federal Court of Appeal, as I learned if from Registry Officer Joshua Breeze 3 days ago. Such confusing and controversial manoeuver cannot be called good faith litigation.

  14. It seems that the continuous and cruel mental or psychological warfare of the Crown and its counsel to ruin the innocent victim has no limits since 2012. My only “crime” has been my stubborn faith and reliance on the laws of Canada, falsely depicted by Counsel as I exhibited “vexatious behaviour” in the courts.

         

PART II – A statement of the points in issue

  1. If, in practice, a single justice can declare Zoltan Andrew Simon a vexatious litigant by a preliminary decision following a motion but the Act prescribes that only a division of the Federal Court of Appeal consisting of no less than three judges shall deliver it as a final judgment after hearing an application of the moving party, should the moving party be rewarded by costs for doing that improperly, not following the laws but creating an unnecessary and, therefore, abusive procedural step? [I.e., applications must be heard before at least three justices while motions may be heard by a single justice.] Counsel knows that the Crown has no evidence and legislative justification for its money extortion tort.  

  2. If it is plain and obvious that the moving party at bar cannot fulfill the conditions of the established tests while acting oppressively (because it cannot produce any legislative or factual ground to support its sweeping or untrue allegations and “fishing expeditions”). It is the Crown’s abuse of process to initiate such futile procedure which would obviously be appealed by the self-represented litigant to a division of three justices in any case so a preliminary judgment would be wasted energy of a justice. It could not save the Crown and would not punish the appellant because no order could declare a party vexatious retroactively: the fact that a valid appeal is on file would remain. Counsel is asking favourss that the Court cannot do: to issue a combined order that both declares the appellant a vexatious litigant AND terminate his appeal for good, in a single step. Counsel presses the Court to contravene the Act, the Rules, and the clear Order of Madam Justice Gleason. 

  3. Is it procedural fairness if a counsel arbitrarily interrupts a properly brought appeal proceeding in the Federal Court of Appeal in an advanced stage that was flowing according the Rules and the Act but she is unable to substantiate her sweeping allegations by legislation, court order, common law authority, or any supporting evidence while all those support the accused – allegedly a vexatious – litigant? [The proper time to bring a motion for such order to declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant should have been brought in the Federal Court in January 2018.]

  4. Is a single justice able to review meaningfully within an hour, the ten court cases in which Z.A. Simon was a party, when the Crown is unwilling and unable to pinpoint the exact paragraphs in the prior, allegedly final, judgments or reasons revealing any alleged substantive decision in light of section 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act? [I.e., “final judgment means any judgment or other decision that determines in whole or in part any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in any judicial proceeding; (jugement définitif)”].  

  5. Since the Rules clearly distinguish between motions and applications, because Part 7 deals with motions and Part 5 with applications in, also under its section 300 (b), is it acceptable and lawful to assume that motions are always equivalent with applications, so it is the free decision of any party which alternative to choose? [Of course, a Court may skip this question in unique cases where the abusive behaviour of a party is obvious for an informed right-thinking person at the first glance which is not the case here.]    

  6. Does 40 (1) of the Federal Courts Act contain an error of the legislators because the words “on application” shall be construed as “on motion”? Section 40 (1) goes: “If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court.” 

  7. If section 2 (under “Court”) the Rules states, “(a) the Federal Court of Appeal, including, in respect of a motion, a single judge of that court…”, does it mean that any party or person, including Ms. Bridges, is free to get a final order issued by a single justice that could declare a person a vexatious litigant despite that every application must be heard by a three-Justice panel of the FCA?

  8. Is section 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act wrong or contains an error when it states, “final judgment means any judgment or other decision that determines in whole or in part any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in any judicial proceeding; (jugement définitif)”? Note: this is consistent with the wording of the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas in para. [5] of Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 (CanLII), “In the case of final determinations of applications for leave to appeal, applications for judicial review, appeals and references, the Court must be comprised of no less than three justices. This includes motions that result in final determinations. See Federal Courts Act, section 16.”[Emphasis added.];

  9. If the Crown is only seeking a preliminary determination now (with the strategic assumption that it would become final by the passing of time or by the death of Z.A. Simon) while the latter appellant is seeking a clear final determination now, which approach would constitute an abuse of process from the Federal Court of Appeal’s point of view? What is the legit purpose of a preliminary order only?

  10. If there is no error in section 2 (1) of the Act, is Ms. Bridges correct in assuming that every past judgment related to Z.A. Simon has been a final judgment despite the fact that she has no evidence supporting such false claim? (The appellant can easily prove that NO prior court decision has determined in whole or in part any substantive right between any Crown party and the instant appellant.) 

  11. Is it plain and obvious that a party has been vexatious in a special situation – like the appellant before this Honourable Court – if no final judgment exists that had determined any right regarding the only or main subject of the appellant’s Application for judicial review of December 2017 regarding the mysterious fate or disappearance of his $3,441.68 credit amount in the CRA?

  12. If Ms. Bridges and Mr. Justice Manson have been allowed to apply the “gap rule” (contrary to the Act and the Rules) by reference to a very special and very different case, in order to strike out Z.A. Simon’s Application for judicial review in the Federal Court, is Z.A. Simon allowed to request the Court to apply the same “gap rule” and strike out Ms. Bridges’ upcoming motion or application on the same grounds of “gap rule”, namely section 19 of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996?

  13. Is a fatally defective Notice of Motion and Motion Record issued by Counsel to the AGC acceptable without containing the written consent of the Attorney General of Canada, contravening subsection 40 (2) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7”? [I.e., “An application under subsection (1) may be made only with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, who is entitled to be heard on the application and on any application made under subsection (3).]

  14. If subsection 40 (2) of the Act is valid, so the Crown needs to file a motion to amend, but ss. 76(a) and (b) are not applicable, while granting an amendment would result in prejudice to the appellant that cannot be compensable by costs or by the unnecessary delay, should the Court grant amendment in order to make a strategic, unlawful, openly oppressive and abusive procedural step in bad faith?

  15. Can the Court easily visualize the materialization of Ms. Bridges’ wishes such as the (impracticable) combination of a hearing by a single justice and the hearing of a 3-justice division within the same hour and in the same court room, dealing with totally independent subject issues?  

     

PART III – A concise statement of submissions

  1. In Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), a division of three justices of the Federal Court of Appeal delivered an unanimous judgment not too pleasant for the Crown by stating: in para. [12] “There is no suggestion that any garnishment order issued from a court of competent jurisdiction.  … The propriety of the Canada Revenue Agency’s treatment of monies otherwise owing to Mr. Simon unquestionably falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Courtthe Federal Court erred in law by concluding that none of the matters complained of by Mr. Simon fell within its jurisdiction.” [Emphasis added.] That Court, in paras. [20] and [21] added that he had an option to proceed by a “notice of application seeking judicial review”. There was no deadline specified for such step. After Registrar Mr. Roger Bilodeau blocked his three appeals in the SCC unlawfully, Z.A. Simon acted accordingly, properly, and within the prescribed lawful limitation period, when he filed his Notice of Application for judicial review in the Federal Court against the tribunal (CRA) in December 2017.

  2. The Honourable Madam Justice Snider, in para. [11] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FC 582 (CanLII), confirmed the relevant factual finding of the FCA and correctly stated the fact that “the actual garnishment was made by the Defendant” (Canada).

  3. The triple test in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida is satisfied.

  4. In most of Z.A. Simon’s court cases the judges involved ignored the governing landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII), and sometimes misinterpreted those specific factual findings of the FCA, referred to above, thinking that the actual garnishment has been made by a ministry of British Columbia so there was no claim against Canada. Those judges (justices Donegan, Ball, and Manson, or Prothonotary Aylen) have never got the full opportunity to see the complete picture: they have been pressed to deliver quick decisions after short hearings (25 minutes to 2 hours) in order to save court time. None of them had sufficient time to examine the issues on their merits or to apply the governing “plain and obvious” test to strike pleadings. None of them was able to pinpoint any “incurable defect” in Z.A. Simon’s pleadings. Their approach was always to copy or echo the decisions of the prior decision-makers, except the SCC and FCA, and to accept the false or misleading submissions of counsel (Ms. Bridges, Mr. Benkendorf, Mr. Witten, Ms. Brown, and Mr. Weintraub), resulting in a domino effect or avalanche.

  5. Those counsel simply submitted a very long list of unfounded sweeping allegations against Z.A. Simon that constituted “fishing expeditions.” They have never been able to substantiate those sweeping allegations because they had no evidence supporting them, and the courts have no time to examine them. Usually they just copied a plethora of complaints such as: Z.A. Simon’s pleadings are frivolous, vexatious, scandalous, unnecessary, an abuse of process, it is hard if not impossible to understand them, etc.

  6. Once I stated in my pleadings that I could explain in Spanish to a shaman of the Jívaro Indians living in the jungles of Ecuador and Peru the basic issue of my legal fight against the Crown’s tortfeasors, and the shaman would get the picture. Since the Jívaro Indians shrink the heads or skulls of their captured enemies, counsel finally ended to compare my allegedly unintelligible submissions to the confusing wording used in Kisikawpimootewin v. Canada, 2004 FC 1426 (CanLII). 

  7. The Honurable Justices Donegan and Ball, both within the Supreme Court of BC, disobeyed the rules of “stare decisis” in questions of “res judicata”. Their Court of Appeal clearly stated in para. [10] of International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII): “Rule 9-5 is concerned only with the sufficiency of pleadings. It provides in subrule (1) that the court may strike or amend any pleading, in whole or in part. Subrule (2) prohibits the filing of evidence on an application under subrule 1(a). An order striking a pleading could not be the basis for a res judicata defence in subsequent proceedings.” [Emphasis added.] Mr. Justice Ball considered the Reasons of Madam Justice Donegan as the only or main governing common law for him, and displayed zero respect towards the most relevant order of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011] case. The “Reasons” (not an order) of his colleague and good friend working in the same court district overruled the governing order of the SCC. The “tail is wagging the dog” symptom is getting more and more common in Canada.

  8. In 2015, the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan was unable to point out any incurable of fatal defect in my pleadings. Her Reasons include my worst errors as follow: sections of the Criminal Code cannot be referred to in civil proceedings, I “attacked” several ambassadors and my ex-wives, it was an abuse of process to suggest that damages and the length of imprisonment terms may be related to each other or a conversion between them may be considered. (A year later, The Honourable Chief Justice Hinkson applied the same “abuse of process” in Henry v. British Columbia, 2016 BCSC 2082 (CanLII), in connection with a “compensation for a wrongful conviction and some 27 years of incarceration.”) 

  9. It is not plain and obvious that C.J. Hinkson was wrong and Madam Justice Donegan was right. As for my alleged “attack” on several ambassadors, I only wrote in my statement of claim that I had contacted several ambassadors about the possibility to apply for political asylum as a Canadian citizen there so my family’s reunification may be granted in another country. (No country needed Canadian refugees.) Ambassadors are free not to answer letters so the fact in my pleadings was not an “attack” on the ambassadors. [Thus, a slight difference between the dialects or vernaculars used by a BC judge and a “new” immigrant may have caused one of the fatal misunderstandings that escalated into the Crown’s bizarre claim about the alleged vexatious nature of the appellant.] She held that one of Z.A. Simon’s errors was his reference to the laws of King Hammurabi (1848-1805 BCE) stating that a person was not responsible for a debt created by his spouse. If no country has successfully challenged that law for four millennia, my question of law was not vexatious: Canada (the CIC and the CRA) must come up with some explanation why to disregard or disobey that old and accepted international law.

  10. Both Madam Justice Donegan and Mr. Justice Ball stated that my pleadings contained 20 to 60 possible causes of action but neither of them examined sixty causes of action, only a few of them superficially. No judge of the world is able to examine 60 causes of action with serious issues of law or arguable questions in 30 or 60 minutes within a preliminary hearing to strike out a notice of claim. No court has ever examined those sixty – now at least seventy – causes of action. 

  11. The same is the situation with my 78 constitutional questions on file. The Honourable Mr. Justice Manson, who conducted the hearing in a friendly, polite and exemplary way (contrary to Mr. Justice Ball who was excellent but seemed tired and angry at the end of a long and exhausting day (I felt that he sometimes shouted at me). He simply expressed that the previous Court has already dealt with those 78 questions. Judges should not assume facts without any foundation or examination. In reality, no judge has ever dealt with those 78 constitutional questions. (Of course, justices of the Federal Court would have been able to answer all or most of those questions but they were not allowed to do so, or maybe were afraid to do so). Mr. Justice Ball declared me a vexatious litigant by the violation of section 18 of the Supreme Court Act: he was satisfied that I had habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in the Supreme Court or in the Provincial Court of BC despite that only a single order contained my name in BC, against Ms. Lipsack (2009). Ms. Justice Donegan has never issued me an order, only Oral Reasons (as CanLII shows it). Volume II of the Crown’s Motion Record cites her text, without mentioning this key fact.

  12. As for my previous case in the Federal Court (Simon v. Canada, 2016 FC 976 (CanLII) and its attempted appeal in the Federal Court of Appeal, it happened through procedural unfairness as follow in a nutshell: I had been blocked because allegedly a Prothonotary’s judgment must have been appealed within 10 days, pursuant to Rule 51 that allegedly overruled subsection 27 (2) (b) of the Federal Courts Act. The Crown knew that I would be visiting my wife in China (whom Canada forcefully separated from me since February 2007) in December 2016. Then a judgment was issued on the ground that the days of the Christmas recess must have been included into the reckoning of time, so my application for extension of time was refused. Section 6 (3) of the Rules and case law precedents including FCA decisions always maintained that the days of the Christmas recess should not be included into the computation. Finally, I served and filed an Application for Leave to Appeal to the FCA but a single judge dismissed it unconstitutionally: applications for leave to appeal must be heard by a division of no less than three judges. A single justice would act beyond his or her jurisdiction. 

  13. Within that procedural nightmare, one of the FCA’s finest judges referred to the governing decision regarding the timely appeal of prothonotaries’ orders as the Vaughan v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 15069 (FC) case. However, near the end of that cited judgment, the Court stated that prothonotaries were not members of the court and their decisions were not the decisions of the court. Thus, one cannot claim that I have abused the court process because Prothonotary Aylen made her decision against me as a private person so her decision was not valid without the signature of a judge. (The Crown assumes that prothonotaries constitute a “Court” if that is good for their case but they are not the Court if that serves the Crown’s case. Such an on and off qualification of prothonotaries is a procedural tort and error in law.)            

  14. My “issues” were related to my wife’s immigration and have never been properly before any justice, only the “issues” submitted by the lawyers of the Crown: The only issue was whether Z.A. Simon’s pleadings should be struck out in part or in full, with or without allowing him to submit amended documents, or whether his submissions constituted an abuse of process. Also, since 2011 or 2012, the issues of the appellant were not the same and never been heard by any court on its merits, only the Crown’s issues in preliminary hearings to strike out his documents.

  15. None of the prior decision-makers have made any final judgment as defined by section 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act: their “decisions” referred always to procedural and preliminary issues. They often included an alleged error or defect in my pleadings, namely that my statement has never been “concise”. However, no legislation or common law has ever defined the meaning of the word “concise” with certainty: there are “concise” dictionaries that contain hundreds of pages.    

  16. So far, since 2000,  the Crown or/and its representatives, including several counsel, have been unable to produce any photocopy of a ministerial (debt) certificate of Z.A. Simon that is a pre-requisite for any garnishment or seizure by the CRA.

  17. Ms. Bridges is heavily relying on the decision in Canada (National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc., 2013 FCA 250 (CanLII), assuming that the FCA’s judgment can be extrapolated endlessly beyond recognition in any other court case based on the “gap rule.” The honourable justices of the FCA in that case showed no intention to end the rule of law in Canada by the stroke of a pen or a keyboard. They did not declare that their decision shall apply in every different situation which have no resemblance to the circumstances that existed in theirs. 

  18. The recent Notice of Motion and Motion Record drafted by Ms. Bridges suffer from several incurable defects. They constitute an abuse of process and abuse of power. Thus, the appellant’s respectful position is that it cannot be filed in the present form, or, in any form. In short, there is no lawyer or wizard under the sun – except Ms. Bridges – who feels that her 108 (!) “magic” but empty words above her signature, without any substantiation, would convince an open-minded judge.

  19. The appellant respectfully submits that, as a sloppy submission that disobeys several rules, Counsel’s motion should be struck out without right to amend. It has no skeleton or evidence, only sweeping or false allegations. The Affidavit of C. Ewanchyshyn does not claim and cannot claim that all or any of the six court cases of Z.A. Simon listed actually have ended with a final judgment or even an order.

  20. Ms. Bridges seems to misunderstand many provisions of the Federal Courts Act and the Rules and the role of the Federal Court of Appeal. She is pressing the justices of the FCA to do something unique and unlawful. The legislation is silent of a preliminary dismissal of an appeal within a motion. Her motion is improper and bereft of any chance of success, mixing apples and oranges, relying on the false hope that her volumes may end up in the hands of a justice that has zero respect towards the laws of Canada and the relevant SCC or FCA orders.  

  21. The appellant relies on the correct decision and reasoning of the Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas in para. [5] of Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 (CanLII) as follows: “In the case of final determinations of applications for leave to appeal, applications for judicial review, appeals and references, the Court must be comprised of no less than three justices. This includes motions that result in final determinations. See Federal Courts Act, section 16. [emphasis added]. 

  22. Ms. Bridges cannot refer to any case law precedent in which a single justice of the FCA made a double order containing a declaration that someone was a vexatious litigant AND, at the same time, another order preliminarily dismissing the appeal of the same party on the merits. Only a panel of three or five justices have such power for the final determination of an appeal in the FCA.

  23. The Notice of Motion of Ms. Bridges is improper because it excludes the written consent of the Attorney General of Canada and by that failure it disobeys the clear obligation expressed in subsection 40 (2) of the Federal Courts Act

  24. Ms. Bridges expects the FCA to get an order declaring the appellant a vexatious litigant in the Federal Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and perhaps in every court of the world. (She is not specifying the territorial or jurisdictional extent of such wishful declaration.)

  25. Of course, Ms. Bridges is free to request the Court on a motion that Z.A. Simon to be punished by death or imprisonment for life, for having been vexatious by bringing his last motion to request that the Court determine the content of the appeal book (because she has remained silent), or for a direction to accept his documents in an electronic form for filing on a CD as stipulated by the Rules. If she does not need to support her false allegations in her motion and she can succeed she could do the same trick and send the appellant to prison without any evidence.

  26. Section 52 of the Act states: “The Federal Court of Appeal may (a) quash proceedings in cases brought before it in which it has no jurisdiction or whenever those proceedings are not taken in good faith…” [Emphasis added.] Such situation truly applies here. It appears that the habitual bad faith strategy of Ms. Bridges would offend the conscience of reasonable right-thinking persons or open-minded and informed outsiders so it would bring the judges and AGC in disrepute.

  27. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC) stated, “Procedure cannot govern substance ‑‑ an order so erroneous that it results in a fundamentally flawed trial process cannot be allowed to stand.” Our situation is similar, except that Z.A. Simon became the victim of a long psychological or mental warfare of an endless procedural tort. Even a novice judge with no experience would be able to make an objective and impartial decision in this very simple case: whether or not CRA is allowed to snatch the credit monies of any Canadian without the involvement of any court. No judge has been allowed to hear that issue on its merits. This is a result of the Crown’s cruel and bad faith manipulation since 2012, through the stubborn silence of its counsel before any court. However, Ms. Smith, Counsel to the AGC, in her earlier admission before the courts of British Columbia, admitted in writing that the federal policy named IP 2 contained five times a reference to a contract of the sponsors in the family class. Such contract does not appear in any legislation like the IRPA or its Regulations: it is there to mislead every public servant and create a false belief in the ministries that the sponsors have an obligation based on their contracts.

  28. Ms. Bridges and many other counsel routinely disobeyed the rules of pleadings. Their arguments are inconsistent with their earlier arguments in prior pleadings. Ms. Bridges claimed that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction in the case while Mr. Sinnott – another counsel to the AGC – claims that the Tax Court of Canada has no jurisdiction in the same case. One of them is not telling the truth because either the Tax Court or the Federal Court has the jurisdiction. There is no third court between those two courts. Two counsel, both representing the AGC, blow hot and cold at the same time. The courts do not like such inconsistency. 

  29. It is crystal clear – for an impartial justice who would get more than an hour to study these controversies of law and policy – that Ms. Bridges is simply unable to come up with any evidence or reasonable explanation for the missing ministerial certificate. As her only solution, she is pressuring the appellant to deal with dozens of sweeping allegations that she is unable to express, substantiate, or support by any law or evidence. This is clearly bad faith pleading or procedure on her behalf.

  30. The appellant habitually, consistently and stubbornly, without remorse, kept protecting for a decade the rule of law in Canada and the prescribed powers of the nine-justice division of the Supreme Court of Canada with its governing decisions, from the manoeuvres of a few honourable tortfeasors of high rank, including Mr. Bilodeau and three federal ministers of the Harper regime. Z.A. Simon may deserve a cruel or unusual punishment for that, according to Counsel, who submitted a false and/or misleading statement on 18 June 2012 in the Supreme Court of Canada against the instant appellant. She falsely alleged that the [Federal] Courts had had no jurisdiction in the case because Z.A. Simon’s complaints were aimed only against British Columbia, not Canada. Those floodgates of abuse of power have been opened by Ms. Bridges who is now accusing the instant appellant of having been vexatious or abusive. Had she submitted a somewhat true statement for the SCC, admitting that Z.A. Simon had his claims only against the Government of Canada, the three-justice panel court could have resolved the controversy properly, with no costs for any court. The SCC’s 3-Justice division received about 1,000 applications for leave yearly and had no means to read through each file, some of them containing thousands of pages. Ms. Bridges had calculated with this fact and had mislead the SCC judges by a bath faith design. 

  31. The approach of Ms. Bridges is purely strategic. She is smart and understands that the instant appellant is the only Canadian who tries to find a solution for the protection of the – perhaps 1,000 – broken families. Those have been the victims of an ambitious and cruel money extortion scheme: the Genius of the Nation has decided to cut corners and streamline everything, starting with the IRPA. His three ministers raised two unlawful policies (MoU and IP 2) above the law, misinterpreted the IRPA and its Regulations,and degenerated them into a cruel money extortion scheme against hundreds of innocent re-victimized sponsors in the family class. The Liberal government has inherited this mess but to keep that “soft fascism” of Mr. Harper does not seem reasonable. Of course, Ms. Bridges, perhaps an avid supporter of Mr. Harper, has the right to keep serving the interests of the Harpies and reduce the popularity of Prime Minister Trudeau. But, after all, the whole Canadian nation would suffer for her choice on the long run because the destruction of the sponsors in the family class would contribute to the shortage of good immigrants in the family class. Canada needs those ideal immigrants – instead of broken families – in order to pay the future bills and pension benefits of our middle and upper classes.

  32. After all, the instant motion that Ms. Bridges created would serve mainly a collateral and improper purpose as follows. The Crown and its lawyers have gained a great power for the ministers by unconstitutional means. Every “loss” of Z.A. Simon immediately appears as the victory of the Crown tortfeasors. If a division of three FCA judges are not allowed to hear this very simple case, the Crown would interpret such silence as “Mr. Simon had several court cases, claiming that the Crown had no right to garnishee Canadians without a lawful procedure in a court. He has always lost his cases which indicates that the courts of Canada allow the CRA to seize monies from any Canadian without the involvement of any court.” [Thus, CRA could get the Courts’ approval by a case law precedent to seize the monies of anyone including politicians, judges or administrators of any court.] 

  33. One typical example for this “success” of the Crown tortfeasors is related to the verdict of the Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer that cannot be found by a search on www.canlii.org. Its appeal appears on that website as Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII).  Its subject matter includes “a possible future administrative decision that could be subject to a review procedure; allegations regarding hypothetical decisions do not disclose a reasonable cause of action.” (Counsel seems to submit that the subject of that FCA verdict was the same as in the instant appeal at bar regarding the debated ownership of the 3,441.68 dollars.) As for the “Tremblay-Lamer Principle” (since I cannot find a better brief name for it), could it be applied universally in any case? The FCA has approved her reasoning and order. Thus, any Registrar, the Chief Administrator, or the Chief Justice of any court in any province may place the following policy on the Court’s advertising board openly in writing: “If you would file any document or sign any judgment that could hurt the Crown financially, you may immediately lose your future retirement benefits and bonuses, including severance pay, etc.” The person issuing that document would simply refer to the FCA’s approval of the Tremblay-Lamer Principle: no one, not even a judge or a prothonotary, would be able to challenge the FCA order (that has been appealed but the appeal got stuck on Mr. Roger Bilodeau’s desk forever). Now every Canadian must accept the common law that a “hypothetical future administrative decision” cannot be challenged in any court. (The AGC should be thankful for my involvement.)

  34. I “lost” its appeal in the FCA and Court wrote in para. [14]: “…To the extent that the judge did not consider the possibility that the individuals were being sued in their official as well as their personal capacities, which was evident from the style of cause, this constitutes an error on the part of the judge…” [Emphasis added.]

  35. Counsel says that the appellant took “unsuccessful appeals”. There is no clear definition of “loss” or “success” in law. Courts sometimes order the successful party to pay the costs of the “losing” party, etc. I have succeeded in some courts regarding the substance while the Crown often succeeded only procedurally. It is truly amazing for me, for the glory and integrity of the justices involved since 2007, that none of them has delivered a judgment that granted any substantive right to the Crown in my disputes protecting the SCC, FCA, and the rule of law. 

  36. Say, the favourite hockey team of a judge lost the three previous games in a row because the management of the arena did not let the team in the building at the proper time and the team ended up disqualified three times. Now, for the fourth game, they play at home and they want to start to play. The referee would declare, “You guys have lost three games in a row, so it would be a waste of time for everybody, and an abuse of process, if I would let you play today. I cannot do that. You are only entitled to one bite at the cherry and one kick at the can. You are disqualified.” (Would an average Canadian judge find such rush decision fair?)     

  37. The preliminary procedural rulings of the previous courts emphasized that Z.A. Simon’s actions have never disclosed a viable cause of action. Now, if all those courts have been correct and the previous pleadings of Z.A. Simon have never revealed a good cause of action but the instant claim at bar does contain a viable cause of action – the missing $3,441.68 – no reasonable person can claim that the instant procedure contains refers to the same cause of action. (Zero is not equal to $3,441.68. “No cause of action” is not “the same” as a “cause of action.” Also, the Crown fails most of the conditions for the test set out in Danyluk and in many similar decisions regarding abuse of process or res judicata.

  38. In para. [21] of R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] 3 SCR 45, 2011 SCC 42 (CanLII), the SCC wrote: “Valuable as it is, the motion to strike is a tool that must be used with care.  The law is not static and unchanging. Actions that yesterday were deemed hopeless may tomorrow succeed. Before Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) introduced a general duty of care to one’s neighbour premised on foreseeability, few would have predicted that, absent a contractual relationship, a bottling company could be held liable for physical injury and emotional trauma resulting from a snail in a bottle of ginger beer.” Madam Justice Donegan referred to this successful claim in her Oral Reasons. She is a free person and may have her opinion that a claim with 20 to 60 causes of action or serious questions of law, supported by dozens of sections of the legislation (Parliament’s will) and the SCC’s decisions in Mavi and Markevich have much less, or zero, chance to succeed in the courts than the claim of a person who suffered emotional trauma when saw the snail in a bottle of ginger ale. I do not think that her priorities are identical with those of Canada’s best justices. (Canada had maybe the world’s best justice system when I immigrated here in 1976.)

  39. Madame Justice Donegan has issued only Oral Reasons without any order. Reasons for an Order without an order is not an order. Would judges or prothonotaries, after purchasing a Mercedes-Benz car, accept the “four tires for your car” as the “car” itself? No way, they would sue the dealership immediately. 

  40. A last word is about the Crown’s “beautification” of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The date and the name of the “beautifier” is unknown for me. There is no indication in the legislation that Parliament has approved such streamlining or beautification. My bilingual copy of the Charter and the Constitution Act, 1982 show “Proceedings in criminal and penal matters” on the margin at section 11 (b) of the Charter. The Interpretation Act clearly states that marginal notes are not part of the enactments, they serve only as information. The person who decided to beautify the Charter placed all marginal notes into the preambles or headings of the sections of the enactments. Doing this trick, the informative but powerless marginal notes became vital and organic parts of our Constitution. Justices that do not have the original bilingual version of the Charter and rely only on the Internet get the impression that the Charter’s wording regarding the right “to be tried within a reasonable time” only refers to criminals or accused persons, but innocent victims do not have a right to be tried within a reasonable time: that is the privilege of the criminals. But then such discrimination contradicts section 15 of the Charter in which every Canadian, whether innocent or criminal, should be equal before the courts. 

  41. Therefore, the appellant respectfully submits that he has a Charter right to be heard a.s.a.p. on the merits of this very simple seizure case, shortly after the Court’s consideration of the Crown’s bad faith submission asking for an order for declaring me a vexatious litigant. Judges cannot become meteorologists who guess about the outcome of rare and new cases. Ms. Bridges submits that the appellant has zero chance to succeed (since Canada/FCA does not have two judges who respect the legislation and common law including the relevant orders of the Supreme Court of Canada). Should that be the case, our country would not need so many weak judges, only prothonotaries and registrars who could stop any procedure, and perhaps a single judge in every major city who would simply rubber-stamp the ministers’ unconstitutional policies. The Genius of the Nation, since 2006, placed the country’s administrators above the courts: the administrators, controlled by the ministers, can refuse the filing of any document so the justices cannot see the full picture. Exactly this procedural unfairness happened to me and the Honourable Mr. Justice Manson. (Perhaps a judge told to an administrator of the Registry, “This document gives me a headache. Maybe I cannot deliver a judgment that would satisfy the expectations. It would be better not to file it.” Then the administrator may have interpreted the judge’s words as the document’s filing was not allowed by the court. There is no entry with the name of the justice who has allegedly denied the filing of my documents prescribed by the Rules.    

  42. The appellant disagrees with the cherry-picking of the administrators or some of their superiors who may terrorize them. The Rules or the Act does not give “green light” to any capricious motion that tries to block the normal flow of a procedural as prescribed by the Rules. There is no provision in them that would allow the Court or the officers of the Court to ignore the required procedural steps.

  43. Ms. Bridges is using her old strategy of “fishing expeditions” and sweeping allegations, in seven paragraphs (1, 2, a, b, c, d, and e) in her Notice of Motion that she sent me on 15 August 2018, under “The grounds of the motion are”. Those seven allegations are untrue and she has no means to prove such false allegations. 

  44. A brief reply to the sweeping or false allegations of Counsel’s Motion Record, Vol. 1, pages 1 to 2 (the 108 words!) can be offered here one by one as follows:

  45. The appeal has been brought properly and in a timely manner. A long list within this documents shows many authorities demonstrating that the Honourable Mr. Justice Manson seems to be wrong by guessing – without establishing any factual background – that the Tax Court of Canada had jurisdiction in our case instead of the Federal Court. The landmark decisions of the SCC and the FCA support the appellant’s position as well. 20 to 60 issues of law as possible causes of action, as cited from the decisions of the Honourable Madam Justice Donegan and Mr. Justice Ball, cannot be considered a lack of any cause of action. Not a single question of law in our list of 78 constitutional questions has even been answered which indicates that so far the Crown has not allowed our federal judges to address them. [It does not indicate that those justices would be unable to answer any of such questions since Canada has or had perhaps the best judges of the world.];

  46. The Crown has got no evidence to support a false statement that “the Appellant exhibits vexatious behaviour.” Always obeying the court rules and forms or being polite and respectful to everyone in the courtrooms is not vexatious. A party fighting for his legitimate rights including Charter rights, plus the enforcement of two orders of the Supreme Court of Canada and a factual conclusion of the Federal Court of Appeal cannot be called vexatious;

  47. The Crown has no evidence to support the false statement of Ms. Bridges that is aimed to mislead the Court: she cannot cite a single paragraph of a single court order that has determined any substantive right between Z.A. Simon and the Crown. No final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction exists in light of section 2 (1) of the Federal Courts Act, “final judgment means any judgment or other decision that determines in whole or in part any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy in any judicial proceeding; (jugement définitif). Merely procedural rulings do not determine “any substantive right of any of the parties in controversy.” The controversy, namely the fate of Z.A. Simon’s credit amounts that CRA made disappear on 2 June 2008, has never been addressed by any court, let alone resolved by a court order. The several procedural rulings only indicate to an open-eyed observer that the justices involved have never had sufficient time to address to main issues within very brief preliminary hearings. Rather, an outsider would be impressed by the numerous decisions of many justices whose impartiality shines through the dark days of a dictatorship: none of those judges have delivered any final verdict that would take away my rights to the credit amount of $3,441.68 taken by seizure on 2 June 2008. [The appellant’s monies apparently simply disappeared because the CRA sent it to a ministry of BC, instead of his person.] All of the prior decisions have been interlocutory and not final

  48. Ms. Bridges depicts the judges of Canada in very dark colours by claiming that “no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief.” This is her key argument. Generally speaking, justices are reasonable persons who know and respect the laws of Canada, the rule of law, and common law or case law precedents. Most of our judges follow the principles of “stare decisis” and the “plain and obvious” test plus other tests. The AGC or her Counsel cannot declare that none of the reasonable judges in Canada respect the will of Parliament and the key decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. There is no place for such cynical approach in this country that would denigrate every justice. Rather, Canada would need two separate ministers: one to protect the Crown’s tortfeasors by all means, and another that could protect the rule of law. A single minister – the Minister of Justice and AGC – cannot represent both of those principles simultaneously, where her right hand would always need to fight her left hand. Her difficulty does not justify a miscarriage of justice in this appeal. Is it in the interests of justice to terminate the rule of law in Canada by this camouflaged Crown motion?

  49. Court cases have three main components: #1: judges; #2: parties; #3: issues of facts and law. In our case at bar, no court had the opportunity to examine the facts. (In the last SC BC case, the Crown disagreed on all alt the 347 material factual allegations of Z.A Simon but was unable to suggest different facts.) As the courts could not clarify the true facts in a few minutes, those remained in darkness. Thus, the decisive factor has always been the single judge involved, just like now. However, it is not “plain and obvious” that the FCA does not have at least two justices who respect the laws of Canada and the decisions of the SCC and the FCA. 

  50. Ms. Bridges apparently refers to an incomplete sentence taken from Lang Michener v. Fabian (1987) 1987 CanLII 172 (ON SC), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 685, where the Ontario High Court described the characteristics of a typical vexatious proceeding. One of the indicia is: “grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings.” One cannot say that this case has been wrongly decided, rather that the sentence is incomplete, taken out of context. It does not wish to repeat the words written in its first paragraph, namely “…which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.” In any case, the federal Court of Appeal is not bound by an incomplete sentence taken from a decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario. The principle of “stare decisis” does not apply here.

  51. Another paragraph of the Lang Michener case, supra, is: “actions brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment or oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights.” [Emphasis added.] I am fighting for assertion of my legitimate rights on the grounds of Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011], Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII), and the Court’s material factual finding in para. [12] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII). On the other hand, the Crown’s continuous abusive motions for a decade constitute a bad faith non-stop harassment by mental or psychological warfare to break the health of the appellant and punish his innocent family by a cruel money extortion scheme. It is a cruel and unusual punishment, unheard of in Canada, to destroy a self-represented litigant just because the AGC may be happy with a case law precedent allowing the Crown to seize the monies of any Canadian without a court’s involvement. Such improper and collateral motive of the Crown to have an innocent party declared a vexatious litigant constitute a section 8 and 12 Charter infringement that cannot be saved by its s. 1. Simply, pursuant to subsection 52. (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.” A Court should not and would not declare a person vexatious litigant on the ground of seven brief false statements: This improper Crown motion cannot substitute a proper defence. 

  52. Counsel cannot define the meaning of the word “unsuccessful.” The appellant has two orders of the Federal Court of Appeal that is against her position. The first one states a factual conclusion about the non-existence of a garnishing order in the court system. The other one states that the Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer made an error by not considering the acts or omissions of SCC Registrar Roger Bilodeau in his representative capacity. (But that shortcoming did not make a difference in a dictatorship if one reads between the lines, and judges are very good in reading between the lines of other judges, even in the case of silence.) The Crown has been unsuccessful in the last decisions in BC: none of the three judges granted the Crown’s demand to order the appellant to pay $11,000 as security for costs. His latest appeal is still pending so it cannot be called “unsuccessful”. 

  53. A few weeks ago the appellant received a letter from the Tax Court of Canada granting his request to put his appeal in abeyance until the decision of the FCA. [Ms. Bridges cannot call this the appellant’s lack of success.] The appellant was concerned that Madam Justice Gleason’s Order may put his appeal in the FCA “in the freezer” forever but the AGC or/and her Counsel proved to be fair now and did not wait for months idly. Thus, my (unfiled) Application and Motion served and submitted to the Registry in July 2018 have become obsolete and moot. 

  54. As for vexatious “guillotine orders”, a judge may have a daughter who is pregnant with daily abdominal pains. She would keep visiting her family doctor who is always in bad mood so he tells her that she is too fat and should eat less, also referring her to another physician with a warning note that she is a vexatious patient. The second doctor is always busy and overloaded. He treats the woman similarly. She goes to a third doctor who learns that she is an abusive and vexatious patient. After ten visits with each physician, no one has examined the woman thoroughly. A fourth doctor gets an ultrasound result and understands that the woman has been carried stillborn twins for a month, and she would die within a few hours. If doctors would keep using such draconic approach, this could happen. 

  55. Should this Honourable Court decide that the Order of Mr. Justice Manson can override the long list of authorities that decided the other way around, there would be a quick and economic solution as follows:

  56. The Federal Court of Appeal could issue an Order or Direction for the Tax Court of Canada that Z.A. Simon’s missing credit amount is an issue that exclusively belongs to the TCC and that Court must get a solution for it. (In such case some of the paragraphs of Z.A. Simon’s notice of appeal to the TCC may be struck out.)

  57. Returning to the last accusation of Ms. Bridges, the waste of the resources of the Courts at all levels is only partially true because so far Z.A. Simon had no meaningful access to justice in the Supreme Court of Canada. The “waste of resources” always happened when the “officers of the Court” (whether counsel or administrators of a Court) have abused their power, either by submitting false statements in order to mislead the courts, or, by refusing to file crucial documents of the appellant, and (more and more often) by creating procedural unfairness. Registries often do not want to hear about the Act or the Rules so the applicant cannot be rightfully punished by having been forced into a procedural cul-de-sac. After all, if courts themselves wish to waste their resources or let their administrators to do it, why should a party obeying the rules be always punished?

  58. In general, the principle set out in R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC) should apply: “Procedure cannot govern substance ‑‑ an order so erroneous that it results in a fundamentally flawed trial process cannot be allowed to stand.” Interlocutory steps may result in piecemeal judicial procedures at very important crossroads of Canadian law. (The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with such improper court practice in Litchfield, also the ON CA in Reynolds.)

  59. So far Z.A. Simon has been granted zero hours for his trials in any court. For comparison, some other court cases follow. In Tingley v. Wellington Insurance Company, 2010 NSCA 86 (CanLII), 118 days of court time is mentioned. In Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, 1976 CanLII 256 (BC CA), the trial took 396 court days until judgment was reserved. In R. v. Cominco Ltd., 1979 CanLII 1196 (AB QB), we find 150 days of court time, and 160 days in Nova, an Alberta Corp. v. Guelph Engineering Co., 1988 CanLII 3491 (AB QB). The trial took 16 months in R. v. Trudel, 2007 CanLII 413 (ON SC). Often a single family gets months of court time but if immigration and the future welfare of 36 million Canadians is at stake, no one seems to care.  

     

PART IV: A concise statement of the order sought, including any order for costs

  

  1. The instant appellant at bar respectfully seeks remedies from this Honourable Court as follow:

  2. An order or declaration stating that subsection 40 (2) of the Federal Courts Act refers three times to the word “application”, revealing the legislative intent of Parliament that the proper way to proceed is an application (and not a motion), containing the written consent of the Attorney General of Canada;

  3. An order or declaration that two very different complex issues cannot be decided together by a single judge, and the Act or the Rules do not allow such combination: to declare a person a vexatious litigant on a preliminary basis, AND dismiss an appeal on a preliminary basis, because the word “preliminary” is not in the relevant legislation (the Act and the Rules) and it cannot be “read in”;

  4. A declaration or order stating that, in harmony with para. [5] in Canada v. Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 (CanLII), a single judge has no jurisdiction to issue a final judgment in cases where the Act requires the serving and filing of an application under subsections 40 (1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Act;

  5. A declaration or order stating that using the improper form and / or an improper

    procedure without the required consent form signed by the AGC, and disobeying the Court’s Aug 2018 order constitutes an abuse of process on Counsel’s behalf;

  6. An order or direction that the vexatious litigant issue and the appeal shall be heard/decided separately, as the 17 July 2018 Order implies, because the appeal involves an extremely simple question of law about seizure of a small amount of money with interest, while the much more complex vexation litigant issue may need several days, if not weeks. The Court would need to look into a dozen of past court cases for factual support. Making bare assumptions of facts without any evidence would constitute a palpable and overriding error in any judgment; 

  7. A judgment, declaration or opinion stating that an application “via way of motion” is a motion, and not an application anymore; and since in section 2 of the Rules, “Court means … (a) the Federal Court of Appeal, including, in respect of a motion, a single judge of that court…” while, pursuant to section 16 (1) of the Act, every application for judicial review or reference to that court, shall be heard in that court before no fewer than three judges sitting together, subsections 1.1 (1) and (2) of the Rules would apply and the legislative requirements changed by a single judge would make the Rules defeat the Act, sections 8 and 12 of the Charter and section 12 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21. [I.e., “Every enactment is deemed remedial… ” Note: the Interpretation Act does not state that everything must be remedial only for tortfeasors or contraveners of the law, but never for their innocent victims that have always played by the rules of law.]

  8. A decision, statement or direction that the wording “No further steps shall be taken in this appeal until the respondent’s motion under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act is disposed of” in the Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Gleason has been expressed clearly, indicating that the upcoming Order or Reasons would “dispose of” the “vexatious motion” of the Respondent, after which “further steps” may be taken in the appeal procedure, pursuant to the Rules or the Act;

  9. Accordingly, a judgment, order or direction for the FCA Registry to accept the next document prescribed by the Rules, stating that the appellant’s appeal book to be accepted for filing if there is no other or different order of another Justice;

  10. In the alternative, a judgment that grants the parties at least 15 days from the date of the upcoming order, or rather the date when it becomes available for them, to serve and file the specified document(s) as the next step required by the Rules, just like in Fournier v. Canada (Public Service Commission), 2001 FCT 1169 (CanLII), in order to prevent further procedural chaos. [Note: About two inactive months have passed and the parties are still waiting for the decision of this Honourable Court to determine the contents of the appeal book.] 

  11. An order or direction, pursuant to section 317 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules, to instruct Crown or the Canada Revenue Agency to issue material, namely a notarized true photocopy of a ministerial certificate in the FC files referring to the alleged debt of Z.A. Simon that is in the possession of a tribunal (CRA);

  12. An order, if the Court is of the opinion that the “gap rule” is relevant in this case, stating that Rule 1-3 (1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 also applies in the Federal Court of Appeal: “The object of these Supreme Court Civil Rules is to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding on its merits”, also s. 19 of the Court of Appeal Act, RSBC 1996, c 77 applies: no appeal is defeated by irregularities;

  13. An order or direction for the Registrar and the parties to end this general procedural chaos,  also resume the regular application of the Rules, also specify the date for the serving and filing of the next document;

  14. An order or declaration, should Ms. Bridges or one of her superiors prohibit a three-justice division of the FCA to hear the case on its merits, that the instant responding motion of the appellant shall be considered a motion for leave to appeal a possible vexatious litigant order and leave is granted to appeal to a 3-Justice (or 5-Justice) division of the Federal Court of Appeal or/and to Supreme Court of Canada, pursuant to section 357 of the Rules;

  15. An order or declaration that the appeal of the instant appellant has been brought to the FCA in a timely manner and it is formally valid, so it would constitute an abuse of process to force him to file an application for leave to appeal because a potential or possible “vexatious litigant order” cannot apply retroactively; 

  16. An order or direction to the Registry, if a single justice would declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant, that an application (including for leave to appeal) can be commenced in the Federal Court of Appeal and it shall be accepted for filing, pursuant to subsection 382.2 of the Federal Courts Rules;

  17. An order, if the Registry would not make the upcoming potential vexatious order available for the appellant in a timely manner, the instant motion record shall be considered and serve as his Application for judicial review of administrative action under ss. 300(a) of the Rules automatically as a default appeal procedure;

  18. A declaration that the appellant cannot be responsible of any delay in filing late the next document prescribed by the Rules because so far he has not received any decision of the Court from the Registry whether the filing of documents on CDs are allowed or not in the Federal Court of Appeal;

  19. A judgment or order stating that the appellant’s situation is similar to that of the appellant in Coote v. Lawpro Professional Indemnity Company, 2013 FCA 246 (CanLII), and the correct principle of the Court is applicable in our case at bar, in order to prevent irreparable harm for the appellant if his case becomes frozen or paralyzed forever without a final judgment issued by this Honourable Court; 

  20. An opinion or consideration of the case of Mennes v. Canada, 2010 FCA 20 as a guideline where the FCA referred to “64 separate proceedings” of Mr. Mannes while Z.A. Simon had only a small fraction of that number; he is fighting for his legitimate rights in equity, for a mandamus and the enforcement of two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada (Mavi, 2011 and Markevich, 2003), reinforced by this Court’s factual findings in para. [12] of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6;

  21. A final order or judgment stating if Z.A. Simon is a vexatious litigant or not;

  22. A statement or declaration that parties simply trying to enforce the orders issued by the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal cannot be declared vexatious litigants per se in haste, without establishing first the true factual background and the applicable laws through a proper trial;

  23. An order in the nature of mandamus regarding the amount of $3,441.68 as requested in paragraph 3 on page 4 of my original Notice of Application filed on December 27, 2017 which – if enforceable – would render any further pleading unnecessary and an abuse of process on behalf of either party;

  24. In the alternative, a judgment ordering Counsel to the AGC for the production, within 15 days from the date of the order, of a certified document that is supposedly on file in the Federal Court showing the alleged debt of Z.A. Simon in the time period between 2000 and 2018;

  25. In the further alternative, a judgment specifying a date or the means (including teleconference or written representations) to hear and consider some of the 78 paragraphs filed in the appellant’s Notice of Constitutional Question(s); 

  26. If the Court would not receive such above mentioned certified document before issuing a judgment, an order pursuant to ss. 221 (1) of the Rules and s. 52 (a) of the Act ordering that the instant Notice of Motion and Motion Record of the Respondent (to strike out the current appeal and declare Z.A. Simon a vexatious litigant), be struck out or quashed, without leave to amend, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of motion, action or defence, is immaterial or redundant, is unnecessary*, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, it may prejudice, delay or prevent the fair trial of the appeal and the applications, it constitutes a departure from a previous pleadings conducted in the courts of B.C by two counsel representing the AGC, or/and is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. [*Note: Z.A. Simon would never come to any Court of the Federal Court System after his rights would become settled judicially];

  27. A judgment, opinion or recommendation communicated directly to Prime Minister Trudeau and the Honourable Minister and Attorney General of Canada to appoint another Counsel – whether Mr. Keelan Sinnott or another lawyer – who respects the laws of Canada, does not act routinely with the purpose of destruction or termination the rule of law in this country, and would not mislead routinely the courts by false or sweeping allegations that cannot be substantiated, in order to defend the tortfeasors of the previous government and undermine the positions and right immigration and other policies of the present Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice of Canada;

  28. A judgment granting public interest standing, on the grounds in Public Mobile Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 194 (CanLII);

  29. An order or direction for the Tax Court of Canada, if a division of the Federal Court of Appeal is not allowed to hear the appeal on its merits in the near future, that Z.A. Simon’s missing credit amount is an issue that exclusively belongs to the TCC and that Court must get a solution for it before the end of 2018;

  30. In the alternative, if a division of the Federal Court of Appeal is not allowed to hear the appeal on its merits in the near future, a written – not oral – final judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, granting leave to the Supreme Court of Canada under ss. 357(3) of the Rules, certified by the Registrar, pursuant to subsections 37.1 and 51 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26;

  31. An indication or direction of this Honourable Court to show in the upcoming judgment that it is either a final order, or only an interlocutory ruling;

  32. A direction for the Registry that a TD bank draft (#84661273) in the amount of $50 as filing fee for a motion, submitted to the Registry in mid-July as filing fee for Z.A. Simon’s application, to be returned him by the Registry because so far it has not been filed and it became moot by now;

  33. An order for costs in the amount between $500 and $1,200 payable forthwith by the vexatious Respondent to the Appellant;

  34. Any further remedy that this Honourable Court may find necessary or fair. 

All of this is respectfully submitted by Zoltan A. Simon on August 20, 2018.

  

_________________________________________________

(Zoltan Andrew SIMON, appellant, self-represented litigant)

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

No active telephone number,        FAX: (403) 341-3300.

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com     URL: www.correctingworldhistory.com

 

TO: The Attorney General of Canada, C/o

Ms. Wendy Bridges or/and Mr. Keelan Sinnott, Counsel

Department of Justice Canada, Edmonton Regional Office,

EPCOR Tower   300, 10423 – 101 Street, Edmonton, AB   T5H 0E7

Telephone: (780) 495-7801   Fax: (780) 495-3319

 

PART V – A list of the authorities to be referred to (SEE APPENDIX B as

            Volume 2 for their reproduced texts. Please note that the asterisks *

           at the front indicates incomplete photocopies of the case law text.)

 

Austen v. Forbes Leasing Ltd., 2006 NSCA 25 (CanLII).............................................. 173

Barejo Holdings ULC v. The Queen, 2015 TCC 274 (CanLII)........................................ 177

Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC).................................................. 183

Campbell v. Electoral Canada, 2008 FC 1080 (CanLII).............................................. 189

Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII)...................199

 

VOLUME 2 from here:

Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 SCR 585................... 1

Canada (Minister of National Revenue) v. Millette, 2002 FCT 433 (CanLII).................... 25

Canada v. McKay, 2009 FCA 43 (CanLII).............................................................. 29

Canadian Pacific Ltd. V. Matsqui Indian Band,[1993] 2 FCR 641, 1993 CanLII 2952 (FCA)... 33

Carroll v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 287 (CanLII)..................................... 39

Chand v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 2009 BCCA 559 (CanLII)................ 57

Colburne v. Frank, 1995 CanLII 4237 (NS CA)....................................................... 69

Coote v. Lawpro Professional Indemnity Company, 2013 FCA 246 (CanLII).................... 77

Cornelson v Alliance Pipeline Ltd, 2015 ABCA 272 (CanLII)...................................... 81

Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., [2001] 2 SCR 460, 2001 SCC 44 (CanLII)................................................................................................... 85

Eidsvik v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2011 FC 940 (CanLII)................................................................................................... 91

Esquega v. Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FC 297 (CanLII).................................................................................................. 103

First Majestic Silver Corp. v. Davila Santos,2015 BCCA 452 (CanLII).......................... 119

Fournier v. Canada (Public Service Commission),2001 FCT 1169 (CanLII).................... 125

G.W.L. Properties Ltd. V. W.R. Grace & Co. of Canada Ltd., 1993 CanLII 2767 (BC CA)....................................................................................................... 131

*Heritage Trust of Nova Scotia v. Halifax (Regional Municipality),2007 NSSC 28 (CanLII).................................................................................................. 145

Hockin v. Bank of B.C., 1989 CanLII 2751 (BC CA)....................................................................................................... 147

International Taoist Church of Canada v. Ching Chung Taoist Association of Hong Kong Limited, 2011 BCCA 149 (CanLII).................................................................................................. 151

ITO – Int’l Terminal Operators v. Miida Elactronics, [1986] 1 SCR 752...................................................................................................... N/A

John McKellar Charitable Foundation v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2006 FC 733 (CanLII)..................................................................................................157

Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co., 1990 CanLII 937 (BC CA)...................................................................................................... 163

Lindsay v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 BCCA 594 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 171

Litebook Company Ltd. v. Apollo Light Systems Inc., 2006 FC 399 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 181

Loiselle v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CanLII 8810 (FC)..................................................................................................... 187

Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 193

Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 199

Mennes v. Canada, 2010 FCA 20 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 217

Needles v. Slovarp, 1922 CanLII 145 (SK CA)...................................................................................................... 221

Northland Bank v. Maddigan, 1982 CanLII 511 (BC CA)...................................................................................................... 225

Ogden v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2015 BCCA 175 (CanLII).................. 227

Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada, 2001 BCSC 1721 (CanLII)....................... 245

Pac. Press Ltd. v. Vancouver-New Westminster Newspaper Guild, Loc. 115, 1989 CanLII

2683 (BC CA)........................................................................................... 261

Pine Valley Enterprises Inc. v. The Queen, 2010 TCC 324 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 265

Reynolds v. Toronto Transportation Commission,1937 CanLII 132 (ON CA)................. 281

Rosenberg v. Canada (National Revenue), 2015 FC 549 (CanLII)................................................................................................. 285

Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Derby Management Ltd.,

      1994 CanLII 5110 (SK QB)...................................................................................................... 301

R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333, 1993 CanLII 44 (SCC)....................................................................................................305

R. v. Yelle, 2002 ABPC 158 (CanLII).................................................................................................323

Saskatchewan (Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization) v. Canada Attorney General), 2005 FC 1027 (CanLII)...................................................................339

*Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., [2014] 2 SCR 633, 2014 SCC 53 (CanLII)................................................................................................ 349

Schwarz Hospitality Group Ltd. V. Canada (Minister of Canadian  Heritage), 1999 CanLII 7994 (FC).................................................................................................... 363

Scott v. Board of School District 29 (Lilloet), 1991 CanLII 1142 (BC CA)................... 369

Sentinel Hill Productions (1999) Corporation v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 742 (CanLII)................................................................................................ 375

Simple Pursuits Inc. v. 0842748 B.C. Ltd., 2015 BCCA 382 (CanLII)................................................................................................ 385

6075240 Canada Inc. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2017 FCA 158 (CanLII)................................................................................................ 395

Smith v. Canada, 2001 FCA 86 (CanLII)........................................................... 401

Staltari v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FCA 448 (CanLII)............................... 405

Ultra Fuels Ltd. V. Kern, 1992 CanLII 527 (BC CA).............................................. 409

Vaughan v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 15069 (FC)..................................................... 417

Vuckovich v. Royal Bank of Canada, 1998 CanLII 2398 (ON CA)............................... 427

Walsh v. British Columbia (Minister of Finance), 1979 CanLII 421 (BC SC)................. 435

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