Administration of justice in Canada's lost decade

ACTION

Court File Number: T-1066-16

Federal Court

Between

Zoltan Andrew Simon and

Zuanhao Zhong (represented by her husband Zoltan A. Simon)

Plaintiffs

and

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada

represented by the Attorney General of Canada and

the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship

(none of them is acting in a personal capacity, only as representative)

Defendant

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

TO THE DEFENDANT:

A LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN COMMENCED AGAINST YOU by the Plaintiff(s). The claim made against you is set out in the following pages.

IF YOU WISH TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, you or a solicitor acting for you are required to prepare a statement of defence in Form 171B prescribed by the Federal Courts Rules, serve it on the plaintiff’s solicitor or, where the plaintiff does not have a solicitor, serve it on the plaintiff, and file it, with proof of service, at a local office of this Court, WITHIN 30 DAYS after this statement of claim is served on you, if you are served within Canada.

If you are served in the United States of America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is forty days. If you are served outside Canada and the United States of America, the period for serving and filing your statement of defence is sixty days.

Copies of the Federal Courts Rules, information concerning the local offices of the Court and other necessary information may be obtained on request to the Administrator of this Court at Ottawa (telephone 613-992-4238) or at any local office.

IF YOU FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING, judgment may be given against you in your absence and without further notice to you.

July 4, 2016

Issued by:

 

________________________________

(Registry Officer)

 

Address of local office:

Registry of the Federal Court

Canadian Occidental Tower

635 Eighth Avenue S.W.

3rd Floor

Calgary, Alberta

T2P 3M3

 

Mailing address:

P.O. Box 14

Calgary, Alberta

T2P 3M3

 

Telephone: (403) 292-5920 or 1-800-663-2096

Fax: (403) 292-5329

 

TO:

 

Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada

c/o Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada

284 Wellington Street

Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H8

 

Claim

  1. The plaintiffs claim through the following main relief sought at this Honourable Court for the issuance of:

  2. An order, direction, decision, or rather a writ of mandamus compelling the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and/or the administrators of the Supreme Court of Canada to obey section 61. of the Supreme Court Act and file any Notice of Appeal that alleges error in law in the lower court(s), including the last Notice of Appeal and the Motion to state constitutional questions of the instant Plaintiffs submitted in 2015 and 2016 for filing;

  3. An order, direction or decision expressing that the purported interpretation of Rule 19 (2) (a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, stating that the Registrar “may accept or reject the document” not to be read out of context but in conjunction with Rule 8 (2) [implying that Registrar may not refuse a document that complies with these Rules] and, if applicable, with ss. 19 (4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, “A document that is filed by fax transmission … is deemed to have been filed on the day on which it is received…” [Emphasis added.];

  4. An order, direction or decision expressing that, in light of section 3 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Registrar may not adopt a procedure that is inconsistent with section 61. of the Supreme Court Act;

  5. Should this Honourable Court be of the opinion that section 2 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, [“judge means a judge of the Court and includes the Chief Justice”] is wrong or incomplete and the word “judge” includes the Registrar (so this Court lacks jurisdiction over him), an order, direction, decision, suggestion, or other document issued for the Attorney General of Canada or the Prime Minister to terminate the employment of Mr. Bilodeau with the Government of Canada for routinely disobeying section 61. of the Supreme Court Act;

  6. In the alternative, a statutory declaration expressing that it is a contravention of the Supreme Court Act if any administrator of the SCC Registry including the Registrar openly refuses to file notices of appeal under section 61. of the said Act, in cases when error in law is alleged, if the documents submitted otherwise conform to the Rules;  

  7. If no minister, judge or other authority has any control over Mr. Bilodeau (Registrar of the SCC), an order, direction, decision, suggestion, memorandum, or other document addressed to the Attorney General or the Prime Minister of Canada to open a small separate auxiliary SCC Registry office in Ottawa and appoint for it a new bilingual Registrar who – unlike Mr. Bilodeau – is able to understand the French version of s. 61. of the said Act and is willing to obey the law; also appoint a Deputy Registrar and at least one administrator, solely for the proper administration of s. 61. of the Act, all these either by a decree, or, through a new bill submitted to Parliament;

  8. If this Court of the opinion that the Registrar and the administrators of the SCC Registry have the right to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada and block the filing of properly submitted documents by contravention of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, an order, direction, decision, declaration or writ of mandamus stating that every registrar or administrator of every Canadian court – or only in the federal court system – has equal rights to refuse the filing of documents that comply with the rules;

  9. An order, direction, decision, declaration or writ of mandamus in order to modify and improve the current CIC sponsorship and undertaking forms in the family class, including IMM 1344 (08-2014) E and its updated version(s) on the Internet, the CIC website, and the policies named IP 2 and MoU, in order to reflect the requirements expressed in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII), to obey the IRPA with its Regulations and, by doing so, terminate the degeneration of the IRPA into a cruel money extortion scheme;

  10. An order, direction, declaration or other document regarding the interpretation of section 145 (3) of the IRPA stating that the word “debt” in that paragraph includes all judgement debts but does not include debt claims that remained uncertified in the Federal Court by a minister beyond six years after the default;

     

  11. In order to prevent financial losses for the provinces in the future, an order, direction, declaration or other document stating or advising that if a minister is unable or unwilling to follow the certifying procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011] case the safest way is to grant repayable “hardship loans” or “hardship assistance” for the sponsored persons in the family class;

  12. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that on 4 January 1999 Zoltan Andrew Simon signed his Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms unconsciously while there was no meeting of the minds between the vaguely defined parties and about the basic issues in them, therefore, his signature shall be removed from those CIC forms; also his sponsorship agreement or undertaking documents regarding Ms. M. Reyes and her sons be considered void ab initio;

  13. An order, direction, declaration, decision or other document stating the above mentioned unconsciousness of Zoltan A. Simon that results in the invalidity and/or removal of his signature from the sponsorship documents dated 4 January 1999 and makes the sponsorship debt issue before the Hong Kong visa officer in April 2007 moot or irrelevant (while his discharged bankrupt status since March 2015 yields the same effect regarding the fate of his uncertified debt);  

  14. In light of the previous paragraph and considering Zoltan A. Simon’s old sponsorship agreement of 1999 void ab initio, an order, direction, declaration or rather writ of mandamus to compel or instruct the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Immigration Appeal Division and its Tribunal to consider or apply 21February 2007 as CIC’s date of filing Ms. Zhong’s original application for permanent residence as the proper lock-in-date for the purpose of the upcoming appeal hearing in the pending immigration matter of Ms. ZuanHao Zhong and her son Mr. JianFeng Ye, in order to prevent irreparable damages for Mr. Ye;

     

  15. An order, direction, instruction or other document addressed to the IRB-IAD to expedite the upcoming (second) appeal hearing of Zoltan A. Simon in the immigration matter of his wife Ms. ZuanHao ZHONG and her son Mr. JianFeng YE while consider the position or instructions of this Court regarding the proper cut-off date above that affects the status of Mr. Ye, in light of the circumstances (that the Crown has blocked the reunification of this family since their marriage in 2006 without offering any valid or credible lawful reason for such cruel treatment that contravenes section 12. of the Charter);

  16. An order, direction, declaration, writ of mandamus or other document instructing the CIC or the visa officer in Hong Kong to apply the “conditional measure” in Guide 3900 of CIC (subtitle: Information on Conditional Permanent Residence) and grant “Conditional Permanent Residence” for Ms. Z. Zhong and her son J. Ye if the visa officer is unable to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that Ms. Zhong married Z.A. Simon in bad faith in 2006;

  17. In the alternative, an order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document towards the CIC or CBSA allowing the issuance of a Canadian visitor’s visa to Zuanhao ZHONG that is valid until a dismissing decision of the IRB-IAD, or – in case of an appeal to the Federal Court – the reception of the Court’s final judgment by Ms. Zhong, in order to satisfy the Charter’s requirement for her “fair hearing” by the tribunal in light of sections 15(1) and 12 of the Charter;

  18. An order, declaration, direction, writ of mandamus or any other document stating that a YES answer for question 9 under the Sponsor Eligibility Assessment on CIC form IMM 1344 (03-2016) E does not disqualify sponsors (since they may have repaid their debts or became discharged bankrupts) so Guide 3900 should read as follows: “If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question between 5 and 8 or 10 and 15, You are not eligible to be a sponsor. You should not submit an application.” 

  19. Pursuant to s. 504. and 2.(a) of the Criminal Code, file an information – or consider the instant pleading an “information” – and initiate (maybe direct or advice the AGC to begin) an indictment procedure against every tortfeasor that has committed at least one indictable offence, against the IRPA or other enactments of Canada, as listed in this claim, for their offences committed between January 2006 and November 2015;

     

  20. An order or writ of mandamus compelling the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship to change the five occurrences or counts of the words “contract(s)” into “agreement(s)” in paras. 5.18, 6.9, 12 and 16 (twice) of the CIC policy named “IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” in the website www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf (and in its French version if applicable) since they contradict and violate s. 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (that is silent about any contract except in rare cases of settlement plans described in sections 152 through 154);

  21. Or, in the alternative, an order, statement or statutory declaration expressing that the five occurrences of the word “contract” (instead of “agreement”) within the federal (CIC) policy named “IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” in the website www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf contradict or contravene section 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (that is silent about any contract in family class sponsorship) and/or constitutes an indirect misrepresentation of the IRPA that induces or could induce errors in its administration as described in its sections 126 through 129;

  22. An order, direction, decision or writ of mandamus compelling or advising the Crown (CIC) to correct or complete two paragraphs in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CIC and CRA as follows, (A) “WHEREAS subsection 145(2) if IRPA (Immigration and Refugee protection Act) stipulates that an amount that a sponsor is required to pay under the terms of an undertaking is payable on demand, after filing and registering a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court, to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned and may be recovered by Her Majesty in either or both of those rights.” (B) “WHEREAS section 146 of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) provides that, if Her Majesty wants to collect a debt due to Her, an amount or part of an amount payable under this Act that has not been paid may be certified by the Minister without delay…” [I.e., the old text tortuously omits the most important words of the preamble, “Collection of Debts Due to Her Majesty” while s. 13 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 clearly states, “The preamble of an enactment shall be read as a part of the enactment…”] Note: the proposed additions are shown in bold italics;

     

  23. An order, direction, decision, or stating a special case for the opinion of the Court of Appealthat would harmonize the current unlawful immigration policies of Canada and her visa officers with the Charter;

  24. An order, direction, decision, or other document stating that the instant pleadings (or at least some of its issues of law) raise serious questions of law of public importance (effecting the fate of hundreds of Canadians) that shall be solved by a Court of competent jurisdiction by allowing the parties involved to show evidence, instead of a motion to strike out the pleadings without applying any test – or vaguely claiming them as prolix, convoluted, lengthy, fanciful, bizarre, sweeping, rambling, hard if not impossible to understand, incapable of proof, vexatious or/and an abuse of process – without substantiating such wild claims and powerful words of Counsel by any means;

  25. A certification, statement or answer/determination of seventy-seven constitutional questions if possible, at least the ones that transcend the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation and contemplate issues of broad significance or general application;

     

  26. A declaration, statement or other document expressing that the instant Statement of Claim satisfies the “arguable merit” test or has raised some issues that are not only "not frivolous", but of "arguable merit"; 

  27. In the alternative, a declaration, statement or other document expressing that the instant Statement of Claim has “public interest” standing for the issues of law expressed in it, and/or some of the seventy-seven constitutional questions listed show arguable merit;

  28. A declaration stating that the plaintiffs are (and have been since 2007) directly affected by the decision of the three ministers involved, and meet the three-element test for “public interest” standing as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Council of Churches) at paragraph 37;

  29. In the alternative, a declaration that the points of law are of such gravity and importance as to transcend the interests of the parties actually before the court, and it is in the interests of the common good that the law be clarified so as to enable it to be administered not only in the instant case but in future cases (as expressed in Village Residents Association Ltd. v. An Bord Pleanala, [2000] IEHC 34 by Madam Justice Laffoy);

  30. The issuance of an Order in the nature of mandamus requiring the  Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship to produce certified true photocopies of a minister’s or person’s alleged contract with Zoltan Andrew Simon (that the CIC’s “IP 2” a.k.a. “Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” policy claims to be extant in each case), also submit a copy of it to the FC Registry and give another copy to Z.A. Simon at the beginning of the trial; 

  31. The issuance of an Order in the nature of mandamus requiring both the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Minister of National Revenue to produce certified true photocopies of a ministerial certificate, required to be filed and registered in the Federal Court pursuant to sections 146 (1) and (2) of the IRPA, in order to prove the sponsorship debt of Zoltan Andrew Simon as the basis of his decade-long punishment, also submit a copy of it to the FC Registry in Calgary and give another copy to Z.A. Simon at the beginning of the trial; 

  32. If the Crown can produce any of the documents mentioned in the previous two paragraphs, to show a certified true photocopy of a notice from the Minister of the Department of Justice in the form set out in Schedule 2, and the related postal receipt proving that the Registry of the Federal Court obeyed sections 8. and 9. of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181 and has served its Schedule 2 on Zoltan Andrew Simon;

     

  33. An order, direction or other document requesting the Defendant to  produce a certified true photocopy proving a person’s timely service of a garnishee summons on Her Majesty, with a copy of the judgment or order against the alleged debtor (Zoltan A. Simon) showing that the public servants involved obeyed s. 6.(1) and (2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, RSC 1985, c G-2;

  34. An order, declaration, or rather writ of mandamus addressed to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, compelling or directing every Canadian visa officer abroad not the refuse the issuance of permanent resident visas on the only ground that someone involved has violated subsection 145 (1) (a) or/and (b) in pre-IRPA cases where the wording “under this Act” and section 190 (about pending matters) of the Act do not apply [because the CIC files are closed when the previously sponsored family member lands in Canada], in cases where the visa officers cannot find any ministerial certificate on file regarding the sponsor’s debt in the Registry of the Federal Court; 

  35. In the alternative, a statutory declaration or other document stating that a Canadian visa officer or other federal administrator is misrepresenting the IRPA and punishable under its sections 126 through 129 if he or she refuses to issue of permanent resident visa on the only ground of its subsection 145 (1) (a) or/and (b) in pre-IRPA cases under to old Immigration Act, 1976 and its Regulations (and not “under this Act”) and/or section 190 of the Act (about pending matters) do not apply [since the CIC files are closed when the previously sponsored family member lands in Canada], and the visa officer cannot find any ministerial certificate in the Registry of the Federal Court regarding the sponsor’s debt that is a “condition precedent” the Crown must comply with, pursuant to Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII);

     

  36. Or, in the alternative, a declaration, statement or other document stating that the automatic punishment of an unknown percentage of sponsors (that signed sponsorship agreements in the family class in pre-IRPA years) without taking them to court first or without filing and registering a ministerial certificate against them in the Federal Court is unlawful or/and constitutes misrepresentation of the IRPA, and also ignores, disobeys, or violates the governing SCC decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) as well;

     

  37. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that the out-of-context laconic words, “A debt may be recovered at any time” in section 145 (3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are insufficient to raise the whole IRPA above limitation laws applicable in Canada and her provinces without considering the very different meaning in its next sections 146 (1) and (2) while assert that the IRPA applies retroactively (because such provision is missing in that Act);

  38. An order, direction, or other document compelling the Crown to produce a certified true photocopy of an alleged or presumed document showing Zoltan Andrew Simon’s status as a co-obligant under a joint and several promissory note towards Ms. M. Reyes or the Crown (that could allow the Crown to enforce Z. Simon’s obligations while it completely released or discharged the co-obligant from her obligations or debts under contract law); the order may refer to the maxim of “Joint Obligations” in the book of Glanville Williams: The presumption is that a contract made by two or more persons is joint, express words being necessary to make it joint and several, also the widely accepted legal principle expressed in paras. [1] and [2] of Shoker v. Vollans, 1998 CanLII 6447 (BC CA);

  39. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that if the Crown unlawfully paid social benefits to the sponsored persons – for example, to full-time students in certain provinces or imposed annual interests over the allowed five percent – and for at least five years failed to direct or request them to try to find employment, such omissions of the public servants mean that the Crown released the sponsored persons from their joint obligations to support themselves, and such discharge meant discharge of the sponsors as well;

     

  40. (a) An order, direction, declaration, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Director or Minister responsible for the lawful operation of CRA to abandon their comfortable position of their unconditional “trust in the immigration system” or in their predecessors (where deceit or fraud, deliberate or negligent, underlay the transaction or sponsorship agreement) and rather exercise due diligence to determine the exact nature of their policies through investigation of the controversies or major torts inherited from the Harper government, or, request the Attorney General of Canada to initiate such investigations;

     

    (b) An order, statutory declaration or other document stating that the definition of “sponsorship debt” in the MOU is unlawful since it is silent about the Federal Court’s required involvement and a filed certificate; also the Sponsorship Agreement’s wording “It is further agreed that damages will not be less than the total of all amounts actually received by the Immigrant…” on the CIC form IMM 1344 C (02-98) E is invalid for violating s. 15(1) of the Charter: the Crown shifts 100% of responsibility on sponsors where four groups are involved (sponsors, sponsored immigrants, provincial and federal administrators); 

     

  41. An order, declaration, direction or any other document stating that, pursuant to sections 42 (1) and (2) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, SC 1999, directors of the CRA do not act honestly and in good faith, and do not exercise due care, diligence and skill if they ignore the SCC verdict in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) and disobey s. 146 of the IRPA;

  42. In the alternative, a declaration stating that it constitutes a punishable offence if the Crown’s officers unlawfully transfer monies from the tax accounts of pre-IRPA sponsors without seeing and filing a court order or a photocopy of a ministerial certificate filed in the Federal Court (as prescribed by s. 146 of the IRPA) while ignoring the SCC order and its requirements in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011], supra, by sending those “dirty” monies (to be laundered) without colour of law to provincial ministers practically as gifts by designedly permitting them the contravention of the said enactment;

  43. An order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Director of the CRA or the Minister responsible for the lawful operation of CRA to provide a document for the perusal of this Court describing the number of cases in each year from 2006 to 2015 where the tax accounts of the defaulting sponsors in the family class have been garnisheed without a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court;

  44. An order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Registrar of the SCC Registry in Ottawa to provide a document for the perusal of this Court describing the number of cases in each year from 2006 to 2015 where notices of claims under section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, alleging errors in law, have been submitted but the Registry or the Registrar has refused their filing;

  45. A direction or other document determining the proper procedure in case if Mr. Bilodeau simply ignores or disobeys the verdict of this Honourable Court, just as Mr. Rob Nicholson has ignored and disobeyed the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General v. Mavi), 2011 – for example, how frequently shall appellants under s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act re-submit their notices of appeal to the SCC Registry after the Registrar’s refusal of filing such documents?;

        

  46. An order, direction, declaration, or writ of mandamus to oblige the officers or administrators named Eric Murphy, Sandra George and their colleagues working under the Information Commissioner to stop usurping or reducing the prescribed powers of their superior, the Information Commissioner of Canada (Ms. Suzanne Legault) by preventing her to get correspondence from the concerned public and/or by falsely claiming that she has no mandate under s. 7. of the Access to Information Act to investigate complaints due to the CIC’s failure to provide information within the prescribed 30 days (to Service Canada, other authorities, or a citizen) despite that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration is listed under Schedule I of that Act, in cases where the request was for a single record easy to find, and CIC has not filed a notice of request for extension of time;

  47. A Reasons issued by this Honourable Court that would not skip the essential questions of law and would not remain silent regarding the true nature of the pleadings or the strict tests that shall apply;     

  48. An order for Z. Simon’s costs and/or special costs related to this action;

  49. Any other or further relief as may be requested and this Honourable Court may deem fit and appropriate and allow or grant;

     

  50. If the Court is not allowed to offer any effective remedy for the plaintiffs and this Notice of Claim would be struck as an abuse of process without allowing them to amend or show supporting evidence, they request an order, decision, direction, or writ of mandamus towards the competent or authorized federal ministry to issue an updated replacement copy of Zoltan Andrew Simon’s Canadian landed immigrant document (based on his Document of Landing issued on 6 April 1976 and taken by the Crown in 1979) in lieu or in exchange of his current Canadian Citizenship Card and Canadian Passport while to facilitate the revocation of his citizenship granted in September 1979, as his protest against the Crown’s massive torts in all material times (from January 2006 to November 2015);

  51. If paragraph 50 above applies, an order, direction or other document instructing or requesting the authorized federal Minister or diplomat to request the corresponding minister of the communist People’s Republic of China to allow and facilitate the settlement or immigration of Zoltan Andrew Simon in that country as a Canadian political refugee;

  52. Further, if paragraph 50 above applies and/or the majority of the seventy-seven constitutional questions cannot – or not allowed to – be certified, answered or stated, the issuance of a document suggesting to the Crown or its authorized Minister the following draft of a proposed (“mini-omnibus”) bill to submit for Parliament as follow:

    Bill X, Section Y:

    (a) Salaries payable to each Member of Parliament, those of the Senate, and any judge to be increased by fifty percent yearly; and

    (b) Each registrar of every court of Canada is granted unlimited rights to refuse the filing of documents even if those documents are in accordance with the court rules, similarly to the SCC Registrar’s absolute powers and privileges above the SCC;

    (c) Every enactment of Canada and her provinces shall be interpreted that the obligations of the Crown and its public servants cannot be strictly applied and enforced but rather the enactments serve only as guidelines for the Crown;

    (d) The provision described in paragraph (c) above does not apply to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

     

    TABLE OF CONTENTS:

    For material facts relied on to substantiate the claims, see “A super short concise statement of the material facts” (page 16 below); “A concise statement of the material facts” (page 17); “Skeleton of the material facts and torts from the Crown’s point of view (page 26); “Detailed material facts that gave rise to the claims” (page 47); More detailed material facts relied upon” (page 53); and Nature of order sought (page 115).

     

The plaintiff proposes that this action be tried in the City of Calgary.

 

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the 4th day of July, 2016.

 

                  _________________________________

Signature of Zoltan Andrew Simon, Plaintiff (Self-represented litigant acting for himself and also his wife Mrs. Zuanhao Zhong by an Affidavit)

Address: 72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB,  T4R 1H6

Telephone: 403-346-8841 (for messages only); Fax number: (403) 341-3300

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com

URL: www.correctingworldhistory.com

A SUPER-SHORT CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS (in a mini-nutshell; this website scrambles the original numbering of the paragraphs)

  1. From January 2006 to November 2015, in all material times, three federal ministries (CIC, CRA and Justice) introduced and carefully maintained a system of torts through a pyramid of power including the largest money extortion scheme in Canadian history. Simply, the ministers created unlawful policies (IP 2 and MoU) in order to misrepresent and override the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

  2. In 2011, Counsel to the Crown filed a false statement at the SCC claiming that sponsors in the family class had contracts (so that the re-victimized sponsors may be garnisheed without any court procedure). The order of the Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) clearly established the proper way and conditions how to “recover” those alleged debts but the Attorney General (Mr. Rob Nicholson) and his two minister colleagues (in CIC and CRA) agreed to ignore the SCC verdict and keep the money extortion scheme, practically giving away the monies of the sponsors to provincial ministries as gifts.

  3. The “honourable tortfeasors” created an auxiliary tort through illegal policies of Mr. Bilodeau (Registrar of the SCC) who was placed – or placed himself – in a position practically above the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. He is routinely refusing to file notices of appeal where error in law is claimed in the lower courts, against the requirements described in section 61. of the Supreme Court Act.  

  4. Thus, the honourable tortfeasors created an opposite power in order to divide and intimidate the country by torts, and have been usurping the legitimate constitutional powers of Parliament, the Senate and the Supreme Court’s nine judges.

  5. An independent claim is related to the torts of some administrators of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada that usurp or reduce her powers;

  6. A claim points out that the current official CIC website prescribing the rules of family class sponsorship contains sentences that constitute misrepresentation of the IRPA and that tort unlawfully reduces the number of eligible applicants;

  7. As an attempt to force some of the individual tortfeasors to pay the prescribed fines of $100,000 to the Government of Canada, pursuant to sections 126-129 of the IRPA, the plaintiffs file information for their indictment with this Honourable Court.   

    A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS

  8. This is a complex claim that consists of five major issues or fields of law, mainly tort law, as outlined on page 16 above. Most of the serious questions of law involved are directly or indirectly – like the SCC Registrar’s violation of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act – connected since the operations of the CIC, CRA, AGC and PMO are and had been closely connected with each other in all material times (2006-2015).

  9.  Many of the issues are linked with violations of Charter rights by the Crown. 

  10. During the so-called lost decade of Canada, the plaintiff compiled and kept submitting a list of constitutional questions. None of those serious questions of law has ever been addressed, dealt with, certified, let alone stated or answered by any court.

  11.  

    In the period from January 2006 to November 2015, several public servants, including ministers, created and carefully maintained a cruel nationwide tort system under the guise of policies in order to override the laws while generate income for the Crown unlawfully, and in order to reduce immigration drastically in the family class.

  12. By doing this, the Crown has contravened between 30 and 60 paragraphs of the laws of Canada (plus the laws of many provinces) and ruined many families. 

  13. The Crown torts included fraud, conspiracy, massive misrepresentation of the IRPA, contravention of many enactments dealing with limitation law, contract law and garnishment law, the enforcement of fraudulent and unconstitutional policies like IP 2 and MOU (signed between the CRA and the CIC), violations of the Criminal Code and the Charter, the operation of a sophisticated money extraction scheme complete with money laundering, and depositing false testimonies of three or four Counsel with the aim of misleading the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada by alleging that (a) Z.A. Simon had claims against the Province of BC and not Canada in 2012 so the federal courts had no jurisdiction over the case ; and (b) Z.A. Simon, in 2014, submitted a statement of claim in which all of the 193 paragraphs were untrue; and (c) that family class sponsors had binding contracts and unconditional liability.

  14.  

    The ministers involved have created a tort system that has allowed them to prosecute and punish innocent re-victimized sponsors in the family class without any involvement of a court, and without filing and registering a ministerial certificate at the Federal Court as a pre-requisite before their garnishment, pursuant to the IRPA.

  15. By obeying such fraudulent policies while contravening or/and ignoring the relevant legislation and the governing common law – established by the SCC in the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011] case – the tortfeasors acted in bad faith and knowingly caused major damages for the re-victimized sponsors – including the instant plaintiffs – that signed their undertakings before the IRPA (effective from 28 June 2002) and its Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations came into power. 
  16. The main participants were public servants belonging to federal ministries and authorities as follow: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Revenue Agency, the Office of the Minister of Justice and AG of Canada, The PMO, the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, and the SCC Registry, all located in Ottawa.

     

  17. The participants acted and participated voluntarily or under pressure within a pyramid scheme of power while they were employees of the Crown in all material times. Her Majesty has vicarious liability for their wrongful acts and omissions.

  18.  

    In general, the Crown has violated the legislation in the categories as follow:

  19. Tort of misrepresentation of the IRPA and its Regulations by unlawful policies;
  20. Tort of fraud and false pretences;
  21. Misfeasance in public office;
  22. Tort of breach of trust;
  23. Tort of fraudulent conversion;
  24. Tort of interference and failure to deliver monies;

  25. Tort of contravening an Act – actually several enactments – of Parliament;

  26. Tort of fraudulent conspiracy and attempt of conspiracy; 

  27. Tort of mental torture and pressuring of the re-victimized sponsors including the instant plaintiffs by conspiracies;

  28. Tort of corruption, fraud on government; 

  29. Tort of designing and carefully maintaining a cruel nationwide money extortion scheme through the degeneration of the IRPA and its Regulations;

  30. Tort of facilitating terrorist activity against the re-victimized sponsors; 

  31. Tort of possession and laundering the proceeds of crime originating from a money extortion scheme;

  32. The Crown’s unjust enrichment using CIC processing fees without service, etc;

  33. The Crown’s unjust enrichment related to the sponsor’ tax returns;

  34. Tort of defrauding the public – particularly the re-victimized sponsors in the family class – by deceit and causing them injuries or damages;

  35. In every category listed above, the Crown and its top representatives as tortfeasors – public servants including ministers – committed their actions and omissions not by neglect but with high hand, cynically, with a criminal or quasi-criminal mindset, knowing that their unlawful actions and omissions were often causing irreparable damages for the innocent re-victimized sponsors and the families involved, particularly for persons whose sponsorship undertaking and the alleged default took place under the old Immigration Act, 1976 and not under the IRPA; the victims include the instant plaintiffs at bar. 

  36. THIS STATEMENT OF CLAIM DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT. However, a Statement of Claim must contain at least a skeleton of material facts to enable a Court to understand the complete situation because orders, statutory declarations, writ of mandamus or other decisions cannot be delivered in a vacuum.

  37. The Criminal Code states clearly under section 586., “No count that alleges false pretences, fraud or any attempt or conspiracy by fraudulent means is insufficient by reason only that it does not set out in detail the nature of the false pretence, fraud or fraudulent means.” This section of the Code alone, and sections 583. or 585. of the Code, vigorously destroy the possible application of Rule 221. (1) of the Federal Courts Rules and the Crown’s automatic success through a motion to strike and preventing the Court to see any evidence. This Court is to decide where such quasi-criminal cases belong.

  38. The Crown, at least in family sponsorship cases under the old Immigration Act, 1976 routinely fails to perform a condition precedent – the involvement of a Court of competent jurisdiction in the procedure whether by trial or by simply filing a ministerial certificate at the FC – while punishing the re-victimized sponsors (including the instant plaintiffs) by unlawful or unconstitutional torts.

  39. Most of the – often overlapping – Crown torts since 2006 have been causing major financial, mental and emotional damages for the re-victimized sponsors and their families, and those damages have often affected their good health. The instant plaintiffs have been suffering such injuries for 9.5 years. Many of the punished sponsors keep supporting their spouses and family members abroad for years, while maintaining residences in two countries. Z.A. Simon has been supporting his family by sending them half of his income for a decade. Those monies could have stayed in Canada to support the local economy. Instead, they supported the Government of China, Canada’s main competitor. Considering hundreds of sponsors in similar situations, Canada’s financial losses are significant and she cannot collect taxes from those family members.

  40. Similarly, the Crown torts described or listed above, since 2006, have been prostituting a high percentage of Canada’s civil servants including administrators of the courts, tribunals, judges, visa officers, etc. Therefore, the torts routinely violating Canada’s laws and the public servants pressured to keep covering up such criminal or quasi-criminal situations have negative effects of their mind, spirit, mental well-being and health on the long run.

  41. The main plaintiff in the case at bar is Zoltan Andrew Simon. He represents himself and his wife Zuanhao Zhong, citizen of China. (Since April 2007, the Crown has blocked Ms. Zhong’s immigration twice by unlawful means.)

  42. DISCLAIMER: Please note that any reference in the instant document to ministries, authorities or persons of any province or territory of Canada or another state – regardless if the persons have or have not been employees of that province, territory or country in material times – NOT TO BE CONSTRUED by this Court as a CLAIM against that person or authority. 

  43. The instant plaintiffs do no claim for damages or for indictment against any active minister or deputy minister of the present new (Liberal) Government of Canada whose position and intentions are still perfectly unknown for them.

  44. The instant plaintiffs at bar are not seeking to challenge the decisions made by the immigration authorities (although those decisions were demonstrably wrong in law). Rather they are seeking answers for serious questions of law of high importance, and remedies for the critical state of Canada where the tortious policies of the federal government in material times, from January 2006 to November 2015, challenged and often defeated the will of Parliament (the laws of Canada) and a governing verdict of the Supreme Court of Canada. 

  45. Pursuant to Rule 49 of theFederal Courts Rulesthis Honourable Court has the right and privilege to transfer this whole file to the Federal Court of Appeal without a hearing. The Rules do not specify at what stage such transfer may occur. This Honourable Court could certify or answer some of the serious questions of law that do not strictly qualify as constitutional questions, and perhaps the Federal Court of Appeal could answer the rest of them.

  46. Should this Honourable Court be unable or rather prohibited to deal with these serious issues and questions of law of public importance Zoltan Andrew Simon would seek direction of this Court regarding how or where to revoke his Canadian citizenship as an official protest against the Crown’s torts and the schizophrenic nature of Canada’s leading powers as described in this Statement of Claim. Please note that the Crown does not post on the Internet the proper formal procedure to be followed in such unique cases. The address(es) and rules of the Citizenship Court of Canada are not available for the public. When Z.A. Simon applied for his Canadian citizenship in 1979 he was unconscious of the possibility that a few decades later a single dictator and his friends would have the means to govern the country against the laws of Canada and eliminating the Supreme Court of Canada, with the end result of separating spouses from each other forever.
  47. Section 181 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules states,

     

    “A pleading shall contain particulars of every allegation contained therein, including(a) particulars of any alleged misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence; and (b) particulars of any alleged state of mind of a person, including any alleged mental disorder or disability, malice or fraudulent intention.

  48. Rule 181 (1) (a) above does not say that a pleading shall contain “all particulars,” only some particulars of every allegation so the Defendant and the Court can understand the outline or skeleton of the claim or situation. The instant Statement of Claim satisfies such basic requirement. When the Crown will publish a complete list containing the names and locations of the Crown tortfeasors, with the exact dates of their torts committed, the plaintiffs would be able to embed such details into their pleadings, including a possible Amended Statement of Claim. However, the Government of Canada never publishes a list showing the criminal or quasi-criminal acts and omissions committed by its public servants including ex-ministers.

  49. Rule 181 (1) (b) poses a requirement that is physically impossible to comply with. Since in material times, between January 2006 and November 2015, most of Canada’s public servants obeyed blindly the orders and unlawful policies of Mr. Stephen Harper and his ministers, they acted in fear: they did not want to lose their jobs. (The names of public servants that resisted the torts and lost their jobs as a consequence – or perhaps committed suicide during the Harper dictatorship – is unknown and unpublished.) Most of the public servants acted or made omissions under the pressure of a federal minister and/or the PMO. It is impossible to claim that “every civil servant involved acted with high hand and in bad faith.” However, it seems obvious that at least one of the ministers of the federal Cabinet acted in bad faith, pressuring the other ministers to agree upon and participate in the torts and the money extortion scheme. A reasonable person familiar with the power game in Canada would say that Mr. Harper – who was considered a creator god or demigod for the majority of his ministers or the members of Parliament – forced his Cabinet ministers to follow his criminal or quasi-criminal policies but he would probably swear under oath that he had zero knowledge about the torts of his federal ministers or ministries.

  50. If one considers the acts of Prime Minister Harper as acts of God, the AGC still has vicarious liability for actions of God. Please refer to the case of Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228, 1989 CanLII 16 (SCC) where some act of God [maybe torrential rains or the tunnel-digging activity of an animal] may have been contributing factors to the alleged negligence of a ministry’s workers that maintained that highway. Mr. Just was unable to name the persons or employees of the Crown that had acted negligently. Despite of that “deficiency” he had been successful at the SCC. 

  51. Since the role of the PMO cannot be proven, the next possibility is that the ex-ministers of the CIC, CRA, and the Ministry of Justice and AGC forced Mr. Harper to introduce those criminal or quasi-criminal policies and schemes from 2006 to 2015.

  52. A further but very remote possibility is that on one day tens of thousands of Canada’s public servants – including every visa officer abroad – simultaneously revolted from the law-abiding rules and policies of the innocent Prime Minister declaring that they will contravene the IRPA from that day on. Even if Counsel to the AGC would come up with such bizarre explanation, the Crown and her present AGC still have vicarious liability for the Crown torts committed by its ex-ministers.

  53. Again, the plaintiff – although he is Canada’s historian – is not obliged to substantiate the tortious acts of named employees of the Crown, complete with dates. He is able to prove the existence of the sophisticated torts and the money extortion scheme by the existence of the unlawful policies named IP 2, MOU and the tortious CIC sponsorship forms. It is immaterial who drafted those documents, where and on what date. The main thing is that those fraudulent or unlawful documents have been existing and widely used in all material times by the Crown’s employees. The two policies are still used: every servant of the CIC and the CRA must follow and obey them blindly, even by reading in words between the lines, while they are forced to disobey sections 146 (1) and (2) of the IRPA, and also the SCC judgment in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011], supra, regarding the filing and registering of a ministerial certificate about the sponsors’ alleged debts in the Federal Court. 

  54. The Crown cannot prove that such tortious policies do not exist and the public servants do not follow those. The Crown seems to claim that its ministers and public servants are and have been allowed to contravene any legislation and misinterpret or misrepresent any statute as they wished because they had been above the law. 

  55. When Z. Simon signed his Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking in 1999, he was in the misbelief that the principle of federal paramountcy applied in the laws and government of Canada. There was no probability in his mind to think that a decade later an administrator of British Columbia – without any rank, standing, or lawful authorization – would have the absolute power to give unlawful orders to the Director and administrators of the CRA and the latter would blindly obey such order, or, that the single person of the SCC Registrar could usurp the power of the nine SCC judges.

  56. The CRA may claim that BC put a great pressure on it so the federal government could not deny the garnishment of Z.A. Simon’s tax account otherwise that Province may have separated from the rest of Canada – an unlikely scenario.

  57. The plaintiffs are able to plead each tort with more details and the related test in common law. The Defendant’s conduct was sometimes lawful but mostly unlawful. Its predominant purpose was to cause injury for the sponsors, including the plaintiff. The Crown knew the consequences that caused injuries to each re-victimized sponsor.

  58. Z.A. Simon’s diagram showing the tort of the SCC Registry’s administrators:         

    [A diagram is inserted here in the original pleading.] 

 

  1. SKELETON OF THE MATERIAL FACTS AND TORTS FROM THE CROWN’S POINT OF VIEW

  2. This is a general overview revealing the structure of the Crown’s torts and fraudulent money extortion scheme. It is a typical step-by-step scenario based on the plaintiff’s experience. One or more of the steps listed below may be missing in other individual cases across Canada: each case of the Crown’s victims is slightly different. However, the framework of federal ministers’ agreements in order to override the laws of Canada – that satisfies the test of conspiracy or unjust enrichment plus other criminal and quasi-criminal acts and omissions – are common elements in them.  

  3. Thus, the following part describes the skeleton of the material facts and torts from the Crown’s point of view although Counsel may deny many or all of them.

  4. The two plaintiffs in the case at bar are married to each other since 2006. Ms. Zhong has been client of the Government of Canada through CIC since February 2007 while Z.A. Simon shows up in the same file. He has an account with CRA since 1976. 

  5. This pleading includes conspiracy (without claiming any dollar amount for damages) so it must describe the parties and their relationship with each other. Since this Court has no jurisdiction over the administrators or ministers of British Columbia and their torts, the instant Statement of Claim describes briefly the relationship of the “parties” with each other. As there is only a single Defendant shown in the style of cause as Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada represented mainly by the AGC, a party cannot have a relationship with itself. Rather, all individuals involved in the tort of conspiracy – an agreement to disobey the IRPA and other enactments – have been employees of the federal Crown in all material times. A concise pleading cannot and shall not describe the unknown position of each administrator, say each Canadian visa officer working abroad – and the name of their immediate superiors, etc., let alone the required description of the “state of mind”, “fraudulent intention” or the momentary “mental disability” of a visa officer, an IRB-IAD Tribunal, or a dictator.

  6. Thus, the plaintiffs state and list the IP 2, the MOU, and the CIC sponsorship and undertaking forms as the agreements between the Defendant’s employees to conspire against the IRPA complete with its IRP Regulations, and the old Immigration Act, 1976 with its Regulations. The same documents served in order to mislead every provincial or territorial public servant regarding the nature of agreements – falsely represented by the Government of Canada as contracts – between the sponsors and sponsored persons in the family class nationwide.

  7. For example, the heading of s. 146 of the IRPA (“Collection of Debts Due to Her Majesty”) was dropped from the MOU in order to create an impression for every civil servant in Canada that ministers may file and register a certificate in the Federal Court only for fun but they could achieve the same result without certification.        

  8. This catalogue of the Crown’s torts (fraudulent misrepresentation, money extortion scheme, money laundering, unjust enrichment, etc.) is based on the routine and unlawful federal policies described as follow, taken from the material facts as they happened to Zoltan Andrew Simon. During the last nine years the Crown has never indicated that his situation was unique or exceptional. So far no employee of the Government of Canada has sent him any apology claiming that someone in the past had committed an act or omission contrary to the routine procedure in similar cases of pre-IRPA sponsorships related to defaults or alleged debts. Therefore, the instant pleadings widely reflect the Crown’s policies against thousands of innocent victims. 

  9. The printed agreements between ministries (CIC and CRA) to override the laws of Canada – in other words, conspire against those laws – served as a base of the tort of conspiracy. In real practice, the civil servants were forced “to read between the lines” of those policies and go far beyond them by unlawful extrapolations in the interpretation. The PURPOSE of the MOU “is to delegate the powers of the Minister” [of CIC to the CRA]. A non-existing power [to punish the sponsors without certification] cannot be delegated: it is a tort.

  10. The objects of the alleged conspiracy between the defendants served the purpose as follows: Mr. Harper had a big heart and did not aim at extra monies for the Federal Government. His main goal was to punish the re-victimized sponsors in the family class, ruining them financially and emotionally while prevent them to sponsor a new family member that otherwise qualified for immigration. The other goal of Mr. Harper and his supremacist government was to please the good “old stock Canadians” before the next election by reducing the number of new immigrants that otherwise qualified. (Another method to achieve such goal was that about one of three tribunal positions in the IRB-IAD were purposefully left vacated.)

  11. On the other hand, Mr. Harper and his cronies have not stolen those monies for their own use but wisely transferred them as gifts for the provincial and territorial governments without colour of law by the contravention of several enactments.

  12. Similarly, in R. v. McRae, 1980 CanLII 693 (BC SC), a Fisheries officer sold the fish unlawfully seized from Rita McRae, and having exercised that discretion by following a pre-determined department policy, claiming that Mrs. McRae was only entitled to the proceeds realized, i.e., $1.00. (Or, one may suppose that Adolf H. and his ministers sent the golden tooth fillings taken from the victims of the Holocaust to a regional ministry of health of the Third Reich as a gift. Would that “humanitarian” step release them from their crimes against the victims?)

  13. It does not need much elaboration – because it is plain and obvious – that the unlawfully garnisheed monies taken from the re-victimized sponsors, sometimes exceeding $100,000 in amount, often ruined the lives of their families. The instant two plaintiffs at bar suffered such damages: they were forced to live separately for a decade while maintain two residences and households instead of one, they had to spend large amounts yearly on transportation between Canada and China in order to cohabit, indirectly have been prevented from having a common child, etc. Thus, the damages of the plaintiff include those caused by violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

  14. Since the case at bar is about the first or largest conspiracy in Canadian history involving high rank officials of the government the plaintiffs have no idea about the proper category of the torts and conspiracy. This Honourable Court may consider them as civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal conspiracies. They were not military conspiracies.

     

  15. On the authority of Just v. British Columbia, supra, the instant plaintiffs have no obligation to name each individual that caused, or participated in causing, the plaintiffs’ injuries. (Again, this Statement of Claim in NOT for damages at all.). Further, on the ground of para. [23] in Horvath v. Thring, 2005 BCCA 127 (CanLII), the instant plaintiffs are not obliged to sue every tortfeasor involved since there is no room here to list the (unpublished) names hundreds or thousands of Crown employees involved. Further, the plaintiffs have no obligation to plead the exact dates when each of those hundreds of public servants committed an error or omission against the law that caused catastrophic effects or injuries for them (and to the re-victimized sponsors in the family class that signed their agreements in pre-IRPA times, before June 28, 2002). The places where the public servants committed their torts are usually unknown except if those are shown on their letters sent to the plaintiffs.

  16. In light of the common law principle mentioned above, the instant plaintiffs have no obligation to sue any official or ex-official employed by the government of any province including British Columbia. Where the material facts pleaded below contain the name of that province it does not mean that the plaintiffs intend to sue any provincial minister or administrator, or, have serious issues regarding them. The plaintiffs state that their claims are about torts of the federal Crown and its ministers or other administrators and officials.

  17. The chronology of the main torts step-by-step: The Government of Canada and/or CIC, in or before 1998, drafted and created certain forms named Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking in the family class sponsorship. The wording of these forms intended to lure more immigrants in Canada and attract more sponsors by offering a false impression to the latter group outlining mutual or joint obligations for both sponsors and sponsored immigrants while stating that the new immigrants need to work and earn income so the sponsors are responsible “for the shortfall only.” 

  18. Those mutual obligations are highlighted in the text of the old CIC forms entitled Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking.

  19. Such description of “mutual obligations” is mentioned in the policy named “IP Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” as well, under its paragraphs 2 (Table 2); 5.24; and 6.9 in order to attract (and mislead) more sponsors since the Crown fails to reveal crucial information to them. Namely, the CIC has been silent about the Crown’s intention not to make any sponsored person responsible or accountable for any “sponsorship debt” but shift 100% (or more) of the financial responsibility to the sponsors. The sponsors that sign the CIC sponsorship forms are often under the false impression that the wording about their responsibility that is “not less than 100%” refers to situations where the Court finds them 100% responsible financially. However, the Crown understands such punishment without any court.

  20. Such policies are violations of contract law. The established contract law, in case of joint obligations or responsibility, commands that if a creditor forgives the debt or obligation of one of the debtors, it follows that he is forgiving that debt for the other debtor(s) as well. Therefore, if a ministry paid off monies to the sponsored persons (often without notifying the sponsors) and lets the sponsored persons off the hook, the joint obligor sponsors are off the hook as well. It is a fundamental principle of contract law, stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed., Vol. 9 at §627), “A release given to one of a number of persons who is jointly or jointly and severally liable discharges the others.” See para. [1] of Shoker v. Vollans, 1998 CanLII 6447 (BC CA). 

  21. The Crown has been unable to prove that the re-victimized sponsors, including Z.A. Simon, have signed “joint and several” agreements in the pre-IRPA family sponsorship class. Therefore, if several years pass but the Crown never asks the sponsored persons to support themselves by work or employment, there is no legal base for the punishment of the sponsors without the involvement of a Court.

  22. On the other hand, the CIC forms stated that, if the sponsors stop supporting the sponsored persons, the letter may take the sponsors to a court of law of competent jurisdiction where the Crown is allowed to represent the sponsored persons. [Please note that practically the same wording occurs in section 118 (2) of the old Immigration Act, 1976 as well.] Further, the forms state that if the sponsors do not respect their promises a minister may recover the monies from the defaulting sponsors, and the total amount would not be less than the monies paid to the sponsored persons by the Crown. Such extremely vague wording undermines the whole “agreement” because it contradicts the principle of joint obligations and the sponsors’ responsibility to cover the “shortfall only” – a situation promised earlier in the forms. Also, here the Crown eliminates the promised and required condition precedent involving a Court. All these manipulations create a situation that prevents or destroys the “meeting of the minds” (consensus ad idem): the sponsors interpret these that they may be held responsible for the total amount of “damages” caused for the Crown by their wrongdoings but such “total amount” would be established by a Court. The Crown, on the other hand – as the persistent CIC and CRA policies indicate – interprets its rights not to take the sponsors to any court but take the “total amount” of their alleged debt automatically and administratively by force, without any court hearing, or the required filing and registering any ministerial certificate against every sponsor in the Federal Court.

  23. Thus, the Government of Canada routinely fails to perform a condition precedent prescribed by s. 146 of the IRPA, s. 118 (2) of the Immigration Act, 1976, the CIC sponsorship forms, and the SCC decision in Canada (A.G) v. Mavi [2011].

  24. The two contradicting and absolutely different interpretations create a major ambiguity that render those sponsorship agreement and undertaking forms a nullity and void ab initio, at least for pre-IRPA times. If two very different interpretations exist side by side in an agreement, the principle of contra proferentem dominates. Thus, the Crown has no right to prosecute the re-victimized sponsors for simply trusting the (non-existing) honesty of the Crown and the prestigious names “Canada” or her “Government.” This is comparable to Mike Duffy’s situation and trial after which Canada understood that an alleged malefactor charged with 31 counts of crimes – as claimed by the Crown and its appendix, the RCMP – turned out to be an innocent victim of the complex tortious manipulations of the PMO’s top officials in Ottawa.

  25. There is and has been, in all material times, an onus on the Crown (CIC and CRA) to establish if the “defaulting debtors” (including Z.A. Simon in the case at bar) may be punished for a decade without the involvement of a court and without the filing and registering the prescribed ministerial certificate against them in the Federal Court before their garnishment; this onus and the conditions precedent were not met.

  26. The SCC applied such contra proferentem rule in Consolidated-Bathurst v. Mutual Boiler, [1980] 1 SCR 888, 1979 CanLII 10 (SCC): “when ambiguity is found, of the contra proferentem doctrine by which any doubt as to the meaning and scope of the excluding or limiting term is to be resolved against the party who has inserted it and who is now relying on it.” In Zurich Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Davies, [1981] 2 SCR 670, 1981 CanLII 68 (SCC), this rule was confirmed. McClelland & Stewart Ltd. v. Mutual Life, [1981] 2 SCR 6, 1981 CanLII 53 (SCC) is a similar case.

  27. The rule is, however, one of general application whenever, as in the case at bar, there is ambiguity in the meaning of a contract which one of the parties as the author of the document offers to the other, with no opportunity to modify its wording. The rule is stated in its general terms in Anson’s Law of Contract (25th ed. 1979), at p. 151, as follows: The words of written documents are construed more forcibly against the party using them. The rule is based on the principle that a man is responsible for ambiguities in his own expression, and has no right to induce another to contract with him on the supposition that his words mean one thing, while he hopes the Court will adopt a construction by which they would mean another thing, more to his advantage. The rule is also stated in general terms by Estey J. in McClelland and Stewart, supra, at p. 15 as follows: That principle of interpretation applies to contracts and other documents on the simple theory that any ambiguity in a term of a contract must be resolved against the author if the choice is between him and the other party to the contract who did not participate in its drafting. The above texts are cited from Hillis Oil & Sales v. Wynn's Canada, [1986] 1 SCR 57, 1986 CanLII 44 (SCC).

  28. The Crown (CIC) forms referred to above fail to state if the Minister, or “a minister” is a party to the family class sponsorship agreements or not. The Crown is of the opinion that it is a party of each sponsorship agreement when it comes to entitlement to moneys or rights but it is not a party to the agreements at all when it comes to obligations. Such “on and off” interpretation is tortious. Even if it is not tortious, the absence of such basic requirement in the CIC forms introduces a major ambiguity that renders the forms invalid in law, a nullity.

  29. The CIC’s “IP 2” policy existed in January 2006, or perhaps even in 2005 or earlier. In it, the Crown claims five times that each sponsor signed a contract. This fraudulent statement introduces a major ambiguity because the sponsors sign the forms in the belief that they are signing agreements with the sponsored persons.

  30. In short, the re-victimized Canadian sponsors think that they have signed a moral gentleman’s agreement with a non-Canadian person and have not signed an agreement or contract with any minister and they may not be punished without court procedure, the Crown claims that each sponsor had signed a valid contract (in the form of a blank cheque) with a person whom a minister is allowed to represent at a court; thus, every sponsor must be punished at any time without any court procedure, and even without the notification of the sponsors of their alleged debts and without filing and registering a ministerial certificate.
  31. Allowing the Crown to represent sponsored persons at a court – as described in the CIC sponsorship agreement and undertaking forms cannot be interpreted as “each sponsor had signed an agreement with a minister.” Such allegation is false and tortious. A sponsored wife after a “default” would not become Her Majesty the Queen; she would not be allowed to wear the Crown jewels or sign an international treaty.    

  32. It is clear and obvious that the sponsors – at least Zoltan A. Simon in the case at bar – and the Crown (CIC) or its policies had nothing in common and did not constitute the required “meeting of the minds.” Therefore, Z.A. Simon has signed the forms unconsciously and his signature has been invalid from the beginning. He claims that his signature of January 1999 shall be removed from those two CIC forms.

  33. Z.A. Simon claims that the prescribed condition precedent in the CIC sponsorship forms regarding the involvement of a court – and the “Severability of terms…” clause to a smaller degree – were his main factors of signing his sponsorship agreement and undertaking forms in 1999. These two promises constituted a “causa sine qua non” for him. Without those two promises or conditions, he would not have signed the CIC forms but would have kept Ms. Reyes as his “long distance wife” (just like the Crown forced his present good wife, Ms. Zhong to become such wife).   

  34. The plaintiffs are of the opinion that the Liberal governments in power till the end of 2005 not to be blamed for this tortious situation. Allegorically speaking, they created the sponsorship undertaking forms and the IP 2 policy as scary guns or rifles containing bullets of aluminum foil but filled with chocolate inside. Such “toy guns” served to scare the sponsors morally and prevent them from abandoning the sponsored persons. Practically, there was no real punishment in force until 2004 or 2005. The sponsors were not injured and their families were not destroyed. (No person can successfully sue a ministry for scaring him by a toy gun if no injury or damage has happened.) However, from the beginning of 2006, Mr. Harper’s government started to change the soft components of the “gun” and the “bullets” gradually into steel. The weapons ceased to be scary toy rifles and become real weapons for the purpose of “mass destruction” against the sponsors, so to speak. From a moral obligation of the sponsors the Crown created rigid, absolute and unconditional “legal obligations” for them in secret, by a long list of torts and various illegal tricks. If the Crown was a party to each sponsorship agreement or undertaking, such repeated unilateral changes by the Crown have violated the sponsorship agreements and rendered them to frustrated agreements that ceased to be valid. From the legal point of view, the introduction of the IRPA rendered – or should have rendered – the previous sponsorship agreements into frustrated agreements because the whole legal framework has changed. It introduced radical changes to the detriment of the re-victimized sponsors that gave their signatures under the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its Regulations while granted major privileges to the new sponsors by reducing the term from ten years to three years. 

  35. The IP 2, the MoU and the CIC sponsorship or undertaking forms – at least from January 2006 – became “de facto law” for every administrator in Canada while the federal ministers forced them to ignore the real legislation, particularly the IRPA.

  36. Please refer to our diagram on p. 25 depicting the torts (misrepresentation, etc.) and the frustrated CIC sponsorship agreements from the re-victimized sponsors’ material point of view, with the ever changing and shifting obligations. It is needless to emphasize that the Crown – if it was a signing party to each pre-IRPA sponsorship agreement or contract in the family class – repeatedly violated paragraph 12. of those sponsorship agreements. The Crown was not allowed to change the terms of the agreements – what it did for example by the creation of the IRPA – and Zoltan A. Simon has not given his consent to that step that has changed the whole framework.

  37. Turning back to the chronology of the tortious material facts, the quite typical skeletal scenario in the case of re-victimized sponsors is as follows:
  38. The sponsored persons land in Canada. [In Z.A. Simon’s case it was on or about 27 December 1999.] Soon they abuse the sponsors verbally or/and physically while seek ways how to separate and become independent from the sponsors. [In Z.A. Simon’s case, the separation took place on or about June 14, 2000.] The sponsored persons find wealthier persons and refuse to cohabit with their sponsor spouses even if the latter provide good care of them and provide for their basic necessities.

  39. The sponsored persons seek and receive social assistance from a local ministry, only by claiming that their sponsors abused or/and abandoned them. The provincial ministry does not do any background check and does not contact the sponsors. Often there is no notification of the sponsors within six years, the usual limitation period in the provinces of Canada based on limitation law.

  40. The provincial ministry is in the belief – based on the false IP 2 policy – that each sponsor had signed a contract with a person and/or a minister. Those ministries are aware of the CIC sponsorship agreement and undertaking forms and s. 145. of the IRPA that apparently “grant” the provincial ministries the rights to pay any amount to the sponsored persons and later garnishee the sponsors at any time, while charging any rate of interest on the alleged debts. These factors are conceived by the provincial governments as sound and ambitious investments in the persons of the sponsors.

  41. Thus, for example, provincial government that accepted the highest number of Syrian refugees do not necessarily deserve any praise: the provincial ministries are aware of the prevailing torts in real life and expect a windfall from their “investments.” They know that, say, one in four sponsored persons eventually end up on social benefits. Then the provincial ministry waits for a decade and more by informing the sponsors about their “debts” while the ministry can charge any exorbitant or excessive interest rate on the top of the alleged debts by violating several laws of Canada.        
  42. Pursuant to 42 (1) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, SC 1999, c 17, ex-directors of the CRA should have performed their duties by acting honestly and in good faith, and by exercising care, diligence and skill.

  43. Or, pursuant to 42 (2) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, SC 1999, c 17, if the ex-directors of the CRA relied on a report of a lawyer or other professional, those directors should have provided the name and contact info of such person to Zoltan Andrew Simon during his previous court cases. So far the CRA and each Counsel to the AGC have remained silent whether those ex-directors of the CRA acted on their own (in bad faith or negligently), or, they relied on the improper advice of a lawyer or counsel when routinely transferred monies unlawfully from the tax accounts of the re-victimized sponsors to a provincial ministry without seeing any ministerial certificate.  

  44. The 30 September 2008 letter of Mr. O’Connor, Minister of National Revenue claims, “The CRA does not determine who will be identified for set-off action and a set off can only be suspended when the CRA is advised to do so by the originating department… the CRA is not given detailed information about an individual’s debt.”

  45. Further, the 7 August 2009 letter of Jean-Pierre Blackburn, Minister of National Revenue claims, “As indicated in my previous reply and in a letter of September 30, 2008, from my predecessor, the Honourable Gordon O’Connor, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) is unable to comment on your dispute with the Revenue Services of British Columbia. The CRA does not determine who will be identified for set-off action and is not given detailed information about the debt by the originating department or agency. As the CRA’s position has been explained to you on these two occasions, it considers the matter closed.”

  46. The plaintiffs find that such attitude of the CRA can be described as wilful blindness or lack of open-mindedness in light of the Canada Revenue Agency Act cited above. The ex-directors of the CRA knowingly and routinely have been giving away the monies of the re-victimized sponsors since about 2006 without colour of law: they clearly knew that the ministerial certificates – as prescribed by subsections 146 (1) and (2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the SCC verdict in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) did not exist on file in the Federal Court in any or most of the cases.

  47. The 13 November 2008 letter of Sylvia Dalman (Canada Revenue Agency’s Burnaby Fraser Appeals, Surrey BC) indicates the same tort. She wrote, “You may not object to the amount that Canada Revenue Agency is required to transfer to another agency to offset your account balance with that agency.”

  48. The and 3 February 2010 letter of Sylvia Dalman (CRA) alleges that “… the Canada Revenue Agency has no jurisdiction concerning the Citizenship and Immigration Canada sponsorship program and any indebtness [sic] that may arise from a sponsorship agreement.”

  49. The Crown or the CRA is unable to cite any paragraph of any legislation that supports such false allegation: the CRA is not “required to transfer” monies “to another agency” blindly, without colour of law by illegal means. The only relevant law is stated in sections 146 (1) and (2) of the IRPA coupled with the ground-breaking common law decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII).

  50. These letters show that the CRA ignores or keeps shifting all responsibility and power in the decision-making to the CIC while CIC does the same and shifting back the responsibility to RCA. When it becomes obvious that such false strategy does not work before independent and impartial judges, the CRA and the CIC simply try to shift the responsibility and the blame to the provincial revenue agency or/and the sponsors.    

  51.  On August 25, 2008, Z. Simon sent an e-mail message to Mr. Wally Oppal, then Attorney General of British Columbia, concerning his ongoing dispute with the federal and provincial governments in relation to the sponsorship program.

  52. Mr. Oppal’s reply dated 6 October 2008 was sent to the instant main plaintiff (Zoltan Andrew Simon). Mr. Oppal suggested him to bring his concerns about the sponsorship program to the attention of the Honourable Diane Finley, Minister (CIC). 

  53. The message of Mr. Oppal states, “… it is the provincial Ministry of Housing and Social Development that determines whether a debt is owing to the Government of British Columbia under that program… In her letter, Ms. Lipsack expressed our position, which is that the Undertaking to Assist a Member of the Family Class which you signed is a valid contract.” [Mr. Oppal’s argument is a misrepresentation of the IRPA and subsection 132 (4) of its Regulations since not such contract exists.]

  54. Zoltan A. Simon sent several letters to federal ministers including Diane Finley, Jason Kenney, Rob Nicholson and Stephen Harper. None of the few replies, if any, indicated any interest on the ministers’ behalf to resolve the series of unlawful and unconstitutional elements in the federal policies related to immigration, debts, or garnishment.

  55. Zoltan Andrew Simon’s letter dated 15 May 2009 was addressed and sent to Minister Ms. Diane Finley.

  56. These correspondences reveal that the federal and provincial ministers intended to apply the above mentioned policies and documents as being above the IRPA and other legislation. They considered it as a lawful way to override the valid legislation and punish the sponsors by unlawful means, by sheer power instead of lawful procedures. Their confidence shows that the ministers and public servants involved assumed that they have been above the laws of Canada in all material times.

  57. Further, the few replies of the federal and provincial ministers indicate that the federal Crown and the provincial Crown, at least in British Columbia, agreed on the misrepresentation of the IRPA and its IRP Regulations – including paragraph 132. (4) of the latter that is silent of any contract – by tortiously claiming that the sponsors had signed contracts. (Contracts are enforceable without the involvement of courts while agreements are not.)

  58. The most typical and cynical attitude was that of Mr. Rob Nicholson who was Minister of Justice and A.G. of Canada in and around 2011. He agreed with his Counsel or legal advisor [Henri A. Lafortune Inc.] to mislead the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada claiming that the sponsors had signed contracts and, therefore, the garnishment of the (alleged) debtors in the family class should take place by purely administrative ways, automatically. After the SCC decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011], supra, Mr. Nicholson simply ignored and disobeyed that verdict and advised his minister colleagues to follow the same course. 

  59. One of Mr. Nicholson’s duties or obligations included the supervision of the Court Administration Service. Although subsections 146 (1) and (2) of the IRPA implied the introduction and use of a book or electronic document for the Registry of the Federal Court in order to keep track of the certified debts of the defaulting sponsors Mr. Nicholson failed to enforce that requirement, particularly after the 2011 verdict of the SCC in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, supra. While knowingly insisting on such wilful omission, about the same time, Mr. Nicholson gave an interview – that was published in many Canadian newspapers – condemning white collar crime. (He said – not letter by letter – that the situation of victims of white collar crime was comparable to those that have been mugged in a street or back lane.)

  60. It is clear and obvious that if a Minister of Justice does not care about the existence of a certain book or electronic document in the FC Registry and prefers to conduct business without such record-keeping, an element of bad faith appears.      

  61. Zoltan A. Simon repeatedly requested written statements regarding the status of his alleged sponsorship debt but the Crown has always been unable or unwilling to provide any authoritative document. One of his letters dated 12 January 2012 was addressed to the Registrar or the Judicial Administrator of the Federal Court of Ottawa.

  62. He received a response signed by B. Balazic, Acting Senior Registry Officer, dated 24 January 2012. The brief letter lists seven court proceedings in which Z.A. Simon was shown to be a party. However, the Federal Court’s vague response fails to reveal which one of the seven cases would have dealt with his alleged debt: it seemed to him than none of them.

  63. As for the torts of Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada, he arbitrarily and unilaterally silenced section 61. of the Supreme Court Act in his wording of the SCC Rules and Act. He posted those truncated and misinterpreted versions on the official websites of the Supreme Court. By doing that, he gave the false impression for each Canadian that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act simply did not exist in practice and that section never applied in Canada.

  64. Mr. Bilodeau, in his “Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Print and Electronic)” issued by him in April 2011, has simply eliminated section 61. of the Supreme Court Act as non-existing. 

  65. Similarly, in his document entitled “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I, A guide for unrepresented litigants who want to apply for leave to appeal”, Mr. Bilodeau has silenced and eliminated section 61. of the Supreme Court Act as non-existing and never applicable.

  66. The texts of the relevant policies referred to in the two previous paragraphs are available on the Internet, on the official websites of the SCC Registry.

  67. Returning to the chronology of the related material facts, Zoltan A. Simon received a letter from the Supreme Court of Canada Registry dated 28 March 2012. It was signed by Mary Ann Achakji, Registry officer. She wrote, “This will acknowledge receipt of your document entitled ‘Notice of Appeal’, appealing a decision from the Federal Court of Appeal. After careful evaluation, we have determined that your documents cannot be processed as an appeal As of Right since it does not fall within the criteria set out in the Supreme Court Act 58 1(b).” This letter indicates that more than one administrator of the SCC Registry agreed not to process a properly submitted document pursuant to section 61. of the Supreme Court Act. In other words, the administrators agreed to disobey and contravene a statute: such action or omission belongs to the category of conspiracy. Administrators do not need to vote “after careful evaluation” but they must obey the clear wording of a section (s. 61.) of the Act.

  68. On 4 June 2012, Zoltan A. Simon sent a letter to Mr. Bilodeau, requesting information or data regarding the filing of his document and the status of his payments. 

  69. Zoltan A. Simon was forced, by unlawful and tortious means of the SCC Registry’s administrators, to file an Application for leave to appeal. Such situation is like a hypothetical one where a female super lightweight boxing champion is not allowed to fight within her own category in the Olympic Games but is forced into the category of the heavyweight males. I.e., the Supreme Court of Canada receives about 1000 applications for leave to appeal in each year and it is a physical impossibility for three judges to read, say, 100,000 pages of documents per year thoroughly. The result is a “Russian roulette” situation. It is understandable that those overloaded judges often rely on the concise submissions of a Crown Counsel, like those of Ms. Wendy Bridges in Zoltan A. Simon’s case in 2012, and simply dismiss such application.

  70. Ms. Wendy Bridges, Counsel for the AGC in 2011 and 2012 was extremely familiar with the pleadings of Zoltan A. Simon against Canada. In her submissions to the SCC, dated 18 June 2012, she submitted several false statements. She claimed (1.) “This case involves a routine motions court decision to strike out a deficient statement of claim…  (2.c) Ms. Reyes received social assistance benefits from June 2000 [the correct date was October 2000] and (18.) “To the extent this claim discloses a cause of action, it is against BC only.” The last one of the three false declarations was detrimental to Zoltan A. Simon’s situation resulting in the cruel punishment of his family by the unlawful blocking of his family’s reunification even till today.

  71. Counsel Ms. Bridges mislead justice (the three SCC judges) by deposition of a document that contained false statements, knowing that those statements were false: she committed perjury with intent to mislead them, and she was successful it that. Please refer to subsection 131 (1) of the Criminal Code. Perjury is an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

  72. Since Zoltan A. Simon’s Application for Leave to Appeal was dismissed under these tortious circumstances in 2012, he submitted a Motion for reconsideration to the SCC. Mr. Bilodeau replied him in a letter dated 18 December 2012 saying, “I have reviewed your motion for reconsideration and your affidavit in support. I regret to inform you that, in my opinion, your motion does not reveal the exceedingly rare circumstances which would warrant reconsideration by this Court. Furthermore, please note that Rule 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada is not applicable to this matter.”

  73. The plaintiffs respectfully submit that it is a tort on behalf of the Registrar not to issue an Order as prescribed but terminate the procedure by a personal letter, claiming that Rule 78 is not applicable. He has no right to do that since the ultimate decision always belongs to the SCC and not to him.

  74. On or about 10 February 2013, Zoltan Andrew Simon submitted a Notice of Constitutional Questions and served it on the Attorneys General of each province. 

  75. Mr. Bilodeau, SCC Registrar, sent a letter dated 14 August 2014 to Zoltan A. Simon acknowledging his notice of motion. The Registrar wrote, “However, your notice of motion raises the issue for the decision of a judge of this Court, and will be reviewed and processed accordingly.” The Court file number in that case was 35995.

  76. On or about 7 July 2014, Service Canada sent a letter to Zoltan A. Simon that was signed by N. LeBlanc-Lamarre. It contained a reply as follows, “We have received the Consent to Exchange Information form that you sent us, and we have requested proof of your entry to Canada from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) on your behalf. Please allow 3 to 6 months for a response from CIC. Once we receive this information, we will review your application and let you know if we need more information or documentation.”

  77. Previously Service Canada alleged that Z.A. Simon did not have minimum 20 years of Canadian residency for the portability of his OAS benefits although he had spent 38.5 years in Canada so the plaintiff found the 3 to 6 months limbo unlawful.

  78. On or about 14 July 2014, Zoltan A. Simon sent a letter to Ms. Suzanne Legault, Information Commissioner of Canada. In it, he complained about the CIC and Service Canada, claiming that they had violated subsections 4.(2.1), 7., 8(1) and 9.(2) of the Access to Information Act.

  79. She apparently has not received the complaint. Instead, an administrator named Eric Murphy replied the letter and falsely claimed in his letter dated 5 August 2014 that the Information Commissioner had no authority to get involved.

  80. On or about 22 August 2014, Zoltan A. Simon sent a letter to the Information Commissioner again, appealing Mr. Murphy’s decision.

  81. On or about 29 September 2014, Sandra George, Director, Intake and Early Resolution Unit, Complaints Resolution and Compliance (in the Office of the Information Commissioner) sent a letter to Z. Simon. She confirmed Mr. Murphy’s decision and added, “This benefits request is not a request under the Act.” But Z. A. Simon’s request was not about benefit but his years of Canadian residence to ensure the portability of his future OAS benefits. His request was under s. 7. of the Access to Information Act that obliged the CIC to send the info within 30 days to Service Canada. The CIC disobeyed that section since the CIC is listed at the end of that Act

  82. As a result of the unlawful red tape tort, the first OAS payment for Z.A. Simon arrived with a delay of five months, in November 2014 when he received the cumulative OAS benefits. It was too late for him to get a new passport, Chinese visa, airplane tickets at a decent price, and make arrangements in a haste for a month off with his employer. The result of the unreasonable delay of CIC and Service Canada was that he was unable to visit his family in China in 2014.

  83. On 10 March, 2016, Mr. Bilodeau sent a reply to Z.A. Simon that contained the following, “Further to your letter dated February 9, 2016 and our letter to you dated February 19, 2016, I wish to remind you that the circumstances under one can file a Notice of Appeal in this court without first obtaining leave to appeal are very limited. In certain criminal matters, there are a few provisions for appeals as of right. For example, section 691 of the Criminal Code allows for appeals as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada where there is a dissent in the Court of Appeal on a point of law. [New paragraph] After careful evaluation, I have determined that your Notice of Appeal from Simon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCCA 52, docket no. CA42664, an appeal from an order striking the whole of your claim without leave to amend and dismissing your action, relates to civil proceedings for which there is no automatic right to appeal to this Court. I am therefore refusing to accept the Notice of Appeal for filing pursuant to Rules 8(2) and 19(2)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (“the Rules”) on the basis that it does not comply with the Rules. [New paragraph] In support of my decision, I also refer you to the judgment of Mr. Justice Cromwell of this Court (copy enclosed), dated October 13, 2015, in S.H. v. Ministère de l’emploi et de la solidarité sociale et al. (36674), wherein he states that:

    To accept a notice of appeal for filing under Rule 19(2)(a), the Registrar must be satisfied that, at the very least, the provision or provisions mentioned in the document provide for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. If they do not, the Registrar is entitled to refuse the document for filing pursuant to Rule 8(2) and 19(2)(a) on the basis that it does not comply with the Rules.” 

  84. Although the plaintiff could not find a copy of the cited common law enclosed the verdict of Mr. Justice Cromwell has nothing to do with the application of section 61. of the Supreme Court Act.

  85. Since administrators of the SCC Registry often refer to “certain criminal matters” as exemptions one is puzzled about Parliament’s legislative intent. Say, a top police officer tries to coerce a woman to have sex but she resists. Then the officer takes her baby by force and the Crown protects him in the lower courts. The mother is not charged criminally. She alleges errors in law but the Registrar blocks her Notice of Appeal from being filed. Is it Parliament’s intent that, in her despair, she needs to commit a crime – say by sending a document impregnated with anthrax for filing – and as a criminal having thus murdered an innocent administrator of the SCC Registry her case could finally be allowed to be heard by the nine SCC judges?

  86. On 8 March 2016, Zoltan A. Simon sent a letter to Mr. J. Ian Burchett, Consul General in Hong Kong, pointing out the systemic violations of the IRPA by Canadian administrators nationwide, including visa officers abroad. He received no reply.

  87. On 18 March, 2016, the Immigration Section of the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong sent an unsigned decision to Ms. Zhong and Z.A. Simon based on an unfounded allegation that their marriage was not genuine. They refused to issue a visa to Ms. Zhong for the second time. Z.A. Simon appealed the unlawful decision.

  88. On 29 March 2016, Z.A. Simon sent a detailed letter of three pages to The Honourable John McCallum, Minister of Immigration, listing the repeated violations of the IRPA by the Crown. So far he has not received any reply from that ministry. 

  89. In the spring of 2016, Zoltan A. Simon submitted a motion to a Judge, the Chief Justice, or the Court [SCC] to state constitutional questions. He submitted a Reply to response to the Motion on 1 April 2016.

  90. On 12 April 2016, Z.A. Simon received a reply from Mr. Bilodeau stating, “Further to receipt of your motion to state constitutional questions dated March 18, 2016, I wish to advise you that pursuant to Rule 60(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, a motion to state constitutional questions may only be filed after leave has been granted or after the filing of a notice of appeal for which leave is not required. I refer you to our previous letter dated March 10, 2016, in which it was determined that your notice of appeal could not be accepted for filing and in which you were advised that leave to appeal needed to be sought in order for you to pursue your matter before this Court.”
  91. This letter of the Registrar referred to in the previous paragraph is in sharp contrast with his earlier letter dated letter dated 14 August 2014 to Zoltan Andrew Simon, “However, your notice of motion raises the issue for the decision of a judge of this Court, and will be reviewed and processed accordingly.” It is illogical that a simple matter can raise an issue but over forty serious constitutional question cannot raise any issue. (Otherwise, the circumstances were identical: a Notice of Appeal submitted under section 61. of the Act but refused for filing.)

  92. On 15 April 2016, N. Gauthier, Chief of Departmental Correspondence Unit (Department of Finance Canada) sent a letter to Z.A. Simon. It acknowledged his letter of 2 March 2016 addressed to the Honourable Bill Morneau. The letter goes, “The matter you raise falls more directly within the jurisdiction of the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, the Honourable John McCallum. Therefore, we have forwarded a copy of your correspondence to his office.” In the plaintiff’s mind, the Department of Finance should have sent his letter to the Director of the CRA or the Minister of National Revenue since those authorities have signed the tortious MOU in 2006 with the CIC. Every administrator of the Crown seems to prefer to shift the responsibility to Mr. McCallum but he is too busy with the Syrian refugees.

  93. Generally speaking, each minister of Canada is responsible for the mess and torts inherited from his or her predecessors. For comparison, a new owner of a car dealership has similar responsibilities. If the new owner bought the dealership from a previous owner – that bought short time ago from an even earlier owner – and he keeps receiving complaints from the public claiming that several of the dealership’s vehicles were stolen from someone he is obliged to report that to the police. It is not sufficient if he or she tells to the reporters, “I have faith in the integrity of the system and the honesty of my predecessors.”      

  94. False statements of Crown employees (deposited by two counsel):

  95. On or about 23 May 2014, Zoltan Andrew Simon and his wife Ms. Zhong as plaintiffs filed a Statement of Civil Claim against the AGC and AGBC in Golden, BC. 

  96. On 26 June 2014, Ms. Alison Brown, Counsel for AGC in the Department of Justice, British Columbia Regional Office (Vancouver) filed a Response to Civil Claim. In it, she falsely stated for the Supreme Court of British Columbia that all 193 paragraphs of the plaintiffs were untrue.

  97. On or about July 9, 2014, Mr. Mark Witten, Counsel for the AGBC in the Vancouver office of the BC Ministry of Justice submitted a similar false statement in his Response to Civil Claim to the Supreme Court of British Columbia claiming that all of the 193 paragraphs in the plaintiffs’ Statement of Civil Claim were untrue.           

  98. Under “Disobeying a statute,” subsection 126 (1) of the Criminal Code states, “Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament by wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”

     

  99. Misrepresentation in current CIC forms and policies:

  100. As we refer to paragraph 18 on page 6 above, there is a fillable  CIC form entitled “Application to sponsor, sponsorship agreement and undertaking” marked IMM 1344 (03-2016) E on the Internet, on the official website of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Under its subtitle Sponsor Eligibility Assessment (on page 2 of 7), question 9 goes, “Have persons you previously sponsored of their family members received social assistance during the validity period of the undertaking?”

  101. Since that Question 9 must be read in tandem with Guide 3900 – Sponsorship of a spouse, common-law partner, conjugal partner or dependent child living outside Canada, marking a YES answer at Question 9 results the following situation: Page 27 of 54 of Guide 3900 – just above the subtitle “Co-Signer Personal Details” – shows, “● If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question between 5 and 15  ○ You are not eligible to be a sponsor. You should not submit an application.” Such direction is an open misrepresentation of the IRPA, relating to a relevant matter that induces major errors in the administration of this Act. Whoever has finalized such wording is guilty of an indictable offence. A person who contravenes a provision of section 126 or 127 of the IRPA is guilty of an offence and liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years, or to both, pursuant to sections 126 through 129 of the IRPA.

  102. The plaintiffs claim that a “YES” answer for question 9 under Sponsor Eligibility Assessment on CIC form IMM 1344 (03-2016) E does not disqualify sponsors since they may have repaid their debts or became discharged bankrupts. Thus, the relevant unnumbered paragraph of Guide 3900 should correctly read as follows: “If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question between 5 and 8 or 10 and 15, You are not eligible to be a sponsor. You should not submit an application.” It is clear and obvious that if CIC prohibits sponsors to submit their applications with a “Yes” answer at question 9 under Sponsor Eligibility Assessment, the CIC will never receive such application and consequently would never grant Canadian permanent resident visas for the family members abroad. The misinterpretation is causing a shortage of qualified good immigrants in the family class. [Note: another solution for improvement would be to make the text under question 9 longer by mentioning the cases of exceptions.]

     

  103. DETAILED MATERIAL FACTS THAT GAVE RISE TO THE CLAIMS:

     

  104. For a list of documents covering the events before the summer of 2012 the plaintiffs have a table briefly describing the relevant correspondence related to the main events with their exact dates. However, they are not allowed to include such table because the Crown may claim that it is a document which is considered evidence.

  105. In general, the five-page (1st) Affidavit of Melissa Salvador [see pages 55-59 of the 2015 Appeal Book at the BC Court of Appeal in the possession of Alison Brown, Counsel for the AGC] gives a good summary of the previous court actions of Zoltan A. Simon. Please note that Ms. Salvador considers a cluster of court cases and court file numbers originating from the same claim as one “action,” and not separate cases. Also, the Court File Numbers (A-237-10 at para. 11 and A-232-11 at para. 14) could have been inserted.

  106. The original event that started or triggered the legal issues was a marriage of Z.A. Simon with Ms. Margarita Reyes in December 1998 and sponsoring her in January 1999 with her two minor sons.

  107. Since their landing on or about 27 December 1999, Ms. Reyes and her two minor sons lived with Z.A. Simon, in the latter’s apartment in Port Moody, British Columbia.

  108. Ms. Reyes lived with her sponsor for less than six months in British Columbia. She wanted to live independently and separately. She applied for and received social assistance benefits in Port Moody, B.C., in October 2000. (The ministry involved paid her benefits for five years while they sent her to several English courses for four years, violating para. 16. of the Employment and Assistance Regulation, BC Reg 263/2002.)

  109. Z. Simon informed the Crown of the irregular situation in/about August 2000 but he has not received any notification from the Crown regarding any default or debt.

  110. After their physical separation – without a written separation agreement – on or about 14 June 2000, Zoltan A. Simon and Margarita Reyes divorced from each other in early 2002.

  111. Zoltan Andrew Simon and Ms. ZuanHao Zhong – the instant appellants – married in China in December 2006. In February 2007, he sponsored her so they applied for the Canadian immigration of Ms. Zhong and her son Mr. Ye, then 15 years old. In April 2007, Canada’s visa officer refused to grant them immigrant status. The only ground of refusal was the alleged debt of the sponsor under the IRPA (that did not have any power or effect in October 2000 when the so-called default took place).

     

  112. Ms. Zhong and Zoltan Simon appealed the visa officer’s decision. It took about 2.5 years till a hearing took place with the IAD (Immigration Appeal Division) of the IRB. The decision was delivered in November 2009, almost three years after their marriage. In it, the Tribunal, Ms. Kashi Mattu, claimed that the visa officer had acted correctly. (Both decisions showed Zoltan A. Simon’s “debt” as the sole reason for the refusal of Ms. Zhong’s immigration in Canada.) Their reasoning was based on certain paragraphs of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) and its Regulations. Those two enactments did not yet exist when Z.A. Simon signed his previous sponsorship undertaking forms, or, when the “default” took place.

  113. The Crown has closed the immigration file of Ms. Reyes in 1999 and has never claimed (or notified Z.A. Simon regarding) any pending matter. The Crown was silent for almost eight years while Z.A. Simon was unaware of any debt or debt claim against him, until June 2008. The Crown improperly assumed that the IRPA (2002) applied retroactively while the following laws did not apply at all: s. 32. of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50; s. 3(5) and 9(1) of the Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, or s. 39. of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.

     

  114. The plaintiffs claim that the said decisions contravene the IRPA and its Regulations and, therefore, are invalid in law, also the February 2007 lock-in-date shall apply for both Ms. Zhong and her son Mr. Ye. The instant plaintiffs do not request this Court to revise, modify, or cancel the visa officer’s 2007 decision but request to state or declare that the February 2007 lock-in-date shall govern in the upcoming second appeal hearing of Ms. Zhong and Mr. Simon who are waiting for the scheduling of a hearing with the IRB-IAD (Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division). It may take years till that hearing without a remedy. 

  115. In 2010, the Federal Court dismissed Z.A. Simon’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Tribunal’s verdict of November 2009.

  116. The instant plaintiffs are not trying to undermine or challenge the original decision of the Designated Visa Officer, the Tribunal, and the consequent decision of the Federal Court. That would be quite useless by now. Those officers did they best under the improper pressure of a dictatorship and simply did not want to lose their jobs. (The Harper regime was based on intimidation and fear. Even the AGC seemed to be acting out of fear in this case: he was pressed to defend and cover up the errors and omissions of his predecessor while he was concerned that he may be “thrown under the bus”, so to speak, or, he did not want to be shuffled to a lower position by the lord of life and death.)

     

  117. Zoltan A. Simon has never acknowledged his alleged debt and never made a payment, except the illegal garnishment of his tax account by the Crown (CRA) in 2008 and 2009. A court (Madam Justice Snider) has correctly admitted that the actual garnishment was done by the CRA, under the request or pressure of a ministry of British Columbia.

  118. In 2007-2013, Zoltan A. Simon sued the Government of Canada in several cases in the federal court system where the AGBC was not a Defendant. During those hearings – usually in chambers where showing evidence was not allowed, following the Crown’s applications to strike his claims – the Federal Court and the FCA kept denying jurisdiction in some key issues on the ground that the Government of BC had requested or ordered to garnish his tax credits since the summer of 2008. The courts have ignored the fact that the style of cause page of his pleadings has never showed the Government or A.G. of British Columbia as a Defendant (except as shown below).

     

  119. On June 28, 2009, Zoltan A. Simon sent notices of Constitutional Question to each A.G. Since then, the A.G. of every province and territory, and the A.G. of Canada have been well aware of the systematic violations of Canada’s several laws by the Crown. Between 2009 and 2016, Zoltan A. Simon has repeatedly submitted longer and longer lists of his constitutional questions to the AGC and the Attorneys General of each province and territory but none of those AGs wished to participate in the discussion of those matters. The Crown cannot claim “surprise” now about the issues.

  120. Zoltan A. Simon filed a civil claim against the AGC and the AGBC in 2009, under Court File Number S097926. The Crown claimed – despite the interpretation of the word “Minister” in the Interpretation Act which covered a “Deputy Minister” as well – that he had made an incurable error or defect by showing “Deputy Attorney General” instead of “Attorney General” in the style of cause. The Registry was unwilling to remove the words “Deputy.” The procedure came to a halt. Due to his ongoing appeals in the federal court system, Z. Simon had to file a Notice of Discontinuation at the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court on 27 May 2010. Thus, the first procedure in BC has not ended with a hearing or verdict at all.

     

  121. On 11 March 2009, Zoltan A. Simon filed a claim against Ms. Penelope Lipsack, Counsel to the AGBC or a ministry, in her personal capacity. The Honourable Judge Wishart of the Supreme Court of BC, rightfully, delivered an order against him on May 14, 2009. The verdict was correct but until that point Z.A. Simon was unable to find out whether the tort was created by Ms. Lipsack alone, or, by the Crown.

  122. The Notice of Civil Claim, filed on 23 May 2014 by the instant plaintiffs in Golden, British Columbia, did not attack or challenge any of the previous decisions of the judges and the IRB/IAD Tribunal regarding the immigration of ZuanHao ZHONG and her son Mr. YE. Those verdicts and their destructive or damaging effects have been and remained irreversible. Instead, Zoltan Andrew Simon had to file for personal bankruptcy as the only solution to become eventually discharged, free of debt or claims, and then to sponsor his wife again. Thus, in 2014, they claimed damages against the AGC (Canada) and AGBC (British Columbia) for their torts but there was no claim for direction, statutory declaration or mandamus at that point. Between 2007 and present, no court has dealt with any of his properly submitted constitutional questions. There was not a single judge involved that was willing or allowed to address any of his constitutional questions or questions of high public importance.

  123. In April 2015, the plaintiffs filed a new application at CIC in April 2015 for the immigration of Ms. ZuanHao ZHONG and her son (and a visa officer in Hong Kong refused to grant a visa in March 2016 claiming that their marriage had not been genuine). This constituted lack of procedural fairness because the issue after 9.5 years of happy marriage took Ms. Zhong and Mr. Simon by surprise. Such capricious verdict – without any hint or notice – prevented them to re-submit a DVD showing the wedding dinner reception and many photos already submitted to the CIC in 2007.

      

  124. As we mentioned above, the originating fact of most of these proceedings was a family class sponsorship undertaking of Zoltan A. Simon for Ms. Margarita Lourdes REYES, an ex-wife. In January 1999, he signed a CIC Sponsorship Agreement form – that seemed to be a gentlemen’s agreement containing joint (but not joint and severable) obligations of the sponsor and the sponsored person. Also, he signed the prescribed CIC Undertaking form.

  125. Neither of those two CIC forms show any original or printed signature of a Minister or his/her representative, not even a line for it. The titles of the forms did not imply that they were contracts to which a Minister was a party. In 2007, the plaintiffs were unaware of the CIC policies named IP 2 and the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) between the Minister of CIC and a nameless Commissioner of the Canada Revenue Agency. The instant plaintiffs could not discover the tortious and fraudulent nature of those two policies before 2012 or so. Zoltan A. Simon discovered these two policies on the Internet by accident. The fraudulent nature of those two documents was not obvious at the first glance, only in light of the actual administrative steps or silence of the involved Crown officials nationwide.

  126. The date of vague discoverability is about 11 October 2012 when Z.A. Simon received a document from the authorities of British Columbia following his inquiry of a ministerial certificate regarding his alleged debt towards British Columbia. Then he became suspicious that perhaps no ministerial certificate had existed at any court of Canada at all. It did not seem to be part of “reasonable diligence” to investigate based on an assumption that top administrators of more than one ministry – both on the federal and provincial level – kept acting as professional criminals would act.  

  127. If none of our ministers – as No. 1 experts about the operation of their departments – and our federal judges have been aware of these torts as part of a money extortion scheme against the sponsors, an average Canadian citizen is not obliged to be more familiar with the situation. The plaintiffs are not professional detectives.

     

  128. It is obvious for any sensible tribunal, registrar, master, or judge that a forced separation of spouses or family members for almost a decade caused serious financial hardship and damages for them. The plaintiffs did not waste pages to explain the damages in detail. For example, Ms. Zhong wanted to have a baby from Z.A. Simon in 2007 and 2008 but the Crown’s resistance made it obvious for them that their family could remain separated forever since they had been unable to pay over $38,000 that kept increasing by almost $200 monthly, due to the unlawfully calculated compound interest. After a few passing years the question of planning a baby has become obsolete. Now Ms. Zhong is in her 54th year so she cannot have a child anymore.

  129. During the previous court cases of Zoltan A. Simon, elements of regular procedural unfairness, pressure on court administrators and counsel – the latter in 2012 by Crown counsel’s false statement deposited at the SCC Registry in order to mislead its judges – indicated desperate cover-ups on the Crown’s behalf by all (illegal) means. The outlines of the largest tort system in Canada’s history since 1867 appeared more and more clearly to the main plaintiff day by day.

  130. For the first time in our history, the state has become schizophrenic in the sense that it has developed two separate heads that fight each other. Namely, Camp A consists of the laws of Canada that is Parliament’s will and intent supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and common law consisting of thousands of case law precedents. Camp B, the ministries’ administrators, pressed hard by the federal Cabinet or/and the PMO, systematically undermines the power of Camp A in order to convert Canada for a miserable dictatorship forever.  Thus, the plaintiffs – and the families of the re-victimized sponsors, particularly from pre-IRPA years – are being ground between these two “millstones” rotating into the opposite directions. (This old wording was taken from an old file and still refers to the summer of 2015.)

     

  131. MORE DETAILED MATERIAL FACTS RELIED UPON

  132. The plaintiffs are Zoltan Andrew SIMON and his wife Zuan Hao ZHONG (Zhong Zuan Hao in Chinese). The latter is citizen of the People’s Republic of China. They are pleading in their personal capacity as two individuals forming a single party since Z.A. Simon is representing Ms. Zhong and himself. Their address for service is the same.

  133. Zoltan A. Simon is Canadian citizen since 1979. In the following pleadings the word “plaintiff” always refers to Zoltan Andrew Simon, the main plaintiff.

  134. On 4 January 2011, Ms. Zhong and her son Mr. Ye signed an affidavit before a state notary public office in China, authorizing Zoltan A. Simon to represent them in any court case or hearing in Canada, by transferring their interests to him pursuant to section 117 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules.

  135. In 2014, in the Statement of Claim of the two plaintiffs, the two Defendants were: (A): The Attorney General of Canada in his representative capacity (representing four ministries and two court registries of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada) and (B): The Attorney General of British Columbia (representing four provincial ministries of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia). Both Defendant parties were sued in their representative capacity. There were no individual defendants.

  136. Both defendants included Canada’s Crown servants, employees, agents and/or departmental or other officers and ministers responsible for the lawful operation of the CRA (Canada Revenue Agency) – maybe the Minister of National Revenue or Minister of Finance, or both – and the CIC (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration Canada), the Ministry of Justice or the federal authority responsible for the lawful operation of the Courts Administration Service, particularly the FC/FCA Registry in Edmonton, and the Ottawa Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada. As for British Columbia, four branches of the BC Government were also included: RSBC (Revenue Services of BC), Ministry of Housing and Social Development, Ministry of Finance, and Ombudsman BC. Again, this is not a claim against BC.

     

  137. The key officials of the Crown that have caused the damages in different torts for the plaintiffs were called “honourable tortfeasors” in those pleadings, since it was hard to find a better definition for this group. It included the ministers of the CIC (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, or Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism): Mr. Monte Solberg (January 2006 to January 3, 2007), Ms. Diane Finley (January 4, 2007 to October 29, 2008), Mr. Jason Kenney (October 30, 2008 to July 14, 2013), and Mr. Chris Alexander (from July 15, 2013); the ministers of Human Resources and Skills [or Social] Development: Ms. Diane Finley (January 2006 to January 4, 2007 and from October 30, 2008 to July 15, 2013); ministers of Department of Justice [Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General]: Mr. Vic Toews (February 6, 2006 to January 3, 2007), Mr. Rob Nicholson (January 4 2007 to July 14, 2013), and Mr. Peter MacKay (from July 15, 2013 to November 2015).

  138. The unnamed Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer as signatory to the policy named MOU, the head of the CRA, or/and the Minister(s) of national Revenue within the material times also belonged to this group. (Or, rather, the Deputy Commissioner named Mr. Bill Baker who had knowledge of the matters.) Further members of this honourable group were Mr. Stephen Harper, Prime Minister, Mr. Wally Oppal (A.G. of BC), Ms. Penelope Lipsack (Counsel to the Government of BC has also been involved and even sued by Zoltan Andrew Simon), Mr. Gordon O’Connor and Jean-Pierre Blackburn, both Ministers of National Revenue, and Ms. Sylvia Dalman (CRA). As for the employees of the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Ms. Mary Ann Achakji, Ms. Barbara Kincaid, Ms. Nathalie Beaulieu and Mr. Michel Jobidon were connected with the torts. Finally, Mr. Daniel Gosselin represented the Courts Administration Service. The Attorneys General of Canada and BC had vicarious liability for the acts, errors, and omissions of all these officials listed above.

  139. In those pleadings submitted in May 2014, the plaintiffs asserted that all of the public servants of Canada and BC in question made their acts and omissions during their employment with the Crown, in all material times. (The Crown is free to sue any of them as third parties if they acted in their personal capacity.)

  140. The torts against Zoltan A. Simon and his wife Zuanhao Zhong took place in Ottawa (Ontario), Greater Vancouver and Victoria (British Columbia), and Hong Kong (Consulate General of Canada), between January 1999 and the present day.  

  141. The plaintiff has a personal tax account (S.I.N. 718 579 337) with both Defendant. Also, he had an active tax file with the Province of BC between 1976 and 2002. Both plaintiffs have a shared CIC file, with Client #20925897, KIT ID #200710018372, in the Mississauga Case Processing Centre. Therefore, in all material times since 4 January 1999, the Defendants owed a standard duty of care obligation to Mr. Simon, and since 21 February 2007 to Ms. Zhong.

  142. Ms. Zhong, one of the two plaintiffs, was born on xxxxx xx, 1962 in Qingyuan, Guangdong Province, China. Presently she is a homemaker, with a low monthly pension income, while she is working for a modest living as well.

  143. The main plaintiff, Zoltan Andrew Simon, is a self-represented litigant. He was born in Budapest, Hungary, on xxxx xx, 1949. His original professions were geologist and land surveyor, with diplomas. He came to Canada in 1976 as a landed immigrant and worked in Canada – mainly in civil, mining, and railway engineering in BC – until 2002. He worked in Ontario till 2007 as a textile operator, finally since June 2008 as a security officer in Alberta. He is author of several published books about world history. He is resident of Red Deer, Alberta.

  144. The plaintiff’s two children were born in Vancouver: Rita (32) and Eric (30). Both of them are living in the Greater Vancouver area and have sons. In 1998, when his children were not living with him, the plaintiff felt lonely and wanted to have and support a family again.

  145. Thus, the plaintiff married Margarita Reyes in December 1998 in Honduras. She was citizen of Honduras, now Canadian. He sponsored her with her two minor sons on or about January 4, 1999. The Defendant CIC instructed the plaintiff to sign the “Sponsorship Agreement IMM 1344 C (02-98) E” and “Undertaking IMM 1344 B (02-98) E” forms. He considered it a moral and personal “gentlemen’s agreement” with Ms. Reyes. It did not contain the term “joint and several” contract or agreement. It was a severable bilateral agreement listing the joint obligations of both the sponsor and the sponsored person. It was not a maintenance agreement. Ms. Reyes and Z.A. Simon were joint promisors towards each other, not towards a ministry.

     

  146. Ms. Reyes and her two sons arrived in Canada on or around December 27, 1999 as landed immigrants in the family class. (The DOB of Richard is 1991-09-17 while Christhian’s DOB is 1996-09-19.) They resided in the plaintiff's rent-to-own apartment in Port Moody (BC) until January 1, 2001. Ms. Reyes spoke a basic English but they communicated mainly in Spanish. She was a healthy, smart and attractive person, an ideal candidate for a job in Canada. She did not work before 2005. [Therefore, pursuant to the BC law, she did not qualify for any social benefit, only for a hardship assistance, loan or similar.] The plaintiff worked as a self-employed owner-operator delivery driver in those days. The money that he made was sufficient to support his sponsored new family members but his wife kept spending more than his income.

  147. The plaintiff supported the sponsored person(s) in his home in Port Moody until January 1, 2001 regarding all costs related to dwelling, despite of his involuntary separation from Ms. Reyes after mid-June 2000, due to the following incident.

  148. One day, about mid-June 2000, the plaintiff had only $50 left and he had to buy gas for his van. The sponsored immigrant wanted to take away that money but the plaintiff resisted. He was abused verbally and physically. In the morning, the plaintiff packed up his van and moved out, preventing further violence in front of the children. He found a miserable room for rent (for $10 per day) where the wind blew the snow inside through the cracks in the winter.

     

  149. In July 2000, the plaintiff tried to make peace with Ms. Reyes but she preferred to live independently, not allowing him to return and sleep in his room. The plaintiff brought them some food occasionally. About August 2000, he sent a letter to the Case Processing Centre in Mississauga, explaining the real situation for the CIC. As re remembers, he wrote that he loved Ms. Reyes and would support her if they formed a family, living together. He promised that he would pay all the costs of the sponsored persons related to dwelling and bills for services until January 1, 2001 in any case. (He kept his word regarding that promise.) In his letter he stated that he had never promised to anyone to maintain two separate dwellings and, on the long run, he was unable to do so.

  150. Apparently the CIC forwarded the contents of the plaintiff’s letter to the B.C. Ministry of Housing and Social Development. Thus, the Crown’s public servants had been aware of the problem long before the first social assistance payment to Ms. Reyes. (However, they have never contacted the plaintiff until 2007.)

  151. In or about September 2000, Ms. Reyes applied for social benefits in Port Moody, BC. The ministry involved has not sent any letter to the plaintiff regarding a debt and he has not received any phone call from any official either. The CIC has remained silent as well. The Crown has not sent him any notification regarding the status of his wife’s application for social benefits.

  152. Apparently, she started to receive benefits from the Government of BC in October 2000. Thus, a default of the Sponsorship Agreement took place in October 2000.

  153. In or about 2001, administrators of a ministry of British Columbia sent the sponsored immigrant to about four full-time English courses within a period of four years or so.

  154. Pursuant to subsection 16  (1) (a) of the Employment and Assistance Regulation, B.C. Reg. 263/2002:

    Employment and Assistance Regulation

    [includes amendments up to B.C. Reg. 340/2008, December 2, 2008]

     

    Effect of family unit including full-time student

16 (1)  A family unit is not eligible for income assistance for the period described in subsection (2) if an applicant or a recipient is enrolled as a full-time student

(a) in a funded program of studies, or

(b) in an unfunded program of studies without the prior approval of the minister.

(2)  The period referred to in subsection (1)

(a) extends from the first day of the month following the month in which classes commence and continues until the last day of the month in which exams in the relevant program of studies are held, and

(b) is not longer than one year.

[am. B.C. Reg. 284/2003.]

 

  1. Thus, between 2002 and 2008, a family unit of Ms. Reyes was not eligible for income assistance because she was enrolled as a full-time student in a funded program of studies four times and each study was shorter than a year. The BC ministry involved paid her benefits unlawfully, at least between September 2002 and October 2005. The case of Ntibarimungu v. British Columbia (Employment and Assistance Appeal Tribunal), 2015 BCCA 392 was somewhat similar.

     

  2. Pursuant to subsection 18 (1) of the Employment and Assistance Regulation, B.C. Reg. 263/2002,, under Requirement for 2 years employment, “For the purposes of section 8 (1) (a) of the Act, an applicant must have been employed for remuneration for at least 840 hours in each of the 2 consecutive years.” Ms. Reyes did not have any employment before receiving the BC benefits from 2000 to 2005.

  3. Thus, the provincial ministry granted social benefits improperly or unlawfully for the sponsored person: it has removed her from the work force of British Columbia for about four years to the detriment of her sponsor. (If a mother of two minor children is required to study more than six hours daily – while her children are in the school – and has to spend the rest of her days with the children at home she is unable to accept any employment.)

        

  4. Pursuant to ss. 118. (2) of the Immigration Act, 1976 [that came into power in 1978],or, the Sponsorship Agreement, theBC Government or its Minister could have brought a court proceeding against Zoltan Andrew Simon but such proceeding has never taken place. Or, the said BC Minister could have granted hardship assistance for Ms. Reyes, pursuant to ss. 4 (a). of the BC Benefits (Income Assistance) Act. Or, pursuant to ss. 9 (1)(a) of the same Act, the Minister may have taken action if Ms. Reyes has failed to demonstrate reasonable efforts to search for suitable employment. (Ms. Reyes accepted the first job that the Ministry offered her in 2005.) 

  5. In 2000 or 2001, Zoltan A. Simon fell behind his obligation to pay the monthly $300 child support for his 15-year old son Eric (by his mother and guardian, Ms. Irma Ortega), residents of Surrey, BC.

  6. By January 1, 2001, the plaintiff lost his nice rent-to-own apartment in Port Moody, his investment for about two years, due to the earlier incident with Ms. Reyes.

  7. In or about March 2001, the BC ministry responsible for the administration of child support started to garnishee the pay cheques of the plaintiff at Reliable Couriers (Coquitlam, BC). The said ministry sent 50% of his gross income – about 75 or 80% of his net income – to Ms. Ortega, then wife of Mr. Peña. The garnishment by the BC ministry took place unlawfully. They disobeyed the law prescribing that the portions of gross income necessary for the debtor to spend as expenditures, in order to maintain his business, should have taken into consideration. Thus, the plaintiff ended up on welfare. He tried to get help from Legal Aid on Kingsway in Burnaby (BC) but they said his situation was too complicated. They were unwilling to assist him. (In reality, no Legal Aid office in Canada seems to be allowed to help the victims of government torts.)

  8. By the summer of 2001 the plaintiff understood that the smart and attractive Ms. Reyes had found a boyfriend in the person of a neighbour living on the same floor. The boyfriend supported her financially for five years.

  9. Therefore, although the plaintiff wanted to keep working as a self-employed contractor and to support his family members, he was disabled to do so. [In general, an average person cannot survive on 20 or 25% of his or her net income.] The plaintiff was on social benefits for 11 months and he filed for bankruptcy at that time. He hated to appear as a “welfare bum” and rather “fled” to a pen-friend overseas. He left BC on January 30 or 31, 2002 for Brazil where he resided in exile for 19 months. In the meantime, most of his documents, books and notes – that had been stored in the house of his daughter’s schoolmate – have been thrown to the garbage or perished.

  10. The plaintiff, Z.A. Simon, divorced Ms. Reyes in January 2002 as he remembers. As stated above, he “fled” Canada to Brazil, due to the harassment of the Crown (BC).

  11. After 19 months in “exile”, regardless the uncertainties in his future, the plaintiff returned to Canada from Brazil. He was afraid to return to BC so he lived at a homeless shelter near Toronto or Brampton, for about two months, then he moved to Arnprior, Ontario.

  12. During the year 2002 and/or 2003 the debtor’s driver’s licence was suspended but was reinstated when he became a discharged bankrupt upon his return from Brazil.

  13. On or about November 18, 2003, the plaintiff received a response signed by the Hon. Martin Cauchon, then Canada’s Minister of Justice. The letter was polite but contained only beautiful words without any solution regarding the BC ministry’s unlawful garnishment action.

  14. In March 2005, the plaintiff sent a birthday card to Ms. Reyes. Soon he learned that she had just broken up with her boyfriend. The plaintiff suggested to Ms. Reyes to cohabit again and form a family but she wanted to remain independent, living separately.

  15. As we stated above, Ms. Reyes unlawfully and unnecessarily received social benefits from the Province of B.C. from October 2000 to June 2005 but the Crown failed to inform the plaintiff about it. Against the BC laws regarding full-time students, she received social benefits for almost five years while the administrators of BC sent her to several English language courses for about four years. This way the Province unilaterally removed the sponsored person from the work force of BC.

  16. In or about June 2005, the plaintiff learned from Ms. Reyes that the proper BC Ministry – after almost five years of limbo or silence – started to encourage her to get employment, so she has accepted the first job offered to her by the agents of that Ministry. As far as the plaintiff understands, she has been working since then. 

  17. In 2006, the ministers or leaders of the CIC and the CRA signed agreements with each other in order to facilitate the garnishment of the sponsors in default. They published two documents, named “IP 2” and “MOU”, primarily for the use of their administrators. These two policies disagreed with the legislation but enabled the administrators to eliminate the requirements as for the Court’s involvement since the documents emphasized only the Crown’s rights and not its obligations, claiming that every sponsor had a valid contract. Please refer to paragraphs 5.18, 6.9, 12 and 16 of the IP 2 policy. Under paragraph 5.29 the text goes, “…may be recovered from the sponsor and/or co-signer.” Those policies did not mention or emphasize the need for the Court’s involvement anymore: a tort in order to mislead the public servants.

  18. In 2006, the Crown (Canada and BC) failed to notify the plaintiff about this important material change (that the Crown had allegedly become a party to his Sponsorship Agreement, and that the Agreement had allegedly become a contract). Therefore, the Crown prevented the plaintiff from studying the relevant legislation, or, to consult a lawyer. [For this reason, he was disabled to defend himself at the IRB/IAD hearing, resulting that he has been separated from his present Chinese wife since early 2007. The Crown has always denied the issuance of any – even visitors’ – visa to Ms. Zhong, his present wife.]

     

  19. The plaintiff was unaware of those policies (IP 2 and MOU) until about 2008 or 2009. He has never received or signed any contract form with any ministry or government. He wanted “to enter into a legally binding Agreement” with BC or Canada but no one sent him anything like that to sign. The Defendant Crown has not been signatory to any written contract or agreement with the plaintiff at all.

  20. In the summer of 2006, the plaintiff began a correspondence with Ms. Zuanhao ZHONG (a.k.a. Zhong Zuan Hao in Chinese). They had common goals, including getting married soon and have a baby if possible. Thus, they got married in December 2006 in Guangzhou City, in the People’s Republic of China. The plaintiff filed the necessary documents to sponsor his new wife, Ms. Zhong (d.o.b. xxxx-xx-xx) and her 15-year old son, Jian Feng YE (d.o.b. xxxx-xx-xx).

  21. Due to some red tape in both countries and the numerous required documents, the plaintiff submitted his Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms with the supporting material to the CIC Processing Centre on or about February 15, 2007. He attached a bank draft in the amount of $1,190 for the required fees. Since then the CIC or the Government of Canada has been using those monies unlawfully, without any reasonable or legally acceptable explanation.

  22. On or about March 20, 2007, a form named “Social Services Information Request” was sent from the CIC Processing Centre to the Ministry of Employment and Income Assistance of BC. (The Plaintiff received its copy after a long delay.) Soon the Human Resources Social Policy Branch sent a reply to the CIC of Mississauga (Re Sponsor Simon; Zoltan Andrew, Immigration Client ID: 20925897. On the form, S. Postuk, Financial and Administrative Services Branch Official, marked the wrong box. Instead of Box 1 [“Social assistance benefits have been paid … however the debt cannot be enforced by the Province of British Columbia therefore no debt is owed by this sponsor”], Box 2 was marked: “Social assistance benefits have been paid to the sponsored relative(s) listed on the attached form and the debt is enforceable.” The form shows zero indication why and on what legislative ground would the alleged debt be enforceable on 21 March 2007.

  23. Another form issued in BC during the same week testified as “In accordance with the provisions of the federal/provincial Memorandum of Understanding to the best of my knowledge the above information is true and correct.” However, that MOU was not a legal document. The officer has not testified that the Information Request satisfied the requirements of the IRPA and its IRPR and that a debt had been certified by a minister against Z. Simon.

     

  24. On or about March 30, 2007, Z.A. Simon received a letter from the CIC Processing Centre in Mississauga. In it, Officer RS or Ravi Sahota stated, "We are pleased to advise that you have met the requirements for eligibility as a sponsor…” However, the same letter indicated that the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong – the visa office as the ultimate authority – may not accept their application in case of any debt to the Crown. [Strangely, this information seemed to indicate that the CIC Case Processing Centre had been unaware of the plaintiff’s sponsorship debt, and only the proper visa officers abroad had been able or allowed to make a final decision.]

  25. Thus, Mississauga immigration officer Ravi Sahota may have phoned the Federal Court and investigated about a possible ministerial certificate of Z.A. Simon’s alleged debt. He may have been informed that no such debt certificate had existed in the Federal Court. Regardless such possible action or omission of officer Ravi Sahota, the Crown policies pressed him to forward the file of Z.A. Simon and Zuanhao Zhong to a visa officer of the Canadian Consulate General in Hong Kong, shifting the duty of the final decision to the visa or immigration officer abroad.

  26. [In general, visa officers abroad have very limited time per application. The budgets of our consulates would not allow visa officers to make thousands of expensive long distance phone calls from abroad to the Registry of the Federal Court inquiring about ministerial certificates or possible debts of each sponsor. Therefore, Officer A. Chau was deprived of the possibility to learn the truth about any debt.]

  27. Soon the plaintiff learned that the application for the permanent Canadian residence of his wife and his stepson had been dismissed. Since they have passed their medical tests, the only reason of the refusal was the alleged sponsorship debt of the plaintiff. This circumstance has been stated clearly on the documents issued by the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong, dated on or about April 26, 2007. The Canadian authorities sent a similar statement to Ms. Zhong at about the same time.

     

  28. On or about 25 April 2007, the two plaintiffs received letters signed by A. Chau, Designated Immigration Officer of Canada in Hong Kong. The visa officer referred to one single ground of the refusal, namely section 133.(1)(a) of the IRPA. The decision was clearly against the law because Zoltan A. Simon’s previous sponsorship undertaking was signed – and the alleged default happened – under the old Immigration Act when the IRPA did not yet exist. It is a palpable and overriding error to punish a person under a statute that is not yet in effect. The IRPA does not contain any provision claiming that it operates retroactively or retrospectively, and against Canada’s limitation laws that fix the limitation periods usually as six years.

  29. [Here the instant plaintiffs do not challenge the unlawful decision of A. Chau.]      

  30. In May 2007, the plaintiff(s) appealed the Immigration Officer’s decision at the IAD (Immigration Appeal Division) of the IRB (Immigration and Refugee Board). [Z.A. Simon appealed to the Federal Court but he lost his immigration-related case in 2010. Canada’s laws do not allow an appeal. There was no Court in Canada that was keen to examine his situation. Due to this federal-provincial tort, his wife and stepson could never immigrate to Canada.]

     

  31. In 2007, the plaintiff – the innocent party – rescinded his sponsorship agreement.

  32. The plaintiff had a court hearing in 2007, in Ottawa, under Federal Court File No. T-1758-07. Since he was waiting for his IAD hearing, his claim was dismissed as abuse of process. The verdict was fair but the plaintiff was unaware of the common law that courts cannot urge the IRB-IAD to expedite the hearings (and that even a delay of five years would not constitute an “unreasonable delay” for the Crown).   

  33. The plaintiff pleaded innocent in any breach of contract because he was unaware of any contract or agreement with the Crown. Also, he was unaware of the dollar amounts and number of months during which Ms. Reyes, the sponsored immigrant, received social benefits in Canada. [After a private investigation of six months, in or about October 2007, he received the first notice about the dollar amount of his alleged “sponsorship debt.” It was over $38,000. [However, British Columbia or Canada has not filed any claim against him at any Court during all material times.]

  34. Before 2008, the plaintiff has never received any summons, court order, a photocopy of the Minister’s certificate, or a Schedule II (now Schedule 2 of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181,) from any ministry or government authority; not even a phone call from an agent or office of the Crown.

  35. On or about July 24, 2007, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Minister Diane Finley. On or about August 3, 2007, T. Gillies (Ministerial Enquiries Division) replied it, adding that as the case was currently before the IAD, it would be inappropriate to discuss the matter further.

  36. In or around 29 November 2007, the Revenue Services of BC or RSBC (Victoria, BC) sent a letter to the plaintiff, claiming that he had been indebted to BC for $38,149.45 within the Sponsorship Default Program.

  37. The plaintiff did not have any sponsorship- or other debt-related contract or agreement with any, federal or provincial, ministry or government in all material times. Despite of this, the Government of BC, in 2007 and/or 2008, originally demanded from him $38,149.45 in one payment without proper or legally acceptable explanation and without any lawful ground.

     

  38. The plaintiff, in 2007 or 2008, contacted the Ministry of Housing and Social Services of BC and offered to them to start paying his alleged debt, without formally acknowledging a debt, in the same framework – the same number of payments over the same period – as it had been granted to Mr. Tieu, a Vietnamese that owed more than $101,000 to the Province of BC due an irresponsible failure to support his sponsored parents. On the behalf of British Columbia, Ms. Penelope Lipsack as Counsel was the Crown’s representative in the matters with the plaintiff till about December 14, 2008 (the date of her last letter to Z.A. Simon). Ms. Lipsack refused to accept the plaintiff’s settlement offer and did not propose a counter-offer or an alternative payment plan. Thus, since the plaintiff was unable to pay about $30,000 in one payment, no more negotiation has taken place. (In 2009, the plaintiff sued Ms. Lipsack in her personal capacity at a Court in Victoria but he, obviously, could not have succeeded that way. His Writ of Summons was dismissed in 2009. The File Number was C090244.)

     

  39. In 2007 or early 2008, the RSBC or another authority sent him a consent form to be signed by Ms. Reyes, instructing the plaintiff to contact her and returned the signed form to them. However, the plaintiff was unable to contact her. It seemed strange for the plaintiff: If those social benefit payments to Ms. Reyes constituted his debt – and not the debt of Ms. Reyes – why was not he allowed to learn the amount of his alleged debt from the Crown?  

  40. In June 2008, after almost eight years of complete silence following the default, the provincial and federal authorities together began to garnishee his federal tax account, without any hearing or documentation, only acting on the RSBC’s request as follow. (His RSBC account No. is X11000006724.)

     

  41. Thus, on or about June 2, 2008, the B.C. Ministry of Housing and Social Services or the RSBC, without colour of right, sought and obtained funds from the tax account of the plaintiff, by conversion. The actual conversion took place in the CRA and by the Canada Revenue Agency, not in or by BC. The CRA intended to keep garnishee the plaintiff’s funds in the amount of $38,149.45 plus a high compound interest that was not mentioned in any agreement signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff thought that the CRA owed him a duty of care just like a chartered bank. The plaintiff relied to his detriment on the CRA as an agency that knew and obeyed the laws of Canada. He relied on the paragraph of the Sponsorship Agreement with Ms. Reyes that the Crown may take moneys from a sponsor due to a default or breach of the agreement only within “an action in a court of law” and that “The suit may be placed in any court in Canada having jurisdiction over claims against the Sponsor (or Co-signer) for breach of contract.” (Citations are from the CIC sponsorship agreement and undertaking documents.)

  42. Thus, in 2008 and 2009, Crown servants of the federal CRA wrongfully, knowingly, by tortious conduct, unlawfully and without colour of law released funds or monies from the 2007 and 2008 tax credits of the plaintiff for the Revenue Services of British Columbia (“RSBC” below) in 2008 and 2009. The RSBC has received such unlawful or “dirty” monies from the CRA so the sophisticated money laundering manoeuvre took place both in the CRA (Canada) and in British Columbia.

  43. The Crown has never clarified the legal basis of such garnishment, whether its ground was in contract or in damages. The Crown felt free to change the characterization of its claim from a claim for unliquidated damages to a liquidated demand. In Canadian law, unliquidated damages cannot be simply converted to a liquidated demand by the CRA. Such conversion in unlawful and unconstitutional. (For example, the unlawful payments made to a full-time student, or, charging an interest of six percent instead of the prescribed five percent mean that the claimed amount is not a mere matter of arithmetic anymore but requires a Court’s involvement in order to establish the true amount of debt.)

  44. Both the RSBC and the CRA contravened s. 3. of the Interest Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-15, since the Crown has charged an interest of 6% or more, instead of the prescribed 5%, on the sponsor’s alleged debt despite that there had been no agreement or contract between Z. Simon and the Crown. (BC’s sample invoice is available for the Federal Court to see at or before the hearing.) It is a tort to charge interest without certification: only ss. 146.(2) of the IRPA allows, “plus interest.”

  45. On or about June 17, 2008, the plaintiff received a photocopy or printout of his Income Tax Return Information from the CRA. The date of the assessment was June 2, 2008 for the tax year 2007. It indicated a refund or credit of $3,577.83 but he has never received any refund. The money has simply disappeared. Much later he learned that, out of that amount, $136.15 had been taken as GST while $3,441.68 had been recovered by the (BC) Sponsorship Default Recovery program.

  46. After the garnishment of his tax account, between June 19 and June 27, 2008, the plaintiff received a letter from the RSBC with a Financial Report form. The letter referred an outstanding obligation for $29,417.04 that the plaintiff did not understand because there was a discrepancy of several thousand dollars in the arithmetic. Also, the fact that the form was received a few weeks after the garnishment had revealed the bad faith of the RSBC officers. Thus, the plaintiff had no opportunity to complain before the garnishment.

     

  47. On or about July 10, 2008, the plaintiff sent a very long and detailed letter to the Revenue Services of British Columbia in Victoria, BC. (He attached his Financial Report form completed, signed as on June 8 that should correctly read July 8.) His letter contained many legal arguments, some of them about his violated Charter rights. In the letter the plaintiff denied his debt to BC and stated that the claim against him was illegal and unconstitutional. However, he authorized the Canada Revenue Agency to confirm his circumstances toward the RSBC. The plaintiff has never acknowledged his “debt” and did not make any repetitive payments so he has never been a confirmed debtor or judgment debtor.

  48. Common law dictates that the term “debt” always refers to a liquidated debt that can be calculated by using simple arithmetic. Zoltan A. Simon’s alleged debt was not “liquidated” because the Act (IRPA) and the sponsorship agreement prescribed the involvement of a Court as a conditions precedent first. 

  49. On or about August 5, 2008, the plaintiff sent a long letter to the Canada Revenue Agency, Attention: Mr. Bill Baker, Deputy Commissioner in Ottawa. Its subject was “Assistance requested in a legal and accounting controversy.”

  50. On or about August 18, 2008, the plaintiff received a reply from the Canada Revenue Agency, signed by Patrick Bélanger. It promised that his concerns will be given careful consideration. (Such careful consideration has never taken place.)

  51. On or about August 20, 2008, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Rob Nicholson, then Minister of Justice, about the issues but has not received a reply.

  52. On or about September 3, 2008, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Claude Richmond, Minister of British Columbia, or/and his two deputy ministers (Ms. Cairine MacDonald and Mr. Andrew Wharton), plus the RSBC. It contained an offer entitled “A proposed frame for settlement.” He has not received any reply from them. About the same time (?), he sent a detailed letter to the Hon. Gordon Campbell, then Premier of BC, informing him about the torts and legal controversies.

     

  53. On or about September 22, 2008, the plaintiff requested info from the Canada Border Services Agency regarding transit visa and return ticket requirements for his Chinese wife if she would spend a few months in Saint-Pierre et Miquelon (belonging to France) until her Canadian papers would be granted. He received a reply, without any answer or suggestion. It appears that they became suspects of the Canadian Government for seeking such a weird solution. (In those days the plaintiff still naively believed that the Crown was acting honestly and in good faith but it was unable to control the spiralling huge red tape in the country.)  

  54. Between about September 30 and November 12, 2008, the plaintiff received a letter from the office of the Hon. Gordon O’Connor, then Minister of National Revenue, writing that the CRA was unable to comment on his dispute with the Revenue Services of BC. The letter stated that the CRA and other federal and provincial government authorities have entered into an agreement to collect amounts owing. It added that the CRA did not determine who will be identified for set-off action and a set-off action can only be suspended when the CRA is advised to do so by the originating department.

  55. Between September and November 12, 2008, the plaintiff began a correspondence with the Ombudsman BC office, in which R. Brown (Complaints Analyst) and Judy Ashbourne were involved. Later the matter was concluded. They were unable or unwilling to solve any issues.

  56. On or about October 7, 2008, the plaintiff sent a letter of inquiry to the Ambassador of The Netherlands in Ottawa, requesting advice about settling in that country or in its territories (in the Caribbean) in order to family unification since Canada’s red tape had not offered any solution.

  57. On or about October 24, 2008, he received a letter from their Consulate in Vancouver, advising him that he could not apply for asylum before entering a country.

  58. On or about October 27, 2008, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Wally Oppal, Attorney General of BC, and to Ms. Penelope Lipsack, Crown Counsel in Victoria, BC. A bit later he sent a photocopy of this letter to the IRB/IAD Registry as well.

  59. On or about November 4, 2008, the plaintiff sent a long letter to the Canada Revenue Agency’s Tax Centre in Winnipeg, requesting an adjustment for the year 2007.

  60. On or about November 7, 2008, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Embassy of Spain in Ottawa. It was similar to the letter sent to the embassy mentioned above.

  61. On or about November 13, 2008, the plaintiff received a letter from Sylvia Dalman (CRA in Burnaby-Surrey, BC) regarding his notice of objection received on July 31, 2008. She wrote him that his objection was not valid.

     

  62. On or about December 23, 2008, the plaintiff had an airplane ticket from Calgary to Toronto, in order to present his case at the IRB/IAD hearing. About twenty flights were cancelled in Calgary on that day, due to inclement weather and icy airplanes. The plaintiff’s plane took off by a delay of 3.5 hours and arrived in Toronto with the same delay. He missed his hearing by two hours, and lost about $800 in travel costs for nothing. In the IAD Registry, he wrote and filed a request for a new hearing. The Registry granted him a new hearing in its letter dated on or about December 24, 2008.

  63. On or around January 12, 2009, the Hon. Jean-Pierre Blackburn (then Minister of National Revenue) sent a letter to the plaintiff.

  64. On or around February 26, 2009, the plaintiff received an e-mail message from the CIC – Ministerial Enquiries Division. [He assumed that it was sent by Mr. Jason Kenney since it had followed his earlier letter sent to that Minister.] The title of the message was, “Your Wife's Application Status / Structure of the Immigration and Refugee Board.” It‏ said, “…your comments regarding the harmonization of federal and provincial laws with regard to immigration have been duly noted.” … etc.

  65. On or about March 15, 2009, the plaintiff wrote a letter to Canada’s Ambassador in Rome (Mr. A. Himelfarb), regarding “Request for info about official procedures of immigration or political asylum” [for a Canadian citizen in order to settle in Italy]. He has not received a reply.

  66. On or about May 15, 2009, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Minister Diane Finley regarding his concern about the garnishment of his future pension benefits if he needed to settle abroad. A copy of the letter was sent to Prime Minister Stephen Harper as well but the plaintiff has not received any reply.

  67. On or about May 27, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application for leave and judicial review to the Federal Court for an Order of Mandamus to require the IAD to issue a decision in this appeal. A Notice of Appearance was filed on June 4, 2009. On or about on September 16, 2009, the Court dismissed his application.

     

  68. On or about June 4, 2009, the B.C. Ministry of Housing and Social Services or the RSBC, without colour of right, sought and obtained funds from the tax account of the plaintiff, by conversion carried out by the CRA unlawfully: there was no “ministerial certificate” on file against his in the Federal Court. The CRA transferred the $100.43 credit balance of the plaintiff’s personal tax account to the (BC) Sponsorship Default Recovery program, apparently to the RSBC.

  69. Or on about July 8, 2009, the plaintiff received a letter from Service Canada, signed by Sharon Shanks. The letter threatened the plaintiff (and apparently tried to coerce him to pay) by claiming that a creditor “may obtain a garnishee summons without proceeding to court.” That principle was false, and the Crown was not his “creditor.”

  70. On or about August 7, 2009, the plaintiff received another letter from the Hon. Jean-Pierre Blackburn, Minister of National Revenue, regarding the set-off action on his income tax account. Mr. Blackburn considered the plaintiff’s matter with the CRA closed.

  71. On or about August 13, 2009, the plaintiff participated in a hearing by the IRB/IAD tribunal in Calgary by videoconference. See Simon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),2009 CanLII 85533 (CA IRB). The IAD File Number was VA9-00194, with Client ID No. 2092-5897.

     

  72. Between October 23 and 27, 2009 the plaintiff filed and served his statement of claim with the Writ of Summons, at the Supreme Court of BC (Vancouver), under the case number S097926. Neither of the two Crown defendants has submitted a Notice of Appearance by January 30, 2010 although (on or about November 19, 2009), Mr. Peter Bell, Counsel to the Government of Canada sent him a letter regarding it. The plaintiff made a minor mistake in the style of cause, showing Deputy Attorney General or/and the Government of Canada instead of the Attorney General. The Registry was unwilling to correct it, or, to give direction. Therefore, the plaintiff served and filed an updated pleading inquiring about the status of the proceedings on January 30, 2010.

 

  1. On or about November 17, 2009, the IAD made a decision in which the plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed. One can see the Crown’s strategy from the dates. In order to gain time, the Crown kept pressuring the IAD and the IRB to delay the matters and decisions related to Z.A. Simon and Ms. Zhong as a punishment of the plaintiff for his 2007 and 2009 court cases (FC). From May 2007 to November 2009 approximately two and a half years passed in a limbo on Canada’s behalf.

  2. Before the end of 2009, the plaintiff applied for judicial review at the Federal Court to revise the IAD decision. His application for leave and judicial review was dismissed. Pursuant to ss. 72. (2) (e) of the IRPA, “no appeal lies from the decision of the Court with respect to the application or with respect to an interlocutory judgment.” This paragraph seems unconstitutional. It should perhaps add, “…in cases where national security is involved, except questions of debts or pure questions of law.”  

  3. On or about January 8, 2010, the Government of Canada (Ministry of Finance, Winnipeg) sent a notice to the plaintiff regarding his [alleged] outstanding debt. He received similar statements regularly.

  4. On or about January 26, 2010, the plaintiff sent a belated reply to the letter of Sylvia Dalman at the CRA (Burnaby-Surrey, BC). He requested to learn the CRA’s position regarding the next legal step.

  5. On or about February 3, 2010, the plaintiff received a brief letter from the Canada Revenue Agency (Appeal Division in Surrey BC), signed by Sylvia Dalman, stating that the CRA had no jurisdiction concerning the Citizenship and Immigration Canada sponsorship program and any indebtedness that may arise from a sponsorship agreement.

     

  6. On or about February 22, 2010, the plaintiff sent a letter from China to Peter Bell, Crown Counsel. He sent its copies to The Hon. Jerry McHale (Deputy A.G. of BC), The Hon. Rob Nicholson (A.G.), The Hon. John H. Sims (Deputy A.G.), and the Civil Registry of the Supreme Court of BC. In it, the plaintiff referred to other cases, like “Citation: 2006 FC 1053” in the Federal Court of Appeal, Court File No. A-417-06 where him (i.e., Mr. Bell) and The Hon. John H. Sims, Q.C. are shown side by side, marked as “for the Respondent.” Also, the plaintiff referred to Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, and Bohman v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) (1994), 354 C.P.C. (3d) 25 (Ont., Ct. (Gen. Div.)). In both cases the Deputy Attorney General was named as Defendant and such wording did not constitute a fatal error for the procedure or the filing. The plaintiff reminded Mr. Bell that ss. 24. (2) (a) and (c) of the Interpretation Act confirmed such liberal interpretation: a “Minister” and a “Deputy Minister” were interchangeable terms.

  7. It seemed to him more and more often that the Crown had been unable to answer any of his questions of law or explain the Crown’s unlawful decisions, so it needed larger and larger cover-ups.

     

  8. On or about March 8, 2010, Zuanhao Zhong, the second plaintiff sent a detailed letter from Guangzhou City (China) to Mr. Jason Kenney, Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism in Ottawa. The main controversial issues have been well explained in the letter but she has never received any answer from the Minister’s person or office.

  9. On or about March 9, 2010, Zoltan Andrew Simon received a reply from Ms. Julie Lauzon, representative of the Tax Court of Canada, following his inquiry. Their decision was that his complex case did not belong to their jurisdiction.

  10. Or on about April 21, 2010, Ms. Jacquie Sewell, Manager of Registry Operations in BC, sent him a letter. [The Registry refused to reimburse the plaintiff’s fees of $208 although the case came to a limbo because the Registry was unwilling to remove the words “Deputy” from the style of cause and none of the defendants have filed and served the required Notice of Appearance. The Writ of Summons had two volumes. Volume 2 began with page 82, and the chapter entitled “List of similar (tort) case law precedents” began on page 246.]

     

  11. On or about May 21, 2010 the plaintiff sent a “Notice of Discontinuance” to The Civil Registry at the Vancouver Law Courts, addressed to Ms. Sewell.

  12. As for the last sentence, the Vancouver Court Registry’s employees committed a fraud: on or about June 6, 2010, they issued a false statement – perhaps to the request of Crown Counsel – in a letter stating that the plaintiff’s action had not been discontinued on that certain day in June while they received and stamped the discontinuation request on May 27, 2010. (Counsel produced the false statement during the hearing and it influenced the judgment of Mr. Justice Zinn, see below.)

  13. On or about June 1, 2010, the plaintiff received a letter from the Federal Court Registry (Re. Mr. Lafrenière).

     

  14. On or about June 8, 2010, the Hon. Mr. Justice Zinn delivered an Order of the Federal Court against the plaintiff. The verdict stated, “The question of whether he had an agreement with Canada may or may not have been determined between Canada and himself by the decisions of the IAD and this Court in IMM-6265-09; however, it is clear to me that his current dispute is not directly with the Federal Government but with the Province of British Columbia. In this respect it is noted that he commenced litigation in the British Columbia Superior Court against both the Province of British Columbia and the Government of Canada with respect to these financial claims. He says that the action has been discontinued by him but the Court record shows otherwise.” [A false statement cited above has influenced the Court.]

  15. Justice Zinn continued, “What is critical is that the plaintiff’s financial dispute is not directly with Canada and the real dispute he has does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. In my view, he should be seeking his declaration and repayment of the funds taken illegally, in his view, against the Provincial authorities in the B.C. Superior Court, either in the action already commenced or in a new one.”

  16. The plaintiff rather defended the errors or omissions of the BC administrators in his pleadings. He considered such verdict as “the tort of the Court” since the several main claims of his pleadings – that had been totally silenced in the verdict and the Court had not addressed any of them – were clearly against the Government of Canada, including the CRA. The plaintiff claims that the apparent trend of the courts during the Harper dictatorship to skip the main issues of statements of claims and trying to “read the plaintiff’s mind” instead of reading the style of cause and the pleadings constitutes a procedural unfairness. (Such unfairness could be reduced by a proposed new rule that would require each plaintiff to submit a brief summary of facts and law, say in 500 words or less, and the reporting law websites like canlii.org would be obliged to show such abstracts as appendix after each verdict on the Internet nationwide.)    

  17. Several ministers and ministerial officials have been involved through correspondence with the plaintiff, between 2007 and present, but they all failed to act in order to reach a legally acceptable solution for the re-victimized sponsor(s). Some of their names are as follow: The Hon. Diane Finley, The Hon. Jason Kenney, T. Gillies, Sylvia Dalman, Patrick Bélanger, The Hon. Jean-Pierre Blackburn, amongst several other federal officials with whom the plaintiff had correspondence.

  18. In those days the plaintiff assumed a series of legal controversies in which the federal administrators unexplainably kept relying on the personal decisions of one or a few provincial administrators that seemed to be unfamiliar with the laws of Canada but were protected by their provincial superiors. The federal and provincial administrators relied on each other’s policies and ignored many of the related federal and provincial laws. In those days more than thirty paragraphs or subparagraphs of the (mainly federal) legislation have been knowingly violated by the Crown’s servants. By 2016, their number reached sixty or more. (It is hard to provide a true figure because the Crown has never clarified if it claimed damages in contract, or in tort. Also, many of the torts, errors and omission overlapped each other.)

  19. The above mentioned federal administrators, by prejudice and in bad faith, failed to accept or consider any contrary evidence from the plaintiff in the past. In reality, the plaintiff has never allowed to show evidence. The Charter guarantees a “fair hearing” for criminals and – since criminals and innocent victims are equal before the law pursuant to s. 15 (1) of the Charter, our constitution grants the same rights “fair hearing”, the principle of “innocent until proven guilty”, “the obligation to give a reasonable short notice before punishment”, etc. The notion of “hearing” means an opportunity to every party to show evidence before a Court or tribunal. Such basic Charter right has always been denied to Zoltan A. Simon.

  20. The ministers and public servants of the CIC and the CRA kept shifting the responsibility to each other – or to British Columbia – that is one of the indicia of their bad faith.

     

  21. On or about August 6, 2010, Mr. Steve Harrison phoned the plaintiff from the RSBC. He sounded like an angry young man. His voice was intimidating. On that day (or, maybe at another occasion) Mr. Harrison threatened him that BC would take him to Court if he did not pay. (The plaintiff was glad that finally a Court could hear his case or problems and urged Mr. Harrison and the RSBC to start such action.)

  22. The plaintiff (previously appellant) has not received a copy of the Order of the FCA dated 10 January 2011. He found it by coincidence on the Internet by a search at CanLII on February 5, 2011. Therefore, he has been totally unaware of the judgment before the latter date. (His previous enquiries remained unsuccessful until February 9.)

  23. On or about January 23, 2011, the plaintiff sent a long letter to His Excellency David Mulroney, Ambassador of Canada, to Beijing. He attached a long and relevant legal material describing the legal controversies and errors involving the Crown: namely, a written version of his speech at the FCA hearing of December 2, 2010 (File Number: A-237-10). He has not received any reply to the letter.

  24. On or about May 19, 2011, the Order of Madame Justice Snider (Docket: T-639-10) stated, “In pith and substance, this claim is one against the BC Provincial Crown, even though the actual garnishment was made by the Defendant” that was Canada. [Italics added.] Madam Justice Snider made several palpable and overriding errors in her verdict. In it, she wrote “statement of claim” five times because she apparently had not studied properly the Amended Statement of Claim, only the original Statement of Claim.

  25. On or about May 30, 2011, the plaintiff sent a request to the Registrar of the Federal Court in Edmonton, attention to Ms. Champagne, requesting filing info like a photocopy of the ministerial certificate and/or its court file number, regarding his alleged debt that arose in BC.

  26. Several weeks later, as the plaintiff recalls, Ms. Champagne, top administrator of the Registry in Edmonton, told him in person that they had been unaware of such document.

  27. On or about August 23, 2011, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Diane Finley, Minister.

  28. On or September 2, 2011, the plaintiff received a reply for his above mentioned letter from B. Bertrand (Service Canada).

  29. On or about October 18, 2011, Ms. Sharon Shanks (Service Canada) sent a letter to him.

  30. On or about January 12, 2012, the plaintiff sent a request to the Federal Court’ Ottawa Registry, requesting a statement regarding the status of his alleged certified debt.

  31. On or about January 24, 2012, B. Balazic (Acting Senior Registry Officer of the Federal Court in Ottawa) sent a letter to the plaintiff. It listed the court proceedings in which Z.A. Simon were shown to be a party. However, it failed to provide any the description or file number of any debt certification related to the instant plaintiff. The Courts Administration Service tried to cover up the fact of the missing ministerial certificate.

       

  32. On or about February 13, 2012 – during the hearing of case number 2012 FCA 49 – oneof the judges stated in the courtroom that if there was any error or omission [in the administration of Zoltan A. Simon’s files related to his financial or immigration matters] it took place in British Columbia. She added that the word “Minister” [in ss. 146. (1) of the IRPA] probably referred to the minister of a province.

  33. The plaintiff did not comment on that opinion in the belief that it was incorrect and it was a federal minister’s obligation to certify the debt. However, later he realized that the honourable judge – perhaps Madam Justice Trudel – was right. Since the IRPA does not provide any interpretation for the word “Minister” for s. 146., it may mean a provincial minister, the Minister of CIC, or Minister of Justice [that supposed to issue the Schedule 2 to each debtor], and unlikely a minister of a church. Even though the word is vague, it is obvious that the CRA cannot claim a legislative intent to start garnishment before filing and seeing a ministerial claim.    

  34. On or about February 17, 2012, the plaintiff sent a letter to the Hon. Diane Finley but he has not received a reply.

     

  35. On or about March 9, 2012, the plaintiff served and submitted his Notice of Appeal as of right to the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada for filing.

  36. On or about March 28, 2012, the plaintiff received a letter from the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada. It was signed by Mary Ann Achakji, Registry Officer. It stated that they, after careful evaluation, have determined that the plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal (submitted for filing under s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act) cannot be processed as an appeal as of right. The SCC Registry (unlawfully) treated the Notice of Appeal as an application for leave to appeal.

  37. On or about May 24, 2012, the plaintiff received the letter of Ms. Barbara Kincaid, legal counsel for the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada. She wrote that there was “no automatic right to appeal” in civil cases so the document could not be filed. Thus, she contradicted and contravened the French version of 61. of the Supreme Court Act that prescribed automatic appeal (without the application for leave to appeal stage).

     

  38. On or about June 4, 2012, the plaintiff sent a request for Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the SCC, for filing data and the status of his payments involving fees and the security deposit in the amount of $500.

  39. About the same time, or earlier, the officers of the SCC Registry returned the plaintiff’s security deposit (of $500.00) and his filing fees related to the filing of his previously submitted Notice of Appeal. By doing that, they contravened ss. 17.(1) and 17.(4) of the Financial Administration Act since they failed to deposit public monies to the Receiver General’s account. (Formally, the plaintiff’s pleadings were bound to fail because the courts below qualified his pleadings as vexatious or abuse of process. Thus, the administrators lost those amounts that Canada would have otherwise received.) Note: an identical tort situation took place in May/April 2014, and another count in the spring of 2016 when Mr. Bilodeau personally returned the bank draft for the plaintiffs’ security deposit in the amount of $500.00.

      

  40. On or after June 18, 2012, the plaintiff received the Response of the Crown in the file #34831 that was a deposition into the Registry of the SCC. In it, the Crown’s Counsel – Ms. Wendy Bridges – kept repeating a false statement, claiming that the plaintiff had had claims only against British Columbia (and not against Canada). Counsel’s false statement was determinative for the three judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. They absolutely relied on her statement while perhaps they did not have time to read the plaintiff’s pleadings in full.

  41. Or on about July 20, 2012, the plaintiff received the Order of Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer (Federal Court, it does not seem to be posed by CanLII). It dealt with his claim’s subject as a “future hypothetical decision.” She stated that the federal laws were emanations of provincial law so she denied jurisdiction in the main issue.

     

  42. On or about September 4, 2012, the plaintiff received a reply from the Government of BC (Victoria) for his earlier letter addressed to their Ministry of Finance. It was signed by Sasha Joyce (Consolidated Intake, Information Access Operations). The letter promised the plaintiff an access to information regarding the legal basis of his garnishment by the RSBC. 

  43. On or about October 4, 2012, the plaintiff received a photocopy of an Order of the Supreme Court of Canada, bearing the initial of the Chief Judge. In it, his application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, Number A-232-11, 2012 FCA 49 (CanLII), 2012 FCA 49, dated February 13, 2012, was dismissed.

     

  44. On or about October 11, 2012, the plaintiff received a brief statement from the Government of British Columbia implying that there was no record on file regarding his sponsorship debt. The file number was FIN-2012-00205, as a response for his request with their Ministry of Finance. Their document stated, “Although a thorough search was conducted, no records were located in response to your request. Your file is now closed.” It was signed by Russ Fuller, Manager, Business and Infrastructure Team, Information Access Operations.

  45. As for the discovery or discoverability rule for claims based on fraud, the instant plaintiff discovered on or about October 4, 2012 that the false testimony of Ms. Bridges resulted in the loss of his appeal in the SCC, and consequently the loss of his hard work and efforts to compile pleadings for three years. On the other hand, he only discovered on or about October 11, 2012 that the Province of BC had not possessed any document or legal basis for his garnishment and no ministerial certificate had existed at all.

     

  46. Previously, Counsel for Canada once stated before the Court that she had tried to receive a photocopy of such certificate but the BC ministry involved refused to issue it for the Government of Canada pretending that its content was protected by privacy law in order to protect Z.A. Simon’s personal interests. (No comment.)

  47. On or about October 24, 2012, the plaintiff – in the possession of the above mentioned clearance statement of the BC Government – served and filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding the SCC Order of October 4, 2012. He attached a copy of the said BC document.

  48. On or about October 30, 2012, the plaintiff received the letter of Michel Jobidon (SCC Registry). It said that the Registrar will decide whether the plaintiff’s Application [for Reconsideration] would or would not succeed. (Note: no legislation authorizes the Registrar to do that: it is a tort.)

  49. During 2012 or 2013, the Plaintiff informed the Head of the Courts Administration Service regarding the long list of torts and unlawful controversies, regarding the lack of procedural fairness, in the whole administration service nationwide but particularly in Edmonton. He has not received any answer. (It seemed to him that Mr. Gosselin or one of his deputies defended those torts.)

  50. On or about December 4, 2012, an Order of the FCA (Mr. Justice Stratas J.A.) was issued, in A-367-12.

     

  51. On or about December 18, 2012, the plaintiff received a personal letter from Mr. Bilodeau, Registrar of the SCC. It was not an Order. In it, the Registrar decided that the plaintiff’s Motion did not have a merit to succeed and section 78. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada did not apply to his matter. (That paragraph would allow a review of an Order of the Registrar. However, there was no Order of the Registrar, only his personal letter. There is no provision in the enactments of Canada how to appeal a personal letter issued by the SCC Registrar.)

  52. On or about January 18, 2013, Zoltan A. Simon submitted his Appeal Book for filing (A-367-12). The FCA Registry in Edmonton refused to file it, claiming that it was received beyond the deadline because the rule for computation of time regarding Christmas recess did not apply in his case. The Registry forced him to submit a motion for extension of time.

  53. On or February 10, 2013, the plaintiff submitted his Notice of Constitutional Question(s) again to the Attorneys General of each province.

  54. On or about March 14, 2013, The BC Ministry of Justice (Christine Lloyd) informed the plaintiff that the A.G. of BC will not be appearing [regarding the constitutional question].  

  55. In mid-March 2013, the plaintiff filed for personal bankruptcy at BDO Canada Limited in Red Deer. He had to pay $200 monthly for two years and keep filing his monthly statement of his income and expenses while remaining within the guidelines regarding his income, in order to become a “free man” again in March 2015. In March 2015 he became an undischarged bankrupt, and within a month he filed at the CIC a new sponsorship agreement for his wife Ms. Zhong and her son Mr. Ye.

     

  56. On or about March 22, 2013, the Honourable Mr. Justice Evans (FCA) delivered an Order. In it, he held that the Christmas recess should not have been included in computing time so he ordered that the Appeal Book to be filed, without the need for extension of time. He added that pages 37-60 of the Appeal Book “are not to be referred to in the conduct of” that appeal. He ordered that pages 37-60 of the Appeal Book are struck, and may not be referred to.

  57. Unnamed administrators of the FCA Registry, in bad faith, misinterpreted the Order of the Hon. Mr. Justice Evans. They physically removed pages 37-60 from the bound book. They truncated it by a knife or blade, in order to make those issues disappear from the court files. [The prescribed and correct way in common law is to cross the applicable sections by horizontal or other lines across the page, without cutting the pages.] Mr. Stephen Green of the FCA Registry returned all copies of those pages, all the five sets, to the plaintiff in order to make their traces disappear from the Registry’s records. This is a fraud on the Crown’s behalf. (One can see in Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 or A.M. v. Matthews, 2003 that the word “struck” means crossing over the text by horizontal lines.)

  58. In about this time, the plaintiff received a copy of a booklet entitled Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I (a guide published by Mr. R. Bilodeau, or the Registry of the SCC). The booklet tortuously omits section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, just like the official website of the SCC Registry with the step-by-step filing instructions.

  59. The plaintiff received a copy of the Order of Madam Justice Dawson dated May 30, 2013. Her interlocutory Order reinterpreted Rule 346.(2) of the Federal Court Rules, changing the legislation’s word “serving” into “filing.” That was patently unreasonable so the plaintiff appealed it pursuant to section 61. of the Supreme Court Act. So far, even until this very day, the Courts Administration Service has ignored and silenced his appeal: an extreme procedural unfairness and a tort. There is no Court decision regarding the fate of that appeal since June 2013. 

  60. Early in 2013, the unprofessional, vague, “Dodonaic” or controversial Order of Mr. Justice Marc Nadon initiated another unfairness. He failed to specify or identify the documents in question by name, and there were several pending motions. The Registry, in bad faith, arbitrarily interpreted his Order and returned too many of those documents to the plaintiff. (Mr. Harper, observing Mr. Nadon’s potential usefulness for him, soon appointed Mr. Nadon unlawfully to the Supreme Court of Canada.)

  61. On or about February 18, 2014, the Order of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the instant plaintiff in Simon v. Canada, 2014 FCA 47 (CanLII).

  62. On or about March 14, 2014, the plaintiff appealed the said Order. He served and submitted for filing his Notice of Appeal as of right, pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, alleging error(s) in law at the FCA.

  63. On or about March 24, 2014, the plaintiff received a letter from the Courts Administration Service. They returned their only copy of his Notice of Appeal, contravening paragraph 60.(4) of the Supreme Court Act. (It is unlikely that the sender, SCC administrator Ms. Sinclair, acted on her own.)

     

  64. Between March 31 and April 10, 2014, the Registry of the SCC sent a letter to Zoltan A. Simon, informing him that they had refused to file his document as a Notice of Appeal. It was signed by Ms. Nathalie Beaulieu, Registry Officer. She advised him to apply for extension of time and submit the document as an Application for Leave to Appeal. Also, she returned his TD bank draft made out to the Receiver General for Canada, in the amount of $575.00 ($75 filing fee plus $500 security deposit). She has not listed the names of her colleagues that participated in the conspiracy in order to contravene s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act but her word “We” in her letter indicated that she had not acted alone.

  65. On or about April 9, 2014, the plaintiff served and submitted for filing to the SCC Registry his Motion to the Chief Judge or a Judge to state constitutional question(s). So far the Registry has not filed it and the administrators did not provide any reply or comment about it. (A Notice of Motion is independent from a Notice of Appeal do the SCC Registry should have filed it if their conscience were clear.)

  66. On or about April 28, 2014, the plaintiff faxed to Ms. N. Beaulieu a document of five pages regarding the Registry’s filing dilemma, reminding them about his new address. He has not received any reply. Everything at the SCC Registry seemed to be in a limbo and everything disappeared without a trace as if one would throw documents into a black hole – as an astronomer may express it. Or, the Registry has returned each document to Z.A. Simon without filing them, in order to prevent any judge or researcher law scholar to find any trace or paper trail about the grave and important issues.

     

  67. The legal framework in a nutshell:

  68. In this matter some of the relevant main facts are as follow:

  69. (A) There was no IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) yet in effect in January 1999 when – under the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its Regulations – the plaintiff signed his earlier personal sponsorship agreement with Ms. Reyes;

  70. (B) A breach of the plaintiff’s sponsorship agreement with her took place in October 2000 in Greater Vancouver when Ms. Reyes started to receive social assistance benefits from the Government of British Columbia under the old Immigration Act, 1976 and its Regulations, not under toe IRPA;

  71. (C) The plaintiff’s alleged debt expired in or about October 2006, pursuant to the limitation laws of British Columbia and Canada in effect at that time;

  72. (D) A. Chau, Designated Immigration Officer of the Consulate General of Canada in Hong Kong – misled by other Crown agencies and servants – dismissed Ms. Zhong’s application for her permanent residency on or about April 26, 2007, previously submitted to the CIC by Z.A. Simon in February 2007. The only reason of the refusal in April 2007 was the alleged sponsorship debt of the plaintiff under the IRPA – but the IRPA did not yet exist when he signed the Reyes sponsorship and when the “default” took place;

  73. (E) The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) began to garnish unlawfully the plaintiff’s tax credits on or about June 2, 2008 at the request of BC. Besides s. 146 of the IRPA, several enactments of Canada describe well the required lawful way how to recover monies in similar debt situations. For example, paragraphs 23.(1), 66.(2), and 66.(2.2) of the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8 have almost identical wordings. They make it obvious that RCA has regularly misrepresented section 146 of the IRPA in its unlawful practice.

  74. (F) The plaintiff, Z.A. Simon, had several court cases or hearings between 2007 and 2016: two in BC and about nine in other provinces, including one at the IRB/AID, three at the Federal Court, three at the Federal Court of Appeal and three (?) in the Supreme Court of Canada although the latter three are in a kind of limbo, waiting forever for filing;

  75. (G) the plaintiff has never claimed for damages against the Crown in any of his claims or court cases prior to 23 May 2014 that have ended by a valid and final court order following the last appeal of the plaintiff.

     

  76. The May 2014 claim pleaded for damages, mainly for pain and mental distress, suffering and violations of the plaintiff’s Charter rights, with punitive damages, all of which are personal in nature. It did not contain a request to state or answer constitutional questions that were the central issues in most of his previous pleadings.

  77. (H) There is a condition precedent in the Sponsorship Agreement that – if a default or breach occurs – the sponsored person may/shall take the sponsor to a Court of competent jurisdiction where the Minister may represent the sponsored person. Thus, the default or sponsorship debt claim may be converted into a certified debt registered and filed at the Federal Court. On failure of these, within the prescribed time period, the sponsorship agreement is at an end – unless a second default takes place – because the legally prescribed condition precedent has not been performed by the Crown. Another aspect of the condition precedent is even more significant: In October 2000, there was no Court of competent jurisdiction in Canada that was allowed to deal with the severability clause of the Sponsorship Agreement, and there was no designated file kept in the Federal Court system where the ministerial certificates of sponsorship debts could be registered or filed. The state of affairs in Canada’s court system in 1999 and 2000 did not allow the sponsorship agreements come to effect. Even today, the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal – just like any court of any province or territory since 2006 – have always been reluctant or unwilling to get involved regarding sponsorship agreements altough those have been signed on CIC forms. It is well known that immigration issues exclusively belong to Canada, not to the provinces. This is a field where both the FC judges and the provincial judges decline jurisdiction despite that legislation designates the Federal Court and grants jurisdiction for its judges in “no man’s land” in law. Please refer to sections 17 (1),17 (2), 17 (4), 17 (5)(b), 19 and 25 of the Federal Courts Act.

     

  78. (J) An even more crucial condition precedent is as follows. The CIC sponsorship agreement forms state, “It is further agreed that damages will not be less than the total of all amounts actually received by the Immigrant and his or her dependents from any federal, provincial or municipal social assistance program in Canada after the breach has occurred.” This means that the compilers of the CIC forms acted in bad faith, with prejudice and discrimination against the Canadian sponsors. Practically, the Crown’s wording here states that 100% of the financial responsibility belongs to the sponsors while the sponsored persons always have zero responsibility. This is a prejudiced statement of discrimination based on nationality since it assumes that all sponsors (that are Canadians) are always unreliable, abusive, inclined to be dishonest and ignore their promises while the sponsored aliens are always honest, never tell lies and are keen to support themselves by hard work. This unconstitutional condition is the cornerstone of the CIC sponsorship agreement. Thus, since the Charter cannot be violated, the CIC sponsorship agreements are or may be invalid all over Canada, at least for pre-IRPA sponsorship undertakings in the family class.

     

  79. (K) Worse for the Crown, such absolute (or 100%) responsibility of the sponsors in giving their unconditional guarantees that the sponsored persons would never apply for social benefits is impracticable and constitutes a physical impossibility. Such guarantee means that the sponsors are obliged, by all means, to prevent the sponsored persons from entering any office of the Crown in order to apply social benefits. The sponsors have no means to prevent the Crown to pay monies unlawfully for ten years to a sponsored person, particularly where the administrators decide not to contact the sponsor at any time regarding the issues.

  80. About every third sponsored immigrant wants to leave his or her sponsor and become independent a.s.a.p. Thus, the only practical solution for a sponsor to prevent a sponsored person from entering a government office is to lock him or her up as prisoner. (One may imagine a fragile lady that sponsored a 300-lbs heavy man from a Third World country. The man, after landing in Canada, notices hundreds of beautiful women on his city’s streets, many of whom are smiling or winking at him. He cannot resist and wants to become independent from his sponsor wife. He applies for benefits in the first office of the Crown. The wife’s only solution would have been his forceful confinement, so she could have kept him as her “sex slave” locked up in a room for ten years.) However, ss. 279. (2) (a) of the Criminal Code states about forcible confinement, “Every one who, without lawful authority, confines, imprisons or forcibly seizes another person is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years…” Thus, the cornerstone of the Sponsorship Agreement is a condition that is a punishable offence under the Code. Such circumstance makes the plaintiff’s Sponsorship Agreement void ab initio.

     

  81. (L) Thus, the only 100% effective way for a sponsor to prevent a sponsored person from applying and receiving social assistance is only by committing a crime, an indictable offence. Therefore, due to this main condition precedent, the essence of the text on the CIC sponsorship forms is unconstitutional, unlawful and prescribes a physical impossibility. It is typical maxim “ex turpi causa” situation that renders the sponsorship agreements invalid, a nullity from the legal and constitutional point of view in cases where the sponsored person has no intention to stay with the sponsor. Please refer to paragraph 4 (3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978 SOR/78-172 – under which the sponsorship agreement was signed in 1999 and under which the default took place in 2000. It states, “The family class does not include a spouse who entered into the marriage primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class and not with the intention of residing permanently with the other spouse.” The same Regulations adds, under Rule 6.1 (2), “Where a sponsor sponsors an application for landing of a member of the family class described in paragraph (h) of the definition “member of the family class” in subsection 2(1) and that member is unable to meet the requirements of the Act and these Regulations or dies, the sponsor may sponsor the application for landing of another member of the family class described in that paragraph.”

     

  82. The plaintiff claims that Ms. Reyes was unable to meet the requirements of these Regulations, as demonstrated above, since she was unwilling to cohabit with the plaintiff after her fifth or sixth month in Canada. She did not qualify as a member of the Family Class. Thus, the plaintiff has the right to sponsor Ms. Zhong, his present wife since 2006.

                    

  83. (M) Pursuant to ss. 135. (a)(i) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, the default of the plaintiff in the Reyes undertaking began in October 2000, and ended in October 2006, pursuant to ss. 135. (b)(ii) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations and subsections 3.(1); 3.(5); 3.(6)  and 9.(1) of the Limitation Act, RSBC 1996, c 266.

(N)       The Crown (CRA and CIC) routinely contravene the limitation laws of Canada and her provinces. Also, it disobeys the verdict of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed in Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII). In its paragraphs [34] and [35], the Court stated, “A court action brought by the Minister to recover tax debt in this appeal would be subject to the limitation provisions in s. 32.” … Section 39 of the FCA stated:

 

39. (1)  Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the laws relating to prescription and the limitation of actions in force in any province between subject and subject apply to any proceedings in the Court in respect of any cause of action arising in that province.

(2)  A proceeding in the Court in respect of a cause of action arising otherwise than in a province shall be taken within six years after the cause of action arose.

(3)  Except as expressly provided by any other Act, the laws relating to prescription and the limitation of actions referred to in subsections (1) and (2) apply to any proceedings brought by or against the Crown.

 

  1. (O) The Crown (CIC and CRA) always contravenes a basic principle of law settled in Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC) and Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA), a.k.a. 23 O.R. (2d) 720; 96 D.L.R. (3d) 575. The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the legal principle that a party that is stranger to any contract cannot sue for breach of contract. The Crown has been a stranger to the sponsorship agreement of Zoltan A. Simon with Ms. Reyes in 1999.

  2. (P) The Crown (CIC and CRA) routinely contravenes the principle of common law expressed in paragraph [17] of Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII) as follows:

    “In this case, it cannot be shown that the first letter from the province was received by the defendant.  If it could be shown, then I would find the sponsor to be liable from the date of that notice.  Notice on March 13, 1998 can be shown.  Accordingly, I dismiss the claim of the government of Manitoba, except to the extent that assistance was provided from March 13, 1998 to the date of the termination of the assistance payments.” [Emphasis added. Since Z.A. Simon has never received a notice his “debt” has always been zero which amount cannot bear any interest.]

     

  3. A quite interesting case was that of Tieu, Tu Le v. M.C.I. (IAD VA3-01729), May 11, 2004. In that case, Mr. Tieu was owing $101,000 to the Government of British Columbia. The province and IAD allowed him sponsor a further family member after he promised to pay his debt in monthly installments of $200, an option denied for Z.A. Simon.

     

  4. The parties, in the plaintiff’s original understanding – when Counsel of the Crown did not file evasive or false statements at a Court – generally agreed on the material facts but widely disagree regarding the interpretation of the law. The matters before this Honourable Court consist of pure questions of law, or questions of mixed fact and law. The plaintiffs feel that in such situations the minute factual details are almost irrelevant or immaterial.

  5. Apparently, the Crown keeps applying the following logic in its relevant policies: The Minister may certify a debt, or, he may go ahead with any garnishing action without certifying, registering and filing a debt at the Federal Court. Such approach violates 3.(1) of the Interpretation Act, “Every provision of this Act applies, unless a contrary intention appears, to every enactment, whether enacted before or after the commencement of this Act.” The contrary intention is clearly expressed by subsections 146. (1) and (2) of the IRPA: a default becomes real “debt” only by the registering and filing of a certificate of the Minister at the Federal Court and the latter (or the Minister of Justice) is obliged to inform the debtors about the certification and registration of their debts. Also, the lawful ways are described in detail in the enactments and regulations related to garnishment, both federal and provincial.

  6. As for the administrators or employees of the SCC Registry, they are not judges with absolute immunity, only public servants of the Crown. Their conspiracy – that steals power from the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada and shifts it to certain members of the Cabinet – is plainly unconstitutional. It violates section 52. of the Supreme Court Act.

  7. Both the RSBC and the CRA contravened s. 3. of the Interest Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-15, since the Crown has charged an interest of 6% or more, instead of the prescribed 5%, on the sponsor’s alleged debt despite that there had been no agreement or contract between Z. Simon and the Crown. (BC’s sample invoice is available for the Federal Court to see at or before the hearing.) It is a tort to charge interest without certification of a debt: only ss. 146.(2) allows, “plus interest” in the IRPA. The CRA cannot co-operate openly with a tort of a provincial ministry. Rather, it has a duty of care to check the legal authority or framework and the outlines of the arithmetic before garnishment.

 

  1. Further, s. 380. (1), 585. and 586. of the Criminal Code, sections 126. to 128. of the IRPA have been violated by the Crown Counsel during the previous court cases. The earlier Notice of Civil Claim in BC pleaded them properly.

     

  2. The AGC’s FACTUM in the Mavi [2011] case on the Internet claims that individuals may not obtain relief because “in others, such as the IRPA, no such relief is provided.” Such allegation was false. Subsection 145. (3) of the IRPA does not need to repeat the details of the recovery beyond the compulsory process under its ss. 146.(1) and (2) related to garnishment, simply because sections 8., 9., and Schedule 2 of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181, and 6.(1) and (2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, RSC 1985, c G-2 explain everything more clearly about the prescribed procedural steps. Since the alleged “sponsorship debt” is based on the promise of the sponsors towards the sponsored persons in the family class, within a family support agreement, it is clear that the said paragraphs of SOR/88-181 apply, instead of  the A.G.’s alleged legislative silence about those issues. These facts are harmonious with the Supreme Court of Canada’s Order in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII).

  3. The SCC judgment above contains the words “certificate” or “certify” eight times in seven paragraphs. Under its [5], the Court stated,

    “The Crown is obliged prior to filing a certificate of debt with the Federal Court (i) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known address of its claim; (ii) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (iii) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Canada in the first place; and (iv) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision.”

     

    The Supreme Court of Canada nowhere stated in the order that it would be the Minister’s discretion to satisfy such obligation. This is confirmed under para. [45] as follow:

    “In these circumstances I believe the content of the duty of procedural fairness does not require an elaborate adjudicative process but it does (as stated earlier) oblige a government, prior to filing a certificate of debt with the Federal Court, (i) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known address of its claim; (ii) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (iii) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Canada in the first place; and (iv) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision.”

     

  4. The following is a simplified tabulation of three different views or interpretations:

The Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30

Factum of the Attorney General of Canada in the Canada (A.G.) v. Mavi case [2011] as it seems

The IRPA and its Regulations in the understanding of Z.A. Simon

A government is obliged, prior to filing a certificate of debt with the Federal Court, (i) to notify a sponsor at his or her last known address of its claim; (ii) to afford the sponsor an opportunity within limited time to explain in writing his or her relevant personal and financial circumstances that are said to militate against immediate collection; (iii) to consider any relevant circumstances brought to its attention keeping in mind that the undertakings were the essential conditions precedent to allowing the sponsored immigrant to enter Canada in the first place; and (iv) to notify the sponsor of the government’s decision.”

It is the government discretion whether to file a ministerial certificate, or, completely skip that requirement and go ahead with the automatic collection of the debt claim without ever notifying the sponsors. Section 145(3) provides that the “debts”

may be recovered “at any time” (that means forever), thus ousting provincial and federal limitation periods. The sponsors never need to be notified while the automatic collection may take place at any time in the future, without considering any limitation law. The power of subsection 145(3) is retroactive or retrospective, and absolute: it overrides every other or previous legislation, the Charter, and the undertaking documents.

 

 

There is no particular purpose for subsections 146.(1) and (2) of the IRPA, except that the Minister, if he wants to decorate his offices, may hang the framed copies of the ministerial certificates on the wall.

The policies named IP 2 and MOU between the CIC and CRA can modify or overrule the IRPA and its Regulations at the Ministers’ discretion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The sponsors have signed (binding) contracts: the IP 2 mentions such alleged contract five times. 

146. (1) An amount or part of an amount payable under this Act that has not been paid may be certified by the Minister, if he wants to collect a debt by garnishment,

(a) without delay, if the Minister is of the opinion that the person liable for that amount is attempting to avoid payment; and

(b) in any other case, on the expiration of 30 days after the default.

 

(2) The certificate is to be filed and registered in the Federal Court and, when registered, has the same force and effect, and all proceedings may be taken, as if the certificate were a judgment obtained in the Court for a debt of the amount specified in the certificate plus interest to the day of payment. [When no certificate is filed and registered in the Federal Court, a debt claim has no force and effect, and no proceedings – including by a visa officer – may be taken against the sponsor on the basis of an alleged sponsorship debt.]

 

146. (3) A debt may be recovered at any time. An uncertified debt claim is not yet a real debt, only theoretical. The Minister cannot certify a claim in the Federal Court more than six years after the default, pursuant to s. 39.(2) of the Federal Courts Act and s. 32. of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

 

There is no contract between a sponsor and the Minister, only a declaration to the Minister, pursuant to ss. 132.(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, under the heading “Agreement.” The Minister cannot file a claim for damages since he was not a party of the agreement between the sponsor and the sponsored person. (See Bilson v. Kokotow.)

 

  1. Say, a sponsored person, within the old 10-year undertaking scheme, works hard for the first 9.5 years in Canada. Then he or she receives social assistance payments for half a year. The Crown claims that the sponsored family members have been accepted only due to the sponsors’ undertakings. Thus, any default – causing “damages” to the Crown – would not exist without the sponsors and, therefore, the Crown can take away any amount from them automatically. If the Crown’s logic is correct the income taxes paid by the sponsored persons during the validity of the undertakings rightfully belong to the sponsors: the Crown’s enrichment could not exist without their undertaking. Is the CRA sending those tax monies back to the sponsors? No way.  

  2. Z.A. Simon, had no contract or agreement with any minister. He has never received any notification. There is no ministerial certificate against him in the Federal Court. Both the registries of Federal Court and the provincial officers of British Columbia admit that there has been no ministerial or other certificate on file against him. Thus, his alleged debt has never existed only his groundless punishment. Also, the Crown violated the 6-year limitation law confirmed in [46-49] Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1 SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII). The IRPA does not claim that it is above the limitation laws of the provinces or Canada.

     

  3. Should this Honourable Court be unable, unwilling (or, rather, not allowed) to answer at least half of the constitutional question or/and issue any direction, declaration or mandamus, so allowing the administrators of the SCC to take away power from the nine SCC judges by refusing the filing of the plaintiffs by contravening s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, the plaintiffs seek an Order of this Court to grant them an opportunity to submit an Amended Statement of Claim.

  4. On the authority of R. v. McNamara, 2003 SKQB 13 (CanLII), paragraph [29], section 380 of the Criminal Code in part reads:

380(1)(a)  Everyone who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or valuable security or any service,

(a)     is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, where the subject-matter of the offence is a testamentary instrument  or the value of the subject-matter of the offence exceeds five thousand dollars ....

 

  1. In paragraph [30], the judge was guided by the reasoning of McLachlin J. as she then was in R. v. Théroux, 1993 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5 cited with approval by Laing J. in R. v. Timmons (B.L.)  (1999), 1999 CanLII 12688 (SK QB), 179 Sask. R. 213 at 220 (Q.B.):

... The mens rea would then consist in the subjective awareness that one was undertaking a prohibited act (the deceit, falsehood or other dishonest act) which could cause deprivation in the sense of depriving another of property or putting that property at risk. If this is shown, the crime is complete.... To put it another way, following the traditional criminal law principle that the mental state necessary to the offence must be determined by reference to the external acts which constitute the actus of the offence (see Williams, supra, c. 3), the proper focus in determining the mens rea of fraud is to ask whether the accused intentionally committed the prohibited acts (deceit, falsehood, or other dishonest act) knowing or desiring the consequences proscribed by the offence (deprivation, including the risk of deprivation)....

 

  1. In paragraphs [3] through [32] on R. v. McNamara, 2003, supra, the judge continued: At p. 20, McLachlin J. briefly summarized the characteristics of the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence of fraud in these terms:

These doctrinal observations suggest that the actus reus of the offence of fraud will be established by proof of:

 

1.   the prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, a falsehood or some other fraudulent means; and

 2.   deprivation caused by the prohibited act, which may consist in actual loss or the placing of the victim’s pecuniary interests at risk.

 

Correspondingly, the mens rea of fraud is established by proof of:

1.   subjective knowledge of the prohibited act; and

2.   subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could have as a consequence the deprivation of another (which deprivation may consist in knowledge that the victim’s pecuniary interests are put at risk).

Where the conduct and knowledge required by these definitions are established, the accused is guilty whether he actually intended the prohibited consequence or was reckless as to whether it would occur.

 

  1. The instant plaintiff, Z.A. Simon claims that he kept writing letters to several federal (and provincial) ministers involved, where he pointed out the series of unlawful steps against them (or the re-victimized sponsors). Originally, he was in the belief that the root of the problems was red tape, mainly in British Columbia. By 2007 or 2008, he reported the problems to the AGC (Mr. Nicholson), the ministers of CIC and CRA. None of the ministers paid any attention so he started to suspect about the existence of a tort that involved the agreements of several ministries in order to act against the laws.

     

  2. Since the torts and conspiracy referred to is quite a complex issue at the first glance the plaintiffs humbly and respectfully illustrate it by a hypothetical situation that may reflect the present case truly from the legal point of view as follow:

     

  3. There is a slogan or motto on the wall near the entrance of a casino saying, “GO FOR THE GOLD!” A bad-looking unarmed man enters the casino and marches to the security desk. He points to the motto on the wall and tells to the two security guards, “Give me the gold! Your boss wants me to get the gold.” The guards look at each other and agree: “Indeed, that is what the casino’s owner wants. We must give him the gold.” They give all the gold bars to the man (who is their friend and later invites the guards for a beer in a pub). When the casino’s owner reads the report that a man demanded and received the gold he becomes upset and sues his guards at the Court. He cannot sue the man that took and sold the gold immediately because the guards had given it to him as a gift. The security guards plead innocent and their position is just like that of the Crown in our pleadings.

     

  4. In another hypothetical case, a Canadian worker named Mr. Harper gets a notification from a bank of Panama that the bank’s administrators gave away $1,000,000 dollars from his account to three well-dressed men. The men showed a photograph shaking hands with Mr. Harper and hugging him at a dinner table as friends. The three men also produced affidavits claiming that they were good friends of Mr. Harper. Now, does the disappointed Mr. Harper become a vexatious litigant if he sues the three men or rather the bank at a court? [This is like our case at bar.] But even if the three men were armed and received the sum of money from the bank under threat, the bank is still responsible for Mr. Harper’s monies.

     

  5. Summarizing the dozens of torts of the Crow and its employees, one may compare the innocently accidental or “coincidental” nature of the torts, errors and omissions of the civil servants to the following possibility: A whirlwind – as an act of God – picks up 2,000 loose pieces of a jigsaw puzzle from a table in Vancouver, carries them in Ontario and places the beautiful complete picture on a table of Parliament Hill.

     

  6. If such unlikely coincidental situation can happen (?) in real life perhaps it is possible that the contraventions of 20 to 60 laws of Canada in the case at bar were unintentional on the Crown’s behalf as acts of God. [I.e., in the latest court cases of the instant plaintiffs, Madam Justice Donegan and a Counsel of the Crown agreed that there were 20 to 60 independent claims or grounds listed in the Notice of Civil Claim.]

     

  7.  Detailed material facts and issues of law in connection with the decisions of the visa officers and the IRB-IAD:

     

  8. The plaintiff, Zoltan Andrew SIMON, pursuant to section 63(1) of the IRPA, appealed in 2016 at the IRB-IAD from a second refusal decision of a visa officer not to issue a permanent resident visa to his applicant wife on the basis that the marriage is not genuine and that it was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act.

  9. The plaintiff claims that the decision of the unnamed or anonymous visa officer on March 24, 2016, and that of A. Chau, designated visa officer in April 2007 are wrong both in law and fact, based on erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the materials submitted. Both officers belong to Canada’s Consulate General in Hong Kong.

  10. Appeals against refusals to issue a permanent resident visa in the family class are appeals de novo. This comes about from paragraph 67(1)(a), which stipulates that an appeal is allowed if, at the time the appeal is disposed of, the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact. See para. [15] of Mong Hine Lee v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 CanLII 61531 (CA IRB). In the case of Kwan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 2 FCR 99, 2001 FCT 971 (CanLII), Mr. Justice Muldoon stated that the hearing de novo “is undertaken as if the matter comes before the [Immigration] Appeal Division for the first time….”, see para. [5] of Bains v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CanLII 98576 (CA IRB).

     

  11. The appellant claims that the two visa officers failed to consider the required textual, contextual and purposive analysis. Their interpretation of the IRPA, the IRP Regulations and the Charter was incorrect, in light of the principles of statutory interpretation by Mr. Dreidger or Ms. Sullivan. Practically the only main conclusion that seems correct to the instant plaintiff is 21-02-2007 for the lock-in date (that now the visa officers deny).

  12. As for decision of A. Chau, his or her only ground for refusal on March 30, 2007 was the instant appellant’s alleged violation of paragraph 133 (1) (G) (i) of the [IRP] Regulations. This handwritten evidence is shown above the Immigration Officer’s signature on page 14 of the Record booklet issued by Canada Border Services Agency on October 31, 2007. The officer committed a major error in the decision because the previous “Reyes sponsorship” of the appellant in 1999 was not under the IRPA but clearly under the old Immigration Act’s s. 118 (2), and its Immigration Regulations. The IRPA should not be given retroactive effect because it is not clearly expressed. Z.A. Simon’s sponsorship agreement and undertaking for Ms. M. Reyes was dated to January 1999 and received by CIC in the same month while the IRPA came in force only June 28, 2002. The alleged sponsorship default took place in October 2000 when a ministry of British Columbia paid social benefits to Ms. Reyes, pursuant to paragraph 135.(a)(i), “For the purpose of subparagraph 133(1)(g)(i), the default of a sponsorship undertaking begins when a government makes a payment that the sponsor has in the undertaking promised to repay…”

     

  13. Designated Visa Officer A. Chau made another error by overlooking the fact that there was no filed and registered ministerial certificate of debt against Z.A. Simon in the Federal Court (or in any other court of Canada). By failing to verify the authority of the faxed page received from a BC ministry, where S. Postuk (see our page 61) wrongly marked box 2 instead of box 1, the officer contravened paragraphs 146.(1)(b) and 146.(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act since no provision of the IRPA allowed that the required certificate on file in the Federal Court may be substituted by a single uncertified and unfiled page signed by any administrator of a provincial ministry. Further, the visa officer ignored an important circumstance in subsections 145.(1)(a) and (b): both of those contain the wording “under this Act” that is the IRPA, not the previous Immigration Act. Zoltan A. Simon had no debt under the old Immigration Act because no ministry or government has ever filed a claim at a court of law against him. Finally, “A debt” in section 145.(3) of the IRPA does not include uncertified debt claims beyond the limitation period of six years that are only expired claims, not debts. Please refer to sections 3(5) and 9(1) of the Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266.

     

  14. The appellant claims that the visa officer’s cumulative errors were patently unreasonable, amounting to palpable and overriding errors in law. The errors went to the heart of the matter. Therefore, the decision of Visa Officer A. Chau in March/April 2007 is not valid in law. Without these decisive errors of the Visa Officer, the appellant’s wife (Ms. Z. Zhong) and her son (Mr. J.F. Ye) would have been living in Canada since April or May 2007. The instant appellant, in his recent appeal, requested the IRB -IAD that “all references to IRPA be deleted from the refusal letter” of April 2007, just like in paras. [4] to [6] of Amos v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 CanLII 65681 (CA IRB). CIC officer Sahota’s approval may mean that he did not find a certificate in the Federal Court. His official letter dated …. 2007 states, “We are pleased to inform you...”

  15. In 2007, the appellant brought up many arguments for the IAD regarding the unlawful and tortious Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms of the CIC, and the violations of the laws by the ministry of British Columbia involved. His complaints were before the IRB-IAD Tribunal in writing and verbally on 13 August 2009. Ms. Mattu, the Tribunal, in para. [9] of her “Analysis”, claimed that she had no jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s constitutional question filed as documents for the IAD hearing and the Federal Court “because it was not filed or served properly for purposes of the sponsorship appeal hearing.” However, that was a lame excuse because a “constitutional question” search in the IRPA and the IRP Regulations do not yield any match, meaning that there were no rules for their “proper” filing. Otherwise, the Tribunal admitted in her para. [16], “the appellant has serious concerns regarding the eligibility of his ex-wife and stepson to receive social assistance and the rights of the provincial government to garnish or collect the outstanding monies from him directly, those issues are beyond the jurisdiction of the IAD…”

  16. The Tribunal, in her Notice of Decision dated 17 November 2009, simply omitted any reference to the important circumstance that the appellant had considered his Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking documents invalid in law because he signed them unconsciously.

  17. Since the colleagues of Ms. Mattu may declare that she is a Tribunal with outstanding knowledge of the relevant laws, it seems strange that she has simply copied the incorrect decision of the Designated Visa Officer. She must have known the IRPA and its Regulations and must have understood most of the “serious concerns” of the appellant. She could have made a decision in an hour but she did not make one because she probably contacted the Minister or Deputy Minister of CIC first with those serious concerns regarding the unlawful federal and provincial policies. Such communication must have taken time that explains well the otherwise unexplainable gap of more than three months between the hearing and the decision. Obviously, the Minister of CIC pushed her to ignore those concerns of law while forced the appellant’s family to pay the amount over $30,000 to the Crown a.s.a.p. The Tribunal yielded because she did not want to lose her job.

  18. Zoltan A. Simon, in his April 2016 appeal to the IRB-IAD reiterated his declaration and confirmed – as sworn in his attached Affidavit of April 5, 2016 – that he has signed the unlawful and tortious Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms unconsciously in January 1999. Therefore, those two documents are a nullity, void ab initio (from the outset), and have never been binding for him.

     

  19. The said two CIC forms punish only one class, the re-victimized sponsors, out of the four groups involved in the procedures (i.e., sponsors, sponsored immigrants, federal public servants, and provincial public servants). According to Crown policies, the sponsors are always responsible for 100% or more of the “damages,” unconditionally. Such policies contravene sections 15.(1) [equality rights] combined with 11.(a) and (d) [innocent until proven guilty] of the Charter, also the provisions of the Geneva Conventions Act regarding collective punishment. The assumed 100% responsibility of the sponsors in preventing the sponsored persons to enter a government office to apply for social benefits can effectively guaranteed only by their forcible confinement that is a violation of s. 279.(2) of the Criminal Code. It is an indictable offence that renders the CIC forms invalid in law.

  20. The appellant’s Affidavit of April 5, 2016, namely paragraphs 9 through 15, state all the relevant details of his unconscionable conduct when he signed the “Reyes sponsorship” forms in January 1999. The Crown is aware of the contents of his affidavit and its photocopy available for this Honourable Court at any time. In it, Zoltan Andrew Simon, respectfully requested the IAD to strike his signature from his two “Reyes sponsorship” documents signed on both CIC forms in January 1999. However, knowing that the Tribunal routinely refuses to admit jurisdiction in complex issues of law that involve non-immigration fields like contract law, limitation law, garnishment law, Charter rights, etc., to bring these issues and important questions of law to the Federal Court is NOT an abuse of process.

  21. Similarly, in Galaxy Sports Inc. v. Umbro Holdings Limited et al, 2005 BCSC 278 (CanLII), para. [121], the Court stated: “In Bratsch Holdings, supra, the court found the contract was void ab initio; in Number 151 Cathedral, supra, there was a total lack of consideration for the contract; and in Garland, supra, the contract was illegal under the Criminal Code.”

     

  22. It is clear and obvious that the CIC sponsorship forms, signed unconsciously by the appellant, do not constitute any “binding contract” between Zoltan Andrew Simon and any Minister; and such “contract” is a pre-requisite to qualify him a debtor. The fraudulent IP 2 policy of the CIC contains false statements five times, claiming that the sponsors have contracts. This false statement is a contravention of 132. (4) of the IRP Regulations that is silent of any contract. The same false statement was deposited before the Supreme Court of Canada in the “Factum of the Appellant, the Attorney General of Canada” – that is posted on the Internet – by Henri A. Lafortune Inc., in File No. 33520. In this ground-breaking case, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII), Counsel and the AGC (Mr. Rob Nicholson) agreed to mislead the SCC by claiming that each sponsor has had a contract with the Minister. However, most of the nine judges did not buy such falsehood. Regardless that the SCC stated in the verdict at least seven times the ministerial certificate [that had to be filed and registered at the Federal Court] as a pre-requisite of any garnishment, the AGC and the provinces have simply ignored and disobeyed this SCC decision. Thus, the re-victimized sponsors are being ground between two millstones rotating in opposite directions. The lower millstone was the laws of Canada (Parliament’s will) while the top millstone was Mr. Harper’s dictatorship that has “streamlined” the laws of Canada by “cutting corners” of the law. The instant appellant and his family in China belong to this great family of innocent victims of Crown torts. If Z.A. Simon’s signature is struck out from the CIC forms, his invalid and void agreement with Ms. Reyes cannot yield any “sponsorship debt” situation. Therefore, he had no debt in March and April 2007 when A. Chau, the Designated Visa Officer, refused the application of his wife and stepson solely on the basis of his alleged debt. The refusal had no ground at all. It is a nullity. Pursuant to s. 4(3) of the – then governing – Immigration Regulations, 1978, Ms. Reyes disqualified herself in 2000 from being a member of the family class. Section 6.1 (2) of those Regulations legally (would have) allowed Z. A. Simon in 2000 to sponsor another member of the family class in lieu of Ms. Reyes. A re-victimized sponsor cannot lose that right just by the passing years. Since an alleged  “sponsorship debt” and s. 133(1)(g)(i) of the IRPR clearly did not apply, Ms. Zhong and her son were qualified for immigration in 2007.

     

  23. Zoltan Andrew Simon declared personal bankruptcy in March 2013 at BDO Canada, and he officially became discharged bankrupt in March 2015. This was his only solution to get rid of his illegal harassment by the Crown even if this meant to cause the complete loss of his good credit plus financial losses for his only real creditor, the Royal Bank of Canada. (The bankruptcy laws do not permit a bankrupt to pay off real debt for a single good-faith creditor and not to pay for a tortious or bad faith “creditor” at all.)     

  24. On March 24, 2016, another (?) visa officer refused to grant the second application of the same two applicants, members of the family class. The refusal may not be valid because it has no signature and the officer’s name does not appear in print. This gives the impression that no employee of the Government of Canada is willing to give his or her name and signature in order to support the largest tort or crime, a fraudulent money extortion scheme, of the Crown in Canada’s history since 1867. It seems plausible to assume that the unnamed visa officer completely understood Z.A. Simon’s letters, emails and faxes, sent to Canada’s Consulate General in Hong Kong. Not having been qualified to resolve complex problems or controversies between law and policies, and being confused regarding the eligibility or non-eligibility of the son of Ms. Zhong, the simplest way for the visa officer was to invent a new ground for refusal. He/she assumed that everything would be solved if the appellant would be silenced forever. The officer was wrong.

  25. In para. [22] of Thomas-Stewart v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 CanLII 74022 (CA IRB), “The panel has considered the IAD case law in respect of the three decisions cited above.  While the panel respectfully disagrees with Member Collison’s interpretation of Al-Shikarchy, it does agree with his ultimate conclusion and that of Member Ahlfled in Ghazimoradi that section 117(1)(g) must be interpreted such as to give applicant who are under 18 at the time of their application the same protection offered applicants in respect of section 121, that is, their age is locked-in as of the date of the application.  Such an interpretation is consistent with the intentions of Parliament and with the overall scheme of the act which is to facilitate rather than thwart immigration to Canada.”

     

  26. The instant plaintiff sponsored his stepson in February 2007 as well. Then he was a 15-year old boy that is 24 years old now. In para. [28] – there are two paragraphs numbered [28] by mistake – of Cahigas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 CanLII 84208 (CA IRB), the Tribunal William T. Short wrote, “Notwithstanding the fact that the IAD hearing is an appeal de novo, it still is nevertheless an appeal.  Appeals are put in place to right wrongs or correct mistakes that have been made earlier.  In the instant case the appellant was under the age of 18 when the visa post made a decision on her sponsorship.  The refusal letter is dated April 3, 2009 and the applicant did not turn 18 until January 2010.  At the time of the refusal, the applicant was a member of that class of persons described in paragraph 117(1)(g) of the Regulations.  If I assume (for the sake of discussion at this point only) that the decision of the visa post to refuse to issue a permanent resident visa to the applicant in April 2009 was not legally valid, then one is forced to the conclusion that the applicant at that time, all other things being equal, had a right to a permanent resident visa.”

  27. Therefore, as common law indicates, in February 2007, on the lock-in date, Mr. YE, the applicant’s dependent son (Z.A Simon’s stepson) was a student and a member of the family class, fifteen years old on the lock-in date in 2007. Canada’s “lost decade” caused by the Harper dictatorship applies in the situation of Mr. Ye. Legally, he has not lost his landing rights just by getting older. For comparison, in para. [21] of Rocamora v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 CanLII 87214 (CA IRB), the “the Applicant was 33 years of age at the time of the determination of his application…” and he eventually succeeded to immigrate in Canada.

  28. In F.H. v. McDougall, [2008] 3 SCR 41, 2008 SCC 53 (CanLII), a test was described as follow: “Further, the evidence must always be clear, convincing and cogent in order to satisfy the balance of probabilities test.  In serious cases such as this one, where there is little other evidence than that of the plaintiff and the defendant, and the alleged events took place long ago, the judge is required to make a decision, even though this may be difficult.  Appellate courts must accept that if a responsible trial judge finds for the plaintiff, the evidence was sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to that judge that the plaintiff satisfied the balance of probabilities test.” The visa officer(s) “fishing expedition” for grounds of refusal is not justifiable an unreasonable. There are no reasons for the recent “poison pen” decision.

     

  29. In Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998), 1998 CanLII 8677 (FC), 159 F.T.R. 203 at para. 42, Evans J. explained that the visa officer’s practice of asking an applicant at the close of an interview whether he or she wishes to add anything is not sufficient to satisfy the duty to make reasonable inquiries that is imposed by the duty of fairness. He also added the following:

    ... This practice fails to advise an applicant of the concerns that a visa officer may have in such a way as to provide the applicant with a reasonable opportunity to disabuse the visa officer of his or her particular concerns with an application. Rothstein J. in Chen v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 290 (F.C.T.D.) wrote that

    “... when the visa Officer became concerned that the applicant might not qualify ... she should have questioned him specifically on each of the criteria separately. For her to have simply expressed concern in a general way and then expected a meaningful response is, in my opinion, not consistent with the requirements of procedural fairness.”

  30. In paras. [39] and [40] of Pan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 838 (CanLII), “the Court concluded that the visa officer had breached his duty of procedural fairness to the applicant by not affording her the opportunity to address that evidence… The fact that the applicant was not provided with this opportunity suggests that the visa officer failed to satisfy the duty of procedural fairness owed to the applicant.”

  31. Our case is similar. Thick bunches of documents were submitted for the immigration officials in February 2007, May 2007, and April 2015. A professionally made DVD of the wedding reception on 24 December 2006 was included. It was later returned to the appellant as acknowledged by the Crown’s thick booklet issued by CBSA. The silence of the Hong Kong General Consulate and their letter in early 2016 did not indicate any particular concern (say, about bad faith marriage). Even a slight indication of suspicion about bad faith marriage would have enabled the applicant and the appellant – i.e., Ms. Zhong and Mr. Simon – to submit the DVD again, this time by sending it to Hong Kong by Express Post so the nameless visa officer could have watched it and the Crown’s unsupported accusation about fake marriage would not exist now.

     

  32. The secrecy of the HK Immigration Division constitutes bad faith and violates s. 11.(a) and (d) combined with s. 15(1) and s. 12. of the Charter. On the other hand, it seems that no visa officer ever had any suspicion regarding our alleged bad faith marriage between December 2006 and February 2016. The first IAD hearing was completely silent about such possible ground. (Counsel to the Crown, Mr. Statikos, even claimed there that the appellant had been a bad or irresponsible father because he had not seen his son Eric for many years. He had zero comment or suspicion regarding our alleged “marriage of convenience.”)

  33. It is a cruel procedural unfairness on behalf of the Crown’s public servants to ignore between February 2007 and November 2009 all the evidence offered them in a timely manner regarding the true nature of a happy marriage based on love, and claim as a surprise in 2016 that the main purpose of that marriage was to cause financial damages for Canada. (I.e., after the end of the six-year limitation period much evidence like bills gets lost or perishes due to moving or disasters, etc.) Under similar circumstances, if a judge would be pressed after a decade of silence, how could he or she prove that their marriage has been genuine for a decade or so and they loved each other? If the spouses testify verbally or by affidavit, and their testimony is reasonably credible, the burden of proof is on the visa officer to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that their testimony and evidence is false. If the Crown cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that a person is a murderer it cannot condemn the suspect. Similarly, if the Crown cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt that two persons got married primarily in order to cheat the government, the mere suspicion or possibility of any wrongdoing is insufficient to ruin that family forever.  

  34. If the HK visa officers follow a strict policy guidelines issued by the CIC that contravenes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the limitation laws of Canada, it is fair to state that such guidelines are biased and have no power, so in many cases those refusals are invalid in law.

         

  35. The many PDF files entitled “Sponsorship Appeals, January 1, 2008” posted by “Legal Services” on Canada’s official website claim, “It must be noted that it is not common practice for the Immigration Appeal Division to amend refusal grounds without application from a party” [p. 33]. Page 1 of Chapter Nine, in the Introduction, states: “A refusal letter must set out with sufficient detail the basis of the refusal. It is necessary therefore that s. 41(a) is also accompanied by a statutory reference to the specific requirement which is alleged the applicant cannot meet.” Again, due to contraventions of s. 11.(a) and (d) of the Charter, the visa officer’s decision is unconstitutional and invalid. Pursuant to s. 52. (1) of the Charter, “is of no force or effect” after a silence of nine years. The Crown has routinely contravened the IRPA but our family has not.

  36. The visa officer has not demonstrated that his/her bad faith participation in a cover-up by introducing a speculative and groundless restriction and refusal should override s. 3.(1)(d) of the IRPA, “to see that families are reunited in Canada.” Otherwise, 100 visa officers worldwide could create a special questionnaire for alien spouses that the Crown had separated from their Canadian sponsors for 5 to 10 years. The two questions would be as follow: Is your primary purpose (A) to get married in Canada?; or (B) to come to Canada at any price? Say, 70% of the spouses would mark (B) because they want to work in Canada and help their spouses. The other 30% would mark (A) because they want to find and marry a richer person after divorcing the present spouse. The visa officers would let the 30% – the ones in bad faith marriages – enter in Canada while they would refuse the family reunification of the honest 70%.

     

  37. Using the logic of a visa officer in HK, an officer of Greece may refuse now a visa to H.M. Queen Elizabeth II. He/she may suspect that 69 years ago she married Prince Philip, a Greek citizen, primarily for privileges to be enjoyed in beautiful Greece when coming from the foggy and rainy Albion. Some of the IAD rules remind one to witch hunt or the Inquisition. A 5.5 year age gap may seem a bad faith marriage but Ms. Zhong’s ex-husband was born in 1949 and Z.A. Simon’s ex-wife Irma Ortega was born in 1962. In both cases, the age gap was 13 years. Z.A. Simon’s grandmother was 14 years younger than her husband. These were happy marriages in China, Hungary or El Salvador.

  38. A visa officer in 1999 granted permanent resident visa to Ms. Reyes considering her case a genuine marriage despite of a 20 years age gap. That woman cohabited with her husband, the instant plaintiff, only for 6 months or less. Ms. Zhong’s 9.5 year marriage is now qualified as a fraud or bad faith marriage. No comment.

  39. In light of the Charter, it seems that those immigration guidelines would need an overhaul. If differences in nationality, languages, religion, age, education, social status or financial standing of the spouses constitute many red flags for the visa officers resulting an assessment that they must be incompatible, and the prominent reason of the marriage had been to enjoy the privileges offered by Canada is openly against the Charter. It means that a 25-year old Jewish professor of law cannot have a genuine marriage with an attractive but uneducated 40-year old Moslem woman that is the best cook in her country. Or, in another case, a heterosexual woman cannot marry a homosexual man, and so on.

     

  40. Further, sections 2., 11.(a) (b) and (d), 12. and 15. (1) of the Charter apply here and override the prejudicial guidelines. If different people are allowed to marry in Canada despite of differences of race, ethnic origin, age, religion, profession or education, Canada should respect those rights between Canadian and non-Canadian spouses as well. Simply, if it is an offence to marry someone that constitutes red flags for our visa officers, s. 12. of the Charter should apply. But if such marriage is not an offence it constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment to separate spouses from each other forever, based on the common sense and logic used in civilized countries. (I.e., if the first decade of a happy marriage is officially “not genuine” in Canada, what improvement would make it “genuine” during the second decade? The issue is a complete nonsense.) In normal countries a non-offender cannot be punished more cruelly than an offender.

  41. This Court could determine who bears the burden of proof at a hearing with a visa officer. 

  42. If these arguments are not convincing for the visa officers, my wife could sign an affidavit declaring that she is willing to give up such privileges provided by Canada. She could promise for the HK Consulate General (or, to the IAD) that she would never apply for a Canadian passport or citizenship in her whole life, and would not accept unemployment benefits or any social benefits before the death of her sponsor, the plaintiff. Or, she could promise in writing that she would return to China after her husband’s death. That is going to happen, particularly if her son is never allowed to immigrate in Canada.

          

  43. The instant Statement of Claim includes a request for an order, direction, declaration, or mandamus to oblige the officers or administrators named Eric Murphy and Sandra George, Director – that were direct agents of the PMO or the AGC working in the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada during the Harper era – to stop usurping the prescribed powers of the Information Commissioner of Canada.

  44. An additional new claim in the case at bar – in the amount of $100,000 – is against the person who created the misrepresentation of the IRPA atQuestion 9 of “Sponsor Eligibility Assessment” on CIC form IMM 1344 (08-2014) E and its corresponding website at “Defaults” and “Sponsor Eligibility Assessment”. The plaintiffs claim that the person(s) responsible for such tortious wording shall pay an amount of $100,000 to the Receiver General of Canada through a process of indictment initiated by this Honourable Court.

  45. Further, after a procedure of indictment, this Honourable Court or the Head of the RCMP may issue letters to several public servants and ex-ministers of the Crown. They could state that an amount of $100,000 may be taken from them, or a lien may be placed on their properties, for their indirect misrepresentation of the IRPA, pursuant to its sections 126-128. Counsel, tribunals or judges have no immunity from such offence. It would be great income for the Crown a few years later when an arbitrary compound interest would be added to the “debts” of the white collar tortfeasors for the IRPA’s misrepresentation. [Since the Crown may gladly pay those $100,000 penalties on behalf of the honourable tortfeasors – simply moving the amounts from one pocket to another pocket of the same government – it would be necessary to impose the maximum five years sentences of imprisonment on each tortfeasor. Then each person may negotiate with the Crown in order to convert those jail terms into bails payable.]

  46.  

  47. The plaintiffs respectfully submit a list of sheets named “information” pursuant to the Criminal Code.

     

  48. NATURE OF ORDER SOUGHT

  49. The appellants respectfully seek:

  50. An order, direction, decision, or rather a writ of mandamus compelling the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and/or the administrators of the Supreme Court of Canada to obey section 61. of the Supreme Court Act and file any Notice of Appeal that alleges error in law in the lower court(s), including the last Notice of Appeal and the Motion to state constitutional questions of the instant Plaintiffs submitted in 2015 and 2016 for filing;

  51. An order, direction or decision expressing that the purported interpretation of Rule 19 (2) (a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, stating that the Registrar “may accept or reject the document” not to be read out of context but in conjunction with Rule 8 (2) [implying that Registrar may not refuse a document that complies with these Rules] and, if applicable, with Rule. 19 (4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, “A document that is filed by fax transmission … is deemed to have been filed on the day on which it is received…” [Emphasis added.]

  52. An order, direction or decision expressing that, in light of section 3 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Registrar may not adopt a procedure that is inconsistent with section 61. of the Supreme Court Act.

  53. Should this Honourable Court be of the opinion that section 2 (1) of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, [“judge means a judge of the Court and includes the Chief Justice”] is wrong or incomplete and the word “judge” includes the Registrar (so this Court lacks jurisdiction over him), an order, direction, decision, suggestion, or other document issued for the Attorney General of Canada or the Prime Minister to terminate the employment of Mr. Bilodeau with the Government of Canada for regularly disobeying section 61. of the Supreme Court Act;

  54. In the alternative, a statutory declaration expressing that it is a contravention of the Supreme Court Act if any administrator of the SCC Registry including the Registrar openly refuses to file notices of appeal under section 61. of the said Act, in cases when error in law is alleged, if the documents submitted otherwise conform to the Rules;

  55. If no minister, judge or other authority has any control over Mr. Bilodeau (Registrar of the SCC), an order, direction, decision, suggestion, memorandum, or other document addressed to the Attorney General or the Prime Minister of Canada to open a small separate auxiliary SCC Registry office in Ottawa and appoint for it a new bilingual Registrar who – unlike Mr. Bilodeau – is able to understand the French version of s. 61. of the said Act and is willing to obey the law; also appoint a Deputy Registrar and at least one administrator, solely for the proper administration of s. 61. of the Act, all these either by a decree, or, through a new bill submitted to Parliament;

  56. If this Court of the opinion that the Registrar and the administrators of the SCC Registry have the right to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada and block the filing of properly submitted documents by contravention of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, an order, direction, decision, declaration or writ of mandamus stating that every registrar or administrator of every Canadian court – or only in the federal court system – has equal rights to refuse the filing of documents that comply with the rules;

  57. An order, direction, decision, declaration or writ of mandamus in order to modify and improve the current CIC sponsorship and undertaking forms in the family class, including IMM 1344 (08-2014) E and its updated version(s) on the Internet, the CIC website, and the policies named IP 2 and MoU, in order to reflect the requirements expressed in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII), to obey the IRPA with its Regulations and, by doing so, terminate the degeneration of the IRPA into a cruel money extortion scheme;

  58. An order, direction, declaration or other document regarding the interpretation of section 145 (3) of the IRPA stating that the word “debt” in that paragraph includes all judgement debts but does not include debt claims that remained uncertified in the Federal Court by a minister beyond six years after the default;

     

  59. In order to prevent financial losses for the provinces in the future, an order, direction, declaration or other document stating or advising that if a minister is unable or unwilling to follow the certifying procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi [2011] case the safest way is to grant repayable “hardship loans” or “hardship assistance” for the sponsored persons in the family class;

  60. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that on 4 January 1999 Zoltan Andrew Simon signed his Sponsorship Agreement and Undertaking forms unconsciously while there was no meeting of the minds between the vaguely defined parties and about the basic issues in them, therefore, his signature shall be removed from those CIC forms; also his sponsorship agreement or undertaking documents regarding Ms. M. Reyes and her sons be considered void ab initio;

  61. An order, direction, declaration, decision or other document stating the above mentioned unconsciousness of Zoltan A. Simon that results in the invalidity and/or removal of his signature from the sponsorship documents dated 4 January 1999 and makes the sponsorship debt issue before the Hong Kong visa officer in April 2007 moot or irrelevant (while his discharged bankrupt status since March 2015 yields the same effect regarding the fate of his uncertified debt);  

  62. In light of the previous paragraph and considering Zoltan A. Simon’s old sponsorship agreement of 1999 void ab initio, an order, direction, declaration or rather writ of mandamus to compel or instruct the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Immigration Appeal Division and its Tribunal to consider or apply 21February 2007 as CIC’s date of filing Ms. Zhong’s original application for permanent residence as the proper lock-in-date for the purpose of the upcoming appeal hearing in the pending immigration matter of Ms. ZuanHao Zhong and her son Mr. JianFeng Ye, in order to prevent irreparable damages for Mr. Ye who is now 24 and not 15 years old;

     

  63. An order, direction, instruction or other document addressed to the IRB-IAD to expedite the upcoming appeal hearing of Zoltan A. Simon in the immigration matter of his wife Ms. ZuanHao ZHONG and her son Mr. JianFeng YE while consider the position or instructions of this Court regarding the proper cut-off date above that affects the status of Mr. Ye, in light of the circumstances (that the Crown has blocked the reunification of this family since their marriage in 2006 without offering any valid or lawful reason for such cruel treatment that contravenes section 12. of the Charter);

  64. An order, direction, declaration, writ of mandamus or other document instructing the CIC or the visa officer in Hong Kong to apply the “conditional measure” in Guide 3900 of CIC (subtitle: Information on Conditional Permanent Residence) and grant “Conditional Permanent Residence” for Ms. Z. Zhong and her son J. Ye if the visa officer is unable to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that Ms. Zhong married Z.A. Simon in bad faith in 2006;

     

  65. In the alternative, an order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document towards the CIC or CBSA allowing the issuance of a Canadian visitor’s visa to Zuanhao ZHONG that is valid until a dismissing decision of the IRB-IAD, or – in case of an appeal to the Federal Court – the reception of the Federal Court’s final judgment by Ms. Zhong, in order to satisfy the Charter’s requirement for her “fair hearing” by the tribunal in light of sections 15 (1) and 12 of the Charter.

  66. An order, declaration, direction, writ of mandamus or any other document stating that a YES answer for question 9 under Sponsor Eligibility Assessment on CIC form IMM 1344 (03-2016) E does not disqualify sponsors (since they may have repaid their debts or became discharged bankrupts) so Guide 3900 should read as follows: “If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question between 5 and 8 or 10 and 15, You are not eligible to be a sponsor. You should not submit an application.” 

  67. Pursuant to s. 504. of the Criminal Code, file an information – or consider the instant pleadings an “information” – and initiate (maybe direct or advice the AGC to begin) an indictment procedure against every tortfeasor that has committed at least one indictable offence, against the IRPA or other enactments of Canada, as listed in this claim, for their offences committed between January 2006 and November 2015;

     

  68. An order or writ of mandamus compelling the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship to change the five occurrences or counts of the words “contract(s)” into “agreement(s)” in paras. 5.18, 6.9, 12 and 16 (twice) of the CIC policy named “IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” in the website www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf (and in its French version if applicable) since they contradict and violate s. 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (that is silent about any contract except in rare cases of settlement plans described in its rules 152 through 154).

     

  69. Or, in the alternative, an order, statement or statutory declaration expressing that the five occurrences of the word “contract” (instead of “agreement”) within the federal (CIC) policy named “IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” in the website www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf contradict or contravene section 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (that is silent about any contract in family class sponsorship) and/or constitutes an indirect misrepresentation of the IRPA that induces or could induce errors in its administration as described in its sections 126 through 129.

     

  70. An order, direction, decision or writ of mandamus compelling or advising the Crown (CIC) to correct or complete two paragraphs in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CIC and CRA as follows, (A) “WHEREAS subsection 145(2) if IRPA (Immigration and Refugee protection Act) stipulates that an amount that a sponsor is required to pay under the terms of an undertaking is payable on demand, after filing and registering a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court, to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned and may be recovered by Her Majesty in either or both of those rights.” (B) “WHEREAS section 146 of the IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) provides that, if Her Majesty wants to collect a debt due to Her, an amount or part of an amount payable under this Act that has not been paid may be certified by the Minister without delay…” [I.e., the old text tortuously omits the most important words of the preamble, “Collection of Debts Due to Her Majesty” while section 13 of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21 clearly states, “The preamble of an enactment shall be read as a part of the enactment…”] Note: the proposed additions are shown in italics.

  71. An order, direction, decision, or stating a special case for the opinion of the Court of Appealthat would harmonize the current unlawful immigration policies of Canada and her visa officers with the Charter;

  72. An order, direction, decision, or other document stating that the instant pleadings (or at least some of its issues of law) raise serious questions of law of public importance (effecting the fate of hundreds of Canadians) that shall be solved by a Court of competent jurisdiction by allowing the parties involved to show evidence, instead of a motion to strike out the pleadings without applying any test – or vaguely claiming them as prolix, convoluted, lengthy, fanciful, bizarre, sweeping, rambling, hard if not impossible to understand, incapable of proof, vexatious or/and an abuse of process – without substantiating such wild claims and powerful words of Counsel by any means;

  73. A certification, statement or answer/determination of seventy-seven constitutional questions if possible, at least the ones that transcend the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation and contemplate issues of broad significance or general application;

  74. A declaration, statement or other document expressing that the instant Statement of Claim satisfies the “arguable merit” test or has raised some issues that are not only “not frivolous”, but of “arguable merit”. 

  75. In the alternative, a declaration, statement or other document expressing that the instant Statement of Claim has “public interest” standing for the issues of law expressed in it, and/or some of the seventy-seven constitutional questions listed show arguable merit;

  76. A declaration stating that the plaintiffs are (and have been since 2007) directly affected by the decision of the three ministers involved, and meet the three-element test for “public interest” standing as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Council of Churches) at paragraph 37.

     

  77. In the alternative, a declaration that the points of law are of such gravity and importance as to transcend the interests of the parties actually before the court, and it is in the interests of the common good that the law be clarified so as to enable it to be administered not only in the instant case but in future cases (as stated in Village Residents Association Ltd. v. An Bord Pleanala, [2000] IEHC 34 by Madam Justice Laffoy);

  78. The issuance of an Order in the nature of mandamus requiring the  Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship to produce certified true photocopies of a minister’s or person’s alleged contract with Zoltan Andrew Simon (that the CIC’s “IP 2” a.k.a. “Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” policy claims to be extant in each case), also submit a copy of it to the FC Registry and give another copy to Z.A. Simon at the beginning of the trial; 

  79. The issuance of an Order in the nature of mandamus requiring both the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Minister of National Revenue to produce certified true photocopies of a ministerial certificate, required to be filed and registered in the Federal Court pursuant to sections 146 (1) and (2) of the IRPA, in order to prove the sponsorship debt of Zoltan Andrew Simon as the basis of his decade-long punishment, also submit a copy of it to the FC Registry in Calgary and give another copy to Z.A. Simon at the beginning of the trial; 

  80. If the Crown can produce any of the documents mentioned in the previous two paragraphs, to show a certified true photocopy of a notice from the Minister of the Department of Justice in the form set out in Schedule 2, and the related postal receipt proving that the Registry of the Federal Court obeyed sections 8. and 9. of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181 and has served its Schedule 2 on Zoltan Andrew Simon;

  81. An order, direction or other document requesting the Defendant to  produce a certified true photocopy proving a person’s timely service of a garnishee summons on Her Majesty, with a copy of the judgment or order against the alleged debtor (Zoltan A. Simon) showing that the public servants involved obeyed s. 6.(1) and (2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, RSC 1985, c G-2;

     

  82. An order, declaration, or rather writ of mandamus addressed to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, compelling or directing every Canadian visa officer abroad not the refuse the issuance of permanent resident visas on the only ground that someone involved has violated subsection 145 (1) (a) or/and (b) in pre-IRPA cases where the wording “under this Act” and section 190 (about pending matters) of the Act do not apply [because the CIC files are closed when the previously sponsored family member lands in Canada], in cases where the visa officers cannot find any ministerial certificate on file regarding the sponsor’s debt in the Registry of the Federal Court; 

  83. In the alternative, a statutory declaration or other document stating that a Canadian visa officer or other federal administrator is misrepresenting the IRPA and punishable under its sections 126 through 129 if he or she refuses to issue of permanent resident visa on the only ground of its subsection 145 (1) (a) or/and (b) in pre-IRPA cases under to old Immigration Act, 1976 and its Regulations (and not “under this Act”) and/or section 190 of the Act (about pending matters) do not apply [since the CIC files are closed when the previously sponsored family member lands in Canada], and the visa officer cannot find any ministerial certificate in the Registry of the Federal Court regarding the sponsor’s debt that is a “condition precedent” the Crown must comply with, pursuant to Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII); 

  84. In the alternative, a declaration, statement or other document stating that the automatic punishment of an unknown percentage of sponsors (that signed sponsorship agreements in the family class in pre-IRPA years) without taking them to court first or without filing and registering a ministerial certificate against them in the Federal Court is unlawful or/and constitutes misrepresentation of the IRPA, and also ignores, disobeys, or violates the governing SCC decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) as well;

     

  85. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that the out-of-context laconic words, “A debt may be recovered at any time” in section 145 (3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are insufficient to raise the whole IRPA above limitation laws applicable in Canada and her provinces without considering the very different meaning in its next sections 146 (1) and (2) while assert that the IRPA applies retroactively (because such provision is missing in that Act);

  86. An order, direction, or other document compelling the Crown to produce a certified true photocopy of an alleged or presumed document showing Zoltan Andrew Simon’s status as a co-obligant under a joint and several promissory note towards Ms. M. Reyes or the Crown (that could allow the Crown to enforce Zoltan A. Simon’s obligations while it completely released or discharged the co-obligant from her obligations or debts under contract law); the same order may refer to the legal principle of “Joint Obligations” in the book of Glanville Williams: The presumption is that a contract made by two or more persons is joint, express words being necessary to make it joint and several, also the widely accepted legal principle expressed in paras. [1] and [2] of Shoker v. Vollans, 1998 CanLII 6447 (BC CA);

     

  87. An order, direction, declaration or other document stating that if the Crown unlawfully paid social benefits to the sponsored persons – for example, to full-time students in certain provinces or imposed annual interests over the allowed five percent – and for at least five years failed to direct or request them to try to find employment, such omissions of the public servants mean that the Crown released the sponsored persons from their joint obligations to support themselves, and such discharge meant discharge of the sponsors as well;

  88. (a) An order, direction, declaration, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the Director or Minister responsible for the lawful operation of CRA to abandon their comfortable position of their unconditional “trust in the immigration system” or in their predecessors (because there shall be no place for the legal maxim “caveat emptor” or “let the buyer beware” where deceit or fraud, deliberate or negligent, underlay the transaction or sponsorship agreement) and rather exercise due diligence to determine the exact nature of their policies through investigation of the controversies or major torts inherited from the Harper government, or, request the Attorney General of Canada to initiate such investigations;

    (b) An order, statutory declaration or other document stating that the definition of “sponsorship debt” in the MOU is unlawful since it is silent about the Federal Court’s required involvement and a filed certificate; also the Sponsorship Agreement’s wording “It is further agreed that damages will not be less than the total of all amounts actually received by the Immigrant…” on the CIC form IMM 1344 C (02-98) E is invalid for violating s. 15(1) of the Charter: the Crown shifts 100% of responsibility on sponsors where four groups are involved (sponsors, sponsored immigrants, provincial and federal administrators);

  89. An order, declaration, direction or any other document stating that, pursuant to sections 42 (1) and (2) of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, SC 1999, directors of the CRA do not act honestly and in good faith, and do not exercise due care, diligence and skill if they ignore the SCC verdict in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) and disobey s. 146 of the IRPA;

  90. In the alternative, a declaration stating that it constitutes a punishable offence if the Crown’s officers unlawfully transfer monies from the tax accounts of pre-IRPA sponsors without seeing and filing a court order or a photocopy of a ministerial certificate filed in the Federal Court (as prescribed by s. 146 of the IRPA) while ignoring the SCC order and its requirements in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011], supra, by sending those “dirty” monies (to be laundered) without colour of law to provincial ministers practically as gifts by designedly permitting them the contravention of the said enactment;

  91. An order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Director of the CRA or the Minister responsible for the lawful operation of CRA to provide a document for the perusal of this Court describing the number of cases in each year from 2006 to 2015 where the tax accounts of the defaulting sponsors in the family class have been garnisheed without a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court;

  92. An order, direction, writ of mandamus or other document to oblige the Registrar of the SCC Registry in Ottawa to provide a document for the perusal of this Court describing the number of cases in each year from 2006 to 2015 where notices of claims under section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, alleging errors in law, have been submitted but the Registry or the Registrar has refused their filing;

  93. A direction or other document determining the proper procedure in case if Mr. Bilodeau simply ignores or disobeys the verdict of this Honourable Court, just as Mr. Rob Nicholson has ignored and disobeyed the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General v. Mavi), 2011 – for example, how frequently shall appellants under s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act re-submit their notices of appeal to the SCC Registry after the Registrar’s refusal of filing such documents?;

     

  94. An order, direction, declaration, or writ of mandamus to oblige the officers or administrators named Eric Murphy, Sandra George and their colleagues working under the Information Commissioner to stop usurping or reducing the prescribed powers of their superior, the Information Commissioner of Canada (Ms. Suzanne Legault) by preventing her to get correspondence from the concerned public and by falsely claiming that she has no mandate under s. 7. of the Access to Information Act to investigate complaints due to the CIC’s failure to provide information within the prescribed 30 days (to Service Canada, other authorities, or a citizen) despite that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration is listed under Schedule I of that Act, in cases where the request was for a single record easy to find, and CIC has not filed a notice of request for extension of time;

     

  95. A Reasons issued by this Honourable Court that would not skip the essential questions of law and would not remain silent regarding the true nature of the pleadings;    

  96. An order for costs and/or special costs related to this action, to Zoltan Andrew Simon, the main plaintiff;

  97. Any other or further relief as may be requested and this Honourable Court may deem fit and appropriate and allow or grant;

  98. If the Court is not allowed to offer any effective remedy for the plaintiffs and this Notice of Claim would be struck as an abuse of process without allowing them to amend or show supporting evidence, they request an order, decision, direction, or writ of mandamus towards the competent or authorized federal ministry to issue an updated replacement copy of Zoltan Andrew Simon’s Canadian landed immigrant document (based on his Document of Landing issued on 6 April 1976 and taken by the Crown in 1979) in lieu or in exchange of his current Canadian Citizenship Card while to facilitate the revocation of his citizenship granted in September 1979 as his protest against the Crown’s massive torts in all material times (from January 2006 to November 2015);

  99. If paragraph 484 [originally 50 on page 14] above applies, an order, direction or other document instructing or requesting the authorized federal Minister or diplomat to request the corresponding minister of the communist People’s Republic of China to allow and facilitate the settlement or immigration of Zoltan Andrew Simon in that country as a Canadian political refugee;

  100. Further, if paragraph 484 [originally 50 on page 14] above applies and/or the majority of the seventy-seven constitutional questions cannot – or not allowed to – be certified, answered or stated, the issuance of a document suggesting to the Crown or its authorized Minister the following draft of a proposed (mini-omnibus) bill to submit for Parliament as follow:

    Bill X, Section Y:

    (a) Salaries payable to each Member of Parliament, those of the Senate, and any judge to be increased by fifty percent yearly; and

    (b) Each registrar of every court of Canada is granted unlimited rights to refuse the filing of documents even if those are in accordance with the court rules, similarly to the SCC Registrar’s absolute powers and privileges above the SCC;

    (c) Every enactment of Canada and her provinces shall be interpreted that the obligations of the Crown and its public servants cannot be strictly applied and enforced but rather the enactments serve only as guidelines for the Crown;

    (d) the provision described in paragraph (c) above does not apply to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section;

           

  1. The plaintiffs respectfully seek an order, direction, statutory declaration or any other document or procedure to initiate indictment, pursuant to sections 126 through 129 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act under “misrepresentation” and section 2(a) of the Criminal Code, under “information” within an “other pleading” such as the instant Statement of Claim at bar, against the following (ex-)employees of the Crown. Ex-ministers of CIC: Mr. Monte Solberg (January 2006 to January 3, 2007), Ms. Diane Finley (January 4, 2007 to October 29, 2008), Mr. Jason Kenney (October 30, 2008 to July 14, 2013), and Mr. Chris Alexander (from July 15, 2013); ex-ministers of Department of Justice and ex-Attorneys General]: Mr. Vic Toews (February 6, 2006 to January 3, 2007), Mr. Rob Nicholson (January 4 2007 to July 14, 2013), and Mr. Peter MacKay (from July 15, 2013 to 4 November 2015);

198.     Further high-ranking officers of the fallen regime that played key roles in the Crown torts and the money extortion scheme: CRA’s unnamed Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer as signatory to the policy named MOU, the ex-directors of the CRA, or/and the ex-minister(s) of national revenue; Deputy Commissioner named Mr. Bill Baker, ex-Prime Minister Mr. Stephen Harper, Mr. Wally Oppal (ex-A.G. of British Columbia), Mr. Gordon O’Connor and Mr. Jean-Pierre Blackburn, both ex-ministers of National Revenue, and Ms. Sylvia Dalman (CRA). As for the employees of the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Ms. Mary Ann Achakji, and Ms. Barbara Kincaid have been directly involved in the torts and agreed to disobey the legislation (section 61. of the Supreme Court Act). Finally Ms. Alison Brown (Vancouver) and Ms. Wendy Bridges (Edmonton), both Counsel for the Deputy AG or AG of Canada; and Mr. Mark Witten (Counsel for the AG or Deputy AG of British Columbia in Vancouver) can be listed as indictable offenders. Every person mentioned in the list at paragraphs 197 and 198 above have, directly or indirectly, participated in the main tort that consisted of the misinterpretation of the IRPA and its Regulations; The General Manager or Director of Henri A. Lafortune Inc. gave fraudulent and unlawful advices to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General in or before 2011, in the Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi case, supra., also submitted and false statements to the SCC. The File number was 33520 and the false statements can be found in Henri A. Lafortune’s “Factum of the Appellant, the Attorney General of Canada” – its PDF file is posted on the Internet as well.

Regardless the decisions of this Honourable Court for the previous issues, the plaintiffs respectfully submit a list of seventy-seven constitutional questions or/and questions of importance as follow:

A List of Constitutional Questions in issue (drafted by Zoltan A. Simon, with independent internal numbering)  SEE BELOW

77 Constitutional questions the courts were not allowed to answer

  1. Whenever error in law is alleged, does the legislation require the administrators of the SCC Registry to refuse the filing of any Notice of Appeal under section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-26, and prevent it to get before the panel of nine SCC judges, because (a) Errors in law practically never happen in the lower courts; (b)The wording of section 61. reveals that it applies only to criminal cases; (c) Subsection 40.(1) of the Supreme Court Act always overrides s. 61. whenever error in law is alleged; (d) The French version of s. 61. means that the proper proceeding, when error in law is alleged, is automatically by application for leave to appeal; (e) There is an error in the wording of ss. 40.(3) where the word “appeal” shall read as “application for leave to appeal” and, therefore, the same applies to section 40.(1) and 61.; (f) The four categories listed under “proceeding” in paragraph 2. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, are so vague or controversial that only the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada is able to decide about the proper proceeding; (g) The employees of the SCC Registry must obey another enactment that is in conflict with s. 61.; or (h) The Registrar’s absolute power described in Rule 19 (2)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding properly submitted appeal documents clearly overrides sections 52. and 61. of the Supreme Court Act?

  2. Ifthe answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, which specific enactment renders section 61. of the Supreme Court Act invalid or inoperative?
  3. Can subsection 19.(2)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada override – as the SCC Registrar assumes – both section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, and section 8.(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada in case of a document submitted for filing that complies with those Rules?
  4. Can a decision – instead of an order – of the SCC Registrar expressed in a personal letter sent to an appellant, following such situation above involving s. 61., forbid the application of Rule 78.(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, and also override section 52. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, so in reality the Registrar shall exercise exclusive ultimate appellate jurisdiction in Canada?
  5. Is the SCC Registry or its administrators allowed to contravene Subsection 17.(1) or 17.(4) of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11, by failing to pay to the credit of the Receiver General public monies including $500 as security deposit in case of appeals under s. 61., particularly in cases where the Crown considers those appeals vexatious and abuses of process, without a scintilla of chance to succeed?

  6. (A) If the Vancouver Registry of the Supreme Court of British Columbia would refuse to file an Amended Notice of Civil Claim because the instant party submitting it is not represented by a lawyer and has no accessible address within 30 kilometres of the Registry, only an accessible address in Alberta, an email address that had originated in British Columbia, and a fax number in Alberta, would such refusal based on the rigid and non-remedial interpretation of Subrule 1-1 (1) regarding “accessible address” and/or Subrule 4-1 (1)(b)(ii) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 requiring both an accessible address in British Columbia and a fax number or an e-mail address, all in British Columbia infringe the party’s mobility rights guaranteed by s. 6. (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, his equality rights against discrimination primarily on basis of residence guaranteed by ss. 15.(1) of the Charter, or ss. 24. (1) of the Charter (since no court could grant any remedy to a party that has no file in the registry of that court)? 6 (B): If the answer to Question 6 (A) is in the affirmative regarding at least one infringement on the three sections listed, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?

  7. Does the CIC policy called “IP 2 Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class”, by mentioning five times the word “contract” (referring to a sponsorship undertaking between “the Minister” and a sponsor) override ss. 132. (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 that is silent about a contract and only mentions an agreement that includes two statements and a declaration?

  8. In the light that the Crown has no contract with the family class sponsors, at least not with the instant appellant, is the legal principle that strangers to a contract do not have contractual rights and cannot claim damages under that contract, as expressed in Bilson v. Kokotow et al., 1975 CanLII 771 (ON SC), and in  Bilson et al. v. Kokotow et al., 1978 CanLII 1632 (ON CA), a.k.a. 23 O.R. (2d) 720 [where leave to appeal to SCC was eventually dismissed], still valid in Canada?

  9. If the sponsors are not notified of the default and have no means to prevent a ministry to grant social assistance benefits to the sponsored persons unlawfully, so the sponsors’ only efficient solution to prevent a default with absolute certainty would be the forcible confinement of the sponsored person(s), would this circumstance or requirement render a sponsorship agreement in the family class void ab initio as its fulfilment would contravene ss. 279. (2) of the Criminal Code and the doctrine or maxim of ex turpi causa?

  10. If the defaulting sponsors in the family class do not receive notifications of their alleged debts within the limitation period of six years after the default, they are not subject to a spousal or child support order of a court, and ss. 127.(1) of the Criminal Code does not apply to them, could their punishment for such “offence” under the IRPA or the IRP Regulations by their forced separation from their spouses or children for a decade or forever be qualified as “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”?

  11. If the answer to Question 10 is in the affirmative, is the infringement on combined sections 11., 12. and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?

  12. Does the CIC policy called “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” between the CIC and the CRA, issued in 2006, have the power to override any paragraph of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations?
  13. Could the MOU’s paragraph “WHEREAS section 146 of IRPA provides that an amount or part of an amount payable under this Act that has not been paid may be certified by the Minister without delay…” – quoted in the MOU out of context without its important preamble “COLLECTION OF DEBTS DUE TO HER MAJESTY” be construed as – contrary to s. 13. of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21 – “Whenever the Minister wants to collect a “debt” (by garnishment), the Minister may optionally file a certificate in the Federal Court only for fun, but the Minister would be in the same position and have the same rights without making that step”?

  14. If the answer to Question 13 is in the affirmative, but since such misinterpretation violates ss. 15 (2)(a) of the said Interpretation Act (since a contrary intention appears) and indirectly infringes on several Charter rights, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?
  15. Can ss. 145. (3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) be interpreted by extrapolation as “A debt or uncertified debt claim may be recovered at any time” and, therefore, “the IRPA is above any limitation law, and may operate retroactively as well?
  16. Is there a clear legislative intent expressed in the laconic ss. 145. (3) of the IRPA (interpreted or misinterpreted as a debt may be certified at any time, even after the end of the 6-year limitation period) to render ss. 146. (1) (b) of the IRPA – regarding the prescribed 30-day limit – invalid, while to place the whole IRPA above subsections 3 (5), 3 (6), and 9 (1) of the Limitation Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 266, also above section 32. of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, and ss. 39. (1) of the Federal Courts Act, in order to make all those enactments, plus the case law concluded by the SCC in Markevich v. Canada, [2003] 1SCR 94, 2003 SCC 9 (CanLII) invalid or inoperable?
  17. Since the Crown is unable to prove that a contract or agreement has been signed by the ministers or their representatives with each sponsor in the family class, may the legislative intention, particularly the use of the word “may” instead of “shall”, expressed in ss. 145. (3) of the IRPA be reasonably interpreted as “The Minister or the Crown may recover every certified debt claim on the basis of damages in tort that involved fraud in order to get social benefits – for example when the sponsor or/and the sponsored person declared that they lived separately while they resided together – and the recovery may take place after the expiry of the prescribed limitation period because the Crown’s right to sue in tort is not extinguished after that period? 
  18. If the previous family class sponsorship of the instant appellant was filed in January 1999, the sponsored immigrants landed in Canada in December 1999, a default [as defined by ss. 135. (a)(i) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations] took place in October 2000 under the Immigration Act, the Minister or the Crown has not notified the sponsor until 2007, no ministerial certificate has ever been filed in the Federal Court, the sponsor has never admitted any debt and has not made any payment, the Crown has never taken him to any court, the Minister has never taken a self-help action before the end of the 6-year limitation period (except that his tax account was garnished in 2008/9, almost 8 years after the default), and all debt claims of the Crown against him have been exhausted by December 2006 pursuant to paragraphs 3 (5), 3 (6), and 9 (1) of the Limitation Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 266; in such situation what paragraph of which enactment of Canada would allow the resuscitation of his alleged debt after December 2006?

     

  19. If there is no provision in the laws of Canada how to resuscitate a moot claim that has expired forever by limitation law, can section 190. of the IRPA [i.e., “Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force.”] be interpreted that a closed file with silence and inactivity of the Crown for about eight years after the default constitutes a “pending matter” in December 2006, or, in April 2007 when Canada refused permanent resident visas for his wife and stepson?

     

  20. Is there any provision in the laws of Canada that renders ss. 118.(2) of the Immigration Act (in the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, Volume V) inoperable or invalid in a case described at Question 18 above when the default happened in October 2000 under the Immigration Act, before June 28, 2002 when the IRPA came into force?

     

  21. Is the ground-breaking decision of the SCC in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) still governing in (similar) family sponsorship cases, so the mentioning of ministerial certificate (seven or eight times) with the notification of the sponsors as requirements for the Crown in that verdict are still valid?

     

  22. Can the repeated wording, “under this Act” [i.e., the IRPA] in ss. 145.(1)(a) and (b), and ss. 146.(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act be lawfully interpreted as “under this Act and the previous Immigration Act, 1976[-1977]” by the insertion of a few words?

     

  23. (A) Is the legal principle that the sponsors are not responsible before their notification for the social benefit amounts paid to the sponsored persons, as expressed in Manitoba v. Khaleghi-Hashemian, 2002 MBQB 1 (CanLII) correct and still governing in Canada?

     

    (B) In the light of the verdict in Coscia v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1004 (CanLII) – that referred to the lack of definition of “organized crime” –, a lack of definition of “debtor” or “debt” in the IRPA and its IRP Regulations, plus the Crown’s determination to disregard the SCC verdict in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII) in its policies, can potential debtors or re-victimized sponsors (before a ministerial certificate is filed and registered at the Federal Court) be rightfully called “debtors”? [Please also refer to Question #35 that is similar.]

     

  24. Are the CIC-CRA policy called “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)” and/or the Sponsorship Agreement (REGS. April, 1997) on CIC form IMM 1344 C (02-98) by stating in the latter, “It is further agreed that damages will not be less than the total of all amounts actually received by the immigrant” [a prejudice claiming that the – always Canadian – sponsors are always unreliable, act in bad faith so have 100% of the financial responsibility while the alien sponsored applicants and the Crown’s administrators are always perfect and never make errors or omissions] ultra vires the CIC and the CRA for creating an absurd consequence that is contrary to legislative intention expressed in s. 3. of the IRPA, and/or infringe 15. (1) and/or s. 12. of the Charter in forced separation cases wherespouses and their children are separated from each other for years or forever; for nine years in our case?

     

  25. If the answer to Question 24 is affirmative, and such social prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination and collective punishment against the sponsors, based on nationality and profession, results in a cruel and unusual treatment for their families and violates the principles of the Geneva Conventions Act, are such infringements on (sub)sections 12. and 15. (1) of the Charter a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?

     

  26. Was paragraph 4.(3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, I-2 – SOR/78-172 [stating, “The family class does not include a spouse who entered into the marriage primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class and not with the intention of residing permanently with the other spouse.”], or its paragraph 5.(1) [requiring a continuous cohabitation with the sponsor for at least one year], paragraph 5.(2)(iii) – that the Crown never enforces due to the MOU and the sponsorship agreements – , or its paragraph 6.1 (2), [“Where a sponsor sponsors an application for landing of a member of the family class described in paragraph (h) of the definition “member of the family class” in subsection 2.(1) – see “debt obligation” – and that member is unable to meet the requirements of the Act and these Regulations or dies, the sponsor may sponsor the application for landing of another member of the family class described in that paragraph.”] valid for a family class sponsorship where the sponsored immigrants landed in Canada in December 1999 and a sponsorship default took place in October 2000?

     

  27. If the answer to Question 26 is in the affirmative for any of the paragraphs cited above from the Immigration Regulations, 1978, and if a sponsored spouse has not qualified as having been a member of the family class when the sponsorship default occurred, can he or she create a sponsorship debt in the family class for the sponsor?

     

  28. Are paragraphs 145. and 146. of the IRPA as interpreted or misinterpreted by Crown policies inconsistent with the definition of “debts, obligations and liabilities” in ss. 3 (1) of the Court Order Enforcement Act, RSBC 1996, c 78 – claiming that obligations not arising out of trust or contract are not debts, unless judgment has been recovered on them – also supported by paragraphs 8, 9 and Schedule 2 of the Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, SOR/88-181? [Please note that the sponsorship agreements in the family class fully or partially belong to “family agreements.” Also, the IRPA and the IRP Regulations intend to deal with immigration, not with specific details of garnishment.]

     

  29. Does the IRPA or the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations contain any provision that allows a province or territory to issue an efficient document for CRA or CIC, in lieu of the required ministerial certificate filed and registered in the Federal Court pursuant to s. 146. of the IRPA, substituting the latter certificate by a single page signed by any provincial public servant claiming that the sponsor’s debt is enforceable?

     

  30. When a provincial ministry did not make a payment of a prescribed nature or violated the laws of that province, particularly when paying benefits for ineligible full-time students (as in case of the appellant’s previous sponsorship) pursuant to ss. 16. (1) and (2) of the Employment and Assistance Regulation, BC Reg 263/2002, may such error of the Crown’s administrator reduce or eliminate the sponsor’s alleged financial responsibility or debt?

     

  31. Since the word “interest” in the financial or banking sense appears only under ss. 146.(2) in the IRPA, is it a reasonable supposition that the legislative intent was not to charge interest before the filing and registration of a ministerial certificate in the Federal Court that is approximately the time of the sponsors’ supposed notification about their defaults or debts?

     

  32. (A) Is the government of a province or territory, [that of British Columbia in the case at bar] allowed to ignore and contravene sections 3. and 4. of the Interest Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-15 [that prescribes an interest of five per cent per annum] and charge more than six per cent yearly interest rate on the alleged uncertified sponsorship debt in a case where the sponsorship agreement did not specify an interest rate and a non-existing contract between the sponsor and the Crown could not contain an express statement of the yearly rate or percentage of interest to which the other rate or percentage is equivalent?

     

    (B) Since this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction over a specified provincial government and their laws, does the Canada Revenue Agency owe a duty of fairness, open-mindedness, or duty to examine the files before the garnishment of sponsors if the latter called the CRA’s attention to unlawful claims of a provincial ministry or government against them? 

     

  33. Considering Subsection 6.(2) of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act,R.S.C., 1985, c. G-2, when a ministry of British Columbia served a garnishee summons on Her Majesty in Right of Canada [i.e., the CRA] in 2008 with a delay of almost eight years, well after the limitation period has expired, while it could have been served on Her Majesty in October or November 2000 within thirty days after the instant appellant’s sponsorship default, was that garnishee summons properly served and effective in law?

     

  34. If public servants can interpret ss. 80.(2) and ss. 83.(1) of the Financial Administration Act [RSBC 1996] that a “certification” of a debt by any administrator is valid without the involvement of any court, and British Columbia can garnishee the “suspect” debtor’s tax account with CRA, would such inconsistency with s. 27. of Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act, RSC 1985, with s. 26. and s. 45. of Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, RSC 1985, ss. 146.(1) and (2) of the IRPA, and/or paragraphs 8, 9, and Schedule 2 of Family Support Orders and Agreements Garnishment Regulations, or/and ss. 11.(d) of the Charter render the cited sections of the Financial Administration Act [RSBC 1996] invalid in law?

     

  35. In light of the fact that the wording “judgment debtor” is found 34 times in the Federal Courts Rules but no matches show up for “other than judgment debtor”, “possible debtor,” “suspect debtor” or “suspected debtor” by a search at all, and the situation is similar in other federal enactments, is it possible that in the laws of Canada the word “debtor” always refers to “judgment debtor” and, therefore, a possible debtor that has never received any summons shall not be punished? [Please note that this is similar to Question #23 (B).]

     

  36. If a sponsored spouse in the family class abandons his or her sponsor within a year of continuous cohabitation, and keeps to cohabit with another boyfriend or girlfriend while gets social assistance benefits, would such circumstances turn an innocent re-victimized sponsor into an “offender” legally? [Sub-question 36 (a): If the answer for Question 36 is “yes,” and there is no ministerial certificate on file in the Federal Court for seven years after the default of the garnisheed sponsor in the family class, is that a contravention of ss. 11. (a) of the Charter? Sub-question (b): If the answer for the previous sub-question 36 (a) is in the negative, and the Crown is punishing such non-offence by the forced separation of a family for seven or more years, is that considered a cruel or unusual punishment or treatment that contravenes section 12. of the Charter?

     

  37. If a memorandum of fact and law was served and filed by the Government of Canada in the case “Docket: A-367-12,” with a delay of 33 days after the deadline set by Rule 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, and the FCA Registry accepted its filing while the Federal Court found Mr. Abdessadok’s 24-hour delay in filing his submission unacceptable in Abdessadok v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2006 FC 236 (CanLII), and such adverse treatment between the Crown and the instant self-represented appellant (as an unjustified or unjustifiable distinction between the powerful and the weak) infringe on s. 15.(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is such infringement demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society pursuant to s. 1. of the Charter?

     

  38. If the Courts Administration Service or the Chief Justice of the FCA ignored for good the filed Notice of Appeal of an interlocutory order [dated 30 May 2013, Docket: A-367-12 above] issued by a FCA judge, without ever assigning a judge to review the appellant’s arguments that claimed palpable and overriding error(s) in law, is such solution consistent or harmonious with ss. 8. (2)(c) of the Courts Administration Service Act and s. 3. of the Federal Courts Act, “for the better administration of the laws of Canada”?

     

  39. If the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada, by contravening s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, refused the filing of a proper Notice of Appeal under s. 61. [related to questions 37 and 38 above], preventing the appeal be heard by the panel of nine SCC judges, does it mean that the FCA order of 30 May 2013 [Docket: A-367-12] is final, the word “service” in ss.  346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules is “absurd” and the words of that subrule shall be interpreted as “Within 30 days of filing” instead of “Within 30 days after service”? [Note: Particularly in light of s. 3 of the Federal Courts Rules and the fact that parties do not fight with a Court but with each other, and a delay in serving a document may cause huge financial losses for the opposing party or parties but not for the Court.]

     

  40. If the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada, by contravening s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, refused the filing of a proper Notice of Appeal under s. 61. as the instant appellant’s last step againstthe “Tremblay-Lamer principle” (see Docket T-1029-12, the order of the Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer dated 20 July 2012, stating that “No action for damages premised on a hypothetical administrative decision can succeed because no damage has yet materialized”) is such legal principle valid and final in every case where the Crown threatens a party, person or firm with a possible future unlawful administrative decision? [Note: Thus, is it now widely acceptable for the Registrar of every court in Canada to post a memo stating, “Administrators of the Registry that file any pleadings against the Crown may lose their jobs without notice and severance payments”, or, may every A.G. of each province rightfully post a memo saying, “Salaries of judges that grant costs or damages to a party against the Crown may lose all their benefits and severance payments, and their salaries may be cut by 25%?]

     

  41. If the answer to Question 40 is in the affirmative and the Crown may apply coercion and intimidation freely and openly, partly with the aim of corrupting Canada’s public servants and the whole society, is such infringement on values fundamental to a free and democratic society a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?

     

  42. Do the administrators or officers of the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada have the right to usurp or reduce the power of the Information Commissioner by claiming that she (Ms. Suzanne Legault) has no mandate under s. 7. of the Access to Information Act to investigate complaints due to the CIC’s failure to provide information within the prescribed 30 days to Service Canada or/and a citizen despite that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration is listed under its Schedule I, the request was for a single record easy to find, and CIC has not filed a notice of request for extension of time limit?

     

  43. Does a brief note such as “This is not a legal document” or a similar clause in a policy, form, or guide issued by a federal ministry entitle that ministry to contravene the lawful operation of the relevant statute (that is more powerful than the policies under it)?

     

  44. Does the joint interpretation of the sentences “9. Have persons you previously sponsored of their family members received social assistance during the validity period of the undertaking?” in IMM 1344 (03-2016) E form, and “If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question between 5 and 15, You are not eligible to be a sponsor. You should not submit an application” (under “Sponsor Eligibility Assessment” in Guide 3900: Sponsorship of spouse, etc.) both issued by the Government of Canada and published on the Internet, communicate false or misleading information, declaration, or rules with intent to deter immigration to Canada? [I.e., Under question 9 of Form IMM 1344 E, if any of the sponsored family members received social assistance that had been repaid, or, the sponsor became discharged bankrupt, the IRPA and its IRP Regulations allow the immigration of further sponsored person(s).]

     

  45. If Guide 3900 and question 9 of the Crown’s IMM 1344 (03-2016) E and form forbid the submission of such applications (solely due to the tort hidden in their sentences) deter the immigration of otherwise qualified applicants in the family class, does such misinterpretation contravene sections 3 (1) (d) or/and 127 (a) or (b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?

     

  46. If a party (person or company) appeals the order or decision of a lower court at the Supreme Court of Canada obeying its relevant rules, formats and deadlines, while claiming error in law, and thus following the proceeding prescribed by section 61. of the Supreme Court Act and s. 2 (under “proceeding”) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada but the SCC administrators, without a lawful explanation, refuse to file the Notice of Appeal so the issues and questions of law remain unresolved by (and kept in secret from) a panel of nine judges could the decision of the lower court – that has not seen any evidence – be considered as a final judgment in Canada?

  47. In light of section 33 (2) the federal Interpretation Act, does the conclusion in [44] of the Oral Reasons of Madame Justice Donegan in Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 BCSC 924 (CanLII) claiming that the pleaded “torts of contravening several acts of Parliament” are “causes of action… not known to law” override both section 126 (1) of the Criminal Code [that is law] and the often cited opposite statement of Mr. Justice MacGuigan* of the Federal Court of Appeal, “… the necessity for the Government and its officials to obey the law is the fundamental aspect of the principle of the rule of law, which is now enshrined in our Constitution by the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms…”? (*Note: in LeBar v. Canada, [1989] 1 FC 603, [1988] F.C.J. No. 940)
  48. Are the torts of “fraudulent conversion,” and “defrauding the public by deceit” – pleaded in Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 BCSC 924 (CanLII) as Madam Justice Donegan admitted – “not known to law” as she asserted in her Oral Reasons, despite of section 380 (1) and 380.1 (1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore, from now on every Canadian – including public servants – are allowed to defraud the public or any person by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence?
  49. Since the BC Court of Appeal* held that “Her articulation and application of the governing law is unassailable” (regarding the previous two constitutional questions), and considering the circumstance that the instant plaintiffs, pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act, properly submitted a timely Notice of Appeal to the SCC but the Registrar (Mr. Bilodeua) has refused to file it, is the new “Donegan principle” that the contravention of several laws of Canada is now acceptable is valid as governing law in every province and territory? [Note: in Simon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCCA 52 (CanLII)]
  50.  In the circumstances referred to in the previous question about the lack of a final judgment by the SCC, can the comfortable opinion of the BC Court of Appeal [referring to “The detailed and well-considered reasons of the chambers judge… Her articulation and application of the governing law is unassailable”] override and silence the fact that Madam Justice Donegan made several palpable and overriding errors that have been well-pleaded in the appeal documents so this strange new principle is now valid all over Canada?
  51. Can it be called a fair trial where – in Simon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2016 BCCA 52 (CanLII) – the three judges of the BCCA allowed to speak only one of the three parties during the hearing knowing that the two counsel, for the AGC and AGBC, would have been unable to articulate any sound defence or answer any of the well-structured questions of the appellant meaningfully about the torts, also such silence in the recordings and eventually in the transcript would reveal the tort of the court, so to speak
  52. If the wording “penal matter” in the heading of section 11 of the Charter is not defined by federal legislation, while pursuant to section 15 (1) of the Charter innocent victims have the same Charter rights that criminals do, is it a reasonable liberal interpretation in light of s. 12. of the federal Interpretation Act that the victims charged with an offence or a debt claim cannot become punished beyond the six-year limitation period, they have the right to be informed without unreasonable delay of the specific offence or alleged debt, to be tried at a court or tribunal within a reasonable time before punishment, and shall be considered innocent until proven guilty?

  53. If the words “debt” or “debtor” are not defined by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act but its sections 146 (1) through (3) and the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, [2011] 2 SCR 504, 2011 SCC 30 (CanLII), the latter decision by referring to the requirement of a “ministerial certificate” at least seven times, both militate for a certificate “filed and registered in the Federal Court” shall the federal policies named “IP 2” and “MOU” override the enactment and governing common law cited, allowing to punish the alleged “debtors” without such involvement of the Federal Court?
  54. If the vague words “not genuine”, “primarily” and “privilege” under section 4 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations are not defined in that enactment, no instrument (including lie detector) is used during the applicants’ short interviews with Canada’s visa officers abroad, and the visa officers, tribunals or judges are unable to state correctly, numerically or by giving a percentage of the purposes of their own spouses when those married them – let alone that motives or purposes in genuine marriages and those of convenience are dynamic and ever changing – are those authorities able to give a 100% correct verdict “beyond reasonable doubt” when refuse to issue a visa and block the reunification of a family forever solely on such shaky ground?
  55. If the answer to the previous question is “no”, and the visa officers have no proof or evidence to support their allegations beyond reasonable doubt, or/and their decision does not contain any detailed reasons while the married couple has satisfactorily proven the genuine nature of the marriage, is their separation by the caprice of the visa officer constituting unusual or cruel treatment by the violations of sections 12. and 11.(d) of the Charter, subsection 3. (1) (d) of the IRPA and the principles of Geneva Conventions Act are saved or justified by section 1. of the Charter in a free and democratic society?
  56. If the visa officers have no proof or evidence to support their allegations about a bad-faith marriage beyond reasonable doubt, and/or their refusal to issue a visa does not contain any detailed reasons while the married couple has satisfactorily proven the genuine nature of the marriage, and the sponsor answered “YES” for question 3 (“Are you sponsoring a member in the family class…?”) of the IMM 1344 (03-2016) E form, does the visa officers’ contrary decision allow the Crown to declare any time beyond the six-year limitation period that the sponsor has been owing $100,000 to Canada for the alleged violation of sections 127 and 128 of the IRPA by misinterpretation?
  57. If the old guidelines widely used by Canadian visa officers abroad emphasize the differences between two spouses such as in race, colour, national or ethnic origin, language, religion, traditions social and financial standing, education, age gap and similar factors which often raise red flags about the genuineness of the relationship between the appellant and applicant or about their “incompatibility” and alleged “bad faith marriages” so on that ground alone the visa is not granted for the spouses, are those old guidelines in harmony with the values of the Charter, particularly its section 15.(1)?
  58. If the laws of Canada allow and recognize the marriage of such very different persons as genuine marriages but the Canadian visa or immigration officers worldwide apply very different standards in their assessment of compatibility – ignoring the possible compatibility of the wife and husband, say, at the kitchen table and in the bedroom – and prohibit the reunification of those couples or families by the violations of sections 12. and 11.(d) of the Charter, subsection 3. (1)(d) of the IRPA and the principles of Geneva Conventions Act, are the infringements a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1. of the Charter?
  59. When striking out statements of claim [pursuant to s. 221 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules, or, a similar provincial enactment] is it ethical for a court to strike them without right to amend where numerous unanswered questions of law of general importance and many material facts with clear causes of action were pleaded within 193 paragraphs while the court failed to apply the “pain and obvious” test and was unable to pinpoint a single “incurable defect” in its oral reasons except using a list of words like prolix, convoluted, or “sweeping allegations” that are “incapable of proof” and “hard if not impossible to understand”? [I.e., in Simon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 BCSC 924 (CanLII)]
  60. Is it an indication of a court’s open-mindedness to strike out a pleading consisting of 192 clear and understandable paragraphs as only “sweeping allegations” that are “incapable of proof” just because the opposing parties evasively disagreed with all those 192 allegations of fact but failed to offer their version of facts and by doing so contravened the basic rules of pleading?
  61. Does the wording “incapable of proof” include situations where the party has plenty of proofs at hand and could prove most of his allegations at a hearing but the Court is predetermined to strike out his pleadings while the court rules do not allow him to show any evidence at all at that early stage?
  62. Is it an ethically accepted approach or strategy of the courts to simply ignore violations of the court rules in cases where the Crown files and serves documents with a delay of two weeks or a month beyond the prescribed deadline, despite the written and timely complaint of the opposing party?
  63. Since the laws of Canada have no clear definition for the word “concise” and concise dictionaries with hundreds of pages do exist, is it reasonable and ethical for a court to strike pleadings on the main ground or allegation that “it did not contain a concise statement of the material facts”, without specifying that the statement or list of material facts in the pleadings was too long or too short?
  64. If the Oral Reasons of a Court alleges that most of the statement of claim was so convoluted, prolix, irrelevant, vexatious, and hard if not impossible to understand – so perhaps the judge has missed or overlooked most of the main issues in the pleadings – is it a good reasoning of the same judge to allege that most of the material facts claimed “were irrelevant”? (I.e., if one cannot understand the core or essence of a pleadings how can the same person assume that any other fact is irrelevant?)
  65. If a judge allegedly did not understand the pleadings, denied jurisdiction, skipped, overlooked or has forgotten – when writing the verdict – all the important issues properly pleaded in a statement of claim, he or she offered no detailed analysis about such main issues, or have not addressed the main questions of law at all, can another Court consider or interpret the verdict of that judge as res judicata regarding the unsolved issues?
  66. Can it be called ethical or fairness of the court if a judge ignores the name of the defendant as shown in the style of cause where a plaintiff (A) has a clear claim against  the federal defendant (B) and expresses in his pleadings that he has no claim against a third party (C) and even defends that third party (a provincial government), but the judge tries to “read the mind” of party (A) and suggests that party (A) has no real problem with party (B) but rather he must be mad at party (C) and, since he has no jurisdiction over party (C), he strikes out the claim without leave to amend?
  67. Is it a fair legal process of a court if a statement of claim contains dozens of serious issues and/or clear questions of law within a detailed framework of relevant material facts complete with dates and names but the decision of the judge does not address the majority of those main issues, or, any of them?
  68. If a party – say, an author or several published books – has excellent skills to construct pleadings, has perfect evidence against his or her crooked opponent(s), always obeys the rules of the courts in good faith while defending the laws of Canada and the powers of the Supreme Court of Canada, fighting for public interest and a better Canada for a decade, is it possible to render a final judgment against such person without ever allowing him or her to show evidence at a court, preventing his or her case by unlawful means and cover-ups to get before the nine judges of the SCC as the only remedy appropriate and just in the circumstances, could such manipulations by unequal protection and unequal benefit of the law constitute an infringement on sections 12, 15 (1) and 24 (1) of the Charter?
  69. Can common sense and the words about remedial, fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation in section 12. of the federal Interpretation Act R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21 be applied when interpreting section 504. of the Criminal Code, so a “Justice” of the Federal Court has territorial jurisdiction in any province over federal public servants whose addresses are kept in secret – and the AGC has vicarious liability for their errors and omissions – while any Justice of the Federal Court may accept an information about those civil servants and the provable or proven torts in which they have participated?
  70. If the answer for the previous question is in the negative, and the word “Justice” shall mean strictly “a justice of the peace or a provincial court judge, and includes two or more justices where two or more justices are, by law, required to act” as defined under section 2. (under justice) of the Criminal Code, despite that “indictment includes …[a] pleading” under s. 2 (a) of the Code, so the word Justice excludes every federal judge? [Note: the text cited includes “two or more justices” – without the word “provincial” in that phrase – that may refer to three federal judges of the FCA.]
  71. If the word Justice in section 504. of the Criminal Code excludes federal judges while the addresses of the federal public servants are unpublished and unknown for the public due to privacy laws, does it mean that a person may not lay an information in writing and under oath against federal employees, ministers or, say, a Canadian visa officer living in Hong Kong even if those public servants have openly committed indictable offences and the Federal Court has jurisdiction in criminal matters pursuant to section 4. of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7?
  72. If the AGC in 2011 was supportive of the torts and the money extortion scheme against the re-victimized sponsors, and allowed his minister colleagues to simply ignore and disobey the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (A.G.) v. Mavi, supra, while only the AGC was allowed to lay an information against his honourable tortfeasor colleagues but other citizens were not allowed to do so, was/is such discrimination between tortfeasors and law-abiding citizens as an infringement on s. 15 (1) of the Charter justified by section 1. of the Charter in a free and democratic society?
  73. If the wording of ss. 72. (2) (e) of the IRPA, “no appeal lies from the decision of the Court with respect to the application or with respect to an interlocutory judgment” without adding the words “in cases where national security is involved, except where error of law is alleged regarding questions of debts or pure questions of law” separates innocent family members from each other for more than six years and thus violates section 12. of the Charter can the infringement be saved by section 1. of the Charter in a free and democratic society?
  74. If the five counts of untrue statement within the CIC policy named “IP 2 – Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class” (www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/ip/ip02-eng.pdf in paras. 5.18, 6.9, 12 and 16 twice) alleging that the sponsors have (legal or binding) contracts contradict and violate s. 132 (4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations – that is silent about any contract except in rare cases of settlement plans described in sections 152 through 154 – may that infringement on the IRP Regulations be interpreted as an indirect misrepresentation of the IRPA that induces or could induce errors in its administration as described in sections 126 through 129 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)?
  75. If the promise stated on the CIC forms that the sponsors may be taken to a court of law of competent jurisdiction constituted a “causa sine qua non” situation for a signing pre-IRPA sponsor in the family class but there is no such real designated court in Canada because provincial courts decline jurisdiction over the text of the CIC family sponsorship and undertaking forms (since immigration is strictly a federal matter) while the Federal Court declines jurisdiction when a provincial government has been involved by paying social benefits to a sponsored person so there was no consensus ad idem on a main issue between the Crown and the sponsors can this ground of unconsciousness render those agreements void ab initio?
  76. Is section 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be interpreted as a separate block within the Charter surrounded by a solid wall impenetrable from both directions, so section 11 contains every right of offenders or criminals in penal matters while the rest of the Charter’s sections contain every right of non-offenders or non-criminals in other than penal matters?
  77. In light of 15 (1) of the Charter, implying that offenders and non-offenders have similar rights such as right “to be informed without unreasonable delay of an accusation” before punishment, or, the principle of “innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing”, if the answer to Question 76 is in the negative (and section 11 refers to a sample group of the society instead of a privileged group of the society), is it possible that both sections 11 and 15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are equally valid and to be interpreted in tandem?

Alberta man protects the power of Supreme Court of Canada's nine judges from conspiracy (the real pleadings)

Court File No.: [N/A: its filing was refused]        

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL)

 

 

BETWEEN:

ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON

            Appellant

(Also appellant in the FCA)

 and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

IN RIGHT OF CANADA

 

(as represented by The Attorney General,

 the Minister of Human Resources and Skills

Development, including Service Canada,

and

The Hon. Diane Finley, and Sharon Shanks [the latter

persons both in their representative and personal capacity],

and

The federal authority that approved the web site*

http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ar-lr/gl-ld/gl-ld-eng.asp#1)

[* Roger Bilodeau, Registrar, according to Ms. Janice Cheney’s pleadings. He was adverse

in interest to the appellant in the FCA but his person is a non-party to this appeal]

 

Respondent

(Also respondent/respondents in the FCA)

 

 

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Filed by Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant as of right (s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act:

Error in law is alleged)

 

 

   Court File No.: _______________

NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

BETWEEN:

 

ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON

            Appellant

 and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

IN RIGHT OF CANADA

                Respondent

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

NOTICE OF APPEAL

 

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew Simon appeals as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from the two judgments of the Federal Court of Appeal made on 18 February 2014 and on 30 May, 2013 under section 61. and subsections 58.(1)(b), 60.(1), 2.(1)(“appeal”), and 97.(3) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26  [Loi sur la Cour suprême, L.R.C. (1985), ch. S-26]; rules 1. and 19.(4) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada (SOR/2002-156) [Règles de la Cour suprême du Canada (DORS/2002-156)]; s. 12 and 24.(1) of the The Constitution Act, 1982, and s. 12. of the Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21. Errors in law are alleged at the FC & the FCA. This document is not sealed, confidential, or subject to limitations on public access.

 

Please note that subsections 40.(3) and 43.(1)(a) of the [SC] Act, although are associated with application for leave, also support the remedies contained in the legislation referred to above. Section 97.(3) of the Act states: “All rules not inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act have force and effect as if herein enacted.” The “Guidelines for Preparing Documents …” under sub-rule 21.(1) of the Rules ignores s. 61. of the Act so it is inconsistent with the express provision of s. 61. Therefore, it is not in effect where a Notice of Appeal is filed under s. 61.

 

Pursuant to the SCC website http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ar-lr/gl-ld2014-01-01-eng.aspx#B, “Self-represented litigants are not required to file electronic documents.” However, I will file one.

  

Dated at the City of Red Deer, the province of Alberta, this 12th day of March, 2014.

 

SIGNED BY

 

 

_______________________________    

Appellant, self-represented litigant                            

Zoltan Andrew Simon

6 Rutherford Drive

Red Deer, AB   T4P 3G9 (till March 31, 2014)

 

NEW ADDRESS FROM April 1, 2014:

72 Best Crescent

Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

Phone: (403) 340-2334;  Phone (403) 392-9189 (cell.)

Fax: (403) 341-3300

Email: zasimon@hotmail.com

 

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR (Mr. Roger Bilodeau, SCC, Ottawa)

 

COPIES TO:

Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel                                                          

Dept. of Justice Canada, Prairie Region                                   

EPCOR Tower,     300, 10423 – 101 St.

Edmonton, AB   T5H 0E7                                                                 

Phone: (780) 495-7324

Fax: (780) 495-8491                                                                          

E-mail: ................                                           

and                                                                                                         

 

Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the                                          

Registry, Supreme Court of Canada                                          

C/o Janice E. Cheney, Counsel,                                                   

Supreme Court of Canada, Law Branch                                   

301 Wellington Street,

Ottawa, ON   K1A 0J1                                                                       

Phone: (613) 947-2417

Fax: (613) 943-1570                                                                          

E-mail: ................. 

Note: Please find below a copy of the judgments and reasons for judgments of the FCA court appealed from as Schedule. Two certificates (Forms 23A and 23B) are filed separately as pre-scribed. A bank draft is enclosed here, too, issued by the TD Bank of Canada. It is the prescribed security, pursuant to Rule 60. (1) (b)in the amount of $575.00 and made out to the Receiver General of Canada. (The $575 includes a filing fee of $75.)

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (not required for an unbound document)

[...]

      Errors in law in the lower courts ... 

      Final Order and Reasons for Judgment of the FCA appealed from

            (February 18, 2014) ...                                                                     

      Order of the FCA (Madam Justice Dawson, J.A.) appealed from, dated May 30, 2013 ...

      [Note: the last numbered page is 38.]

 

 

Errors in law in the lower courts (questions of pure law) in the judgments objected to

 

Concise overview regarding issues of public importance, jurisdiction, & statement of facts

                The case on appeal contains pure questions of law of great public importance. The facts are not disputed but the parties and the Court(s) disagreed on their interpretation. Also, they agreed that the two most relevant test cases were Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 (CanLII), 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 and ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986]. All parties have agreed in the FCA courtroom that the Registrar failed to apply s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act. The FC and the FCA refused to exercise their jurisdiction in the main issues. The first question is: Does a single registrar have legal power to reduce the power of the Supreme Court of Canada’s panel of nine judges by keeping crucial issues in secret from them? The second main issue is: If a federal ministry intimidates citizens by current illegal policy statements, do the FC and the FCA lack jurisdiction in such cases? The appellant respectfully submits to this Honourable Court that the determination of any issue of pure law requires a more searching review, instead of copying automatically the trial judge’s reasons for judgment. Once Crown Counsel Camille Audain referred to paras. 8-9 of Housen v. Nikolaisen, supra, for the “Standard of Review for Questions of Law.” The FCA’s recent Order and Reasons contradicted those.

                Justice Tremblay-Lamer failed to demonstrate that there was no statutory grant by federal Parliament regarding the issues. She alleged: there is no “existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case.” The appellant claims that all the three conditions of the test have been satisfied to establish the jurisdiction of the Federal Court (ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, para 11). On 26 November 2013, the appellant stated that he had joined the consensus in the courtroom by stating that the Registrar had been a Crown servant. The Court and the respondent(s) did not object to such wording during the hearing (or in the verdict).

                No other court has been constituted to examine the errors and omissions of Crown servants or administrators working in the Supreme Court of Canada. Sections 3., 4., 17. and 25. of the Federal Courts Act and ss. 3.(b)(i) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act explicitly state that the case on appeal belonged to the FC’s and FCA’s jurisdiction: The Federal Court has original jurisdiction, between subject and subject as well as otherwise, in any case in which a claim for relief is made or a remedy is sought under or by virtue of the laws of Canada if no other court constituted, established or continued under any of the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982 has jurisdiction in respect of that claim or remedy.

 

Questions of issues with their arguments

The Crown Party’s issue

The Reasons of Justice Near refer to Ms. Shanks’ written response, to the effect that “there may be garnishment action in the future…” The “garnishment action” is a blurry wording in [3] of his Reasons dated February 18, 2014. The instant appellant had no objection against a possible or potential “garnishment action” by a normal procedure through a court as prescribed by the laws of Canada. Instead, he objected the policy statement of Ms. Shanks that a creditor “may obtain a garnishee summons without proceeding to court” so his CPP benefits may be garnisheed by Service Canada without the involvement of any court. Regarding social assistance, Ms. Shanks added, “If the CPP benefit subsequently becomes payable for that period, the Minister may deduct the amount that has already been paid by the province or municipality.” Such statements referred to the current policies of Service Canada in 2009 as the date of the correspondence clearly indicated. The letters of Ms. Shanks were dated on the current dates, not on a future date. She did not postdate her letters. The appellant is suing the Crown because it allowed Ms. Shanks to threaten him by an illegal policy. No legislation existed (or exists) that would allow to garnishee automatically any debt claim without any involvement of a court.

The appellant’s Statement of Claim claimed threatening or intimidation, undue interference, mental distress and mental suffering as results of an unlawful policy, in light of Minister Finley’s similar unlawful policies at the CIC previously. (She simply equated “judgment debt” with “debt claim”, did not require a certificate of the Minister, etc. The word “may” in the letter of Ms. Shanks above means “will”, just like in Canada (A.G) v. Mavi, 2011.)  

               

The FCA’s Reasons for Judgment repeat the mistake of the FC judgment that “it was plain and obvious on the facts as pleaded that the action could not succeed given that the main claim in the pleading is to the alleged effect of a possible future administrative decision that could be subject to a review procedure; allegations regarding hypothetical decisions do not disclose a reasonable cause of action (Operation Dismantle v Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at paras. 30 and 31).”

                The appellant, Mr. Simon, sued for the current illegal and threatening policies of Service Canada. It was NOT about “a possible future administrative decision” or a “hypothetical decision.” The illegal policy of Service Canada was a de facto decision in 2009, not hypothetical. Thus, the only common law – Operation Dismantle v. Canada, supra – cited by the Respondents and this Court shows no relevance at all to this appeal at bar. The instant appellant provided a long list of facts, documents, with dozens of paragraphs of violated federal law, also related case law precedents that deal with intimidation, threatening, and extortion. It is a major error and biased approach to equate past or present with future, allegation [in Operation Dismantle, supra] with fact [the letters in Z. Simon’s pleading], or mix up illegal policies with a review procedure: Ms. Finlay and Ms. Shanks rejected the possibility of any review in the past and ignored the serious letters of the appellant. In Longley v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2000 BCCA 241 (CanLII), the Crown was ordered to pay $55,000 for not explaining a tax loophole situation to Mr. Longley. (Note: Why is a state obliged to explain any loophole? The taxpayers should experiment and try it out without assistance.) The Crown did not scare or intimidate Mr. Longley; he was not subject to pressure and mental suffering like the instant appellant.

The correspondence reveals that Service Canada was aware of the origin and nature of the debt or debt claim, knowing that so far there was no court order in 2009 or 2011 establishing any alleged debt or its amount against Mr. Simon. The leaders of Service Canada knowingly and illegally equated the notions of “debt” and “debt claim” and, by doing that, disobeyed paragraph 146. (1) of the IRPA, “An amount or part of an amount payable under this Act that has not been paid may be certified by the Minister…”. Ms. Finley supported such unconstitutional policy since her term as minister of immigration previously. She knew that the policies called MoU (between the CRA and CIC) and the “IP 2” have been improper from the beginning but, in bad faith, she wanted to keep enforcing the unlawful paragraphs of them within Service Canada as well. Thus, the leaders of her ministry purposefully undermined and violated the said paragraphs, and the SCC’s highest order in similar situations. I.e., the Supreme Court, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 SCR 504, states at least four times that the minister must certify a debt as a key obligation of the government in case of garnishment.

The above mentioned illegal and unconstitutional policy of Service Canada and its (HRSD’s) Minister, combined with their written threat to act at any time without the Court’s approval, was an auxiliary tort supporting a larger conspiracy – to extort monies – between the CRA and the CIC (that the instant appellant’s pleadings were not referring to since Mr. Prothonotary Lafrenière did not allow the filing of his Amended Statement of Claim).

In striking the pleading relating to the errors and omissions of the Crown servants of Service Canada the Judge (Justice Tremblay-Lamer) seriously misapprehended the pleadings, proceeded on a wrong principle of law in each of her paragraphs or otherwise erred so as to warrant intervention by this Honourable Court.

The Order of Justice Tremblay-Lamer, regarding the Crown, correctly referred to the test (whether it is plain and obvious on the facts pleaded that the action cannot succeed) but she failed to apply that test). She referred to a “minimum level of material fact disclosure” as a rule but has not stated (and could not substantiate) that Z. Simon disobeyed such requirement. She mentioned the expressions of “possible future administrative decision” and “hypothetical administrative decision” as the main and relevant factors. However, none of those two wordings show up at a search by www.canlii.org since they cannot be found in any common law, let alone legislation. By doing that, the Judge based her decision on non-existing authorities: a palpable and overriding error. (Justice Near simply repeated and copied her error.) Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer erroneously assumed: it is plain and obvious that no action can succeed where “no damage has yet materialized.” This is a blatant error in light of R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72 and three other cases below. Similarly, Service Canada’s unlawful policy statement would mean to reasonable elderly persons that they are forced to live with a threat of being abandoned by Canada and being exposed to death by starvation and the lack of medical care abroad (say, living with an unemployed spouse in China). The appellant has established that his constitutional rights and protections enshrined in s. 7 and s. 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been violated by the unconstitutional policy of Service Canada. Regardless this circumstance, none of the judges paid any attention to his claim: this seemed like wilful blindness. These Charter rights are related to right to life, security, and right against unreasonable seizure (of CPP benefits).

There are other similar cases: Runcer v. Gould, 2000 ABQB 25 (CanLII), R. v. Alexander, 2005 CanLII 32566 (ON CA), or R. v. Critton, 2002 CanLII 3240 (ON SC). In all of the four cases above, “no damage has yet materialized” but the threatening or intimidation has been always condemned by the courts. (In the latter case no one was scared and there was no legislation yet about hijacking a plane.)

It is not plain and obvious that top public servants cannot participate in fraud or extortion schemes (like a political pyramid scheme here). See R v Branch, 2012 NBQB 175 (CanLII). A conspiracy to extort money or other personal gain from named victims by threatening them to take away or reduce their deserved pension benefits by improper or illegal garnishment unless the alleged debtors paid the demanded sum to either Canada or one of its provinces is a crime, just like in R. v. Alexander, supra.

The Statement of Claim did not contain anything against British Columbia but Justice Tremblay-Lamer misinterpreted it. She has derailed the claim by wrongly assuming that the social assistance benefits paid for the appellant’s ex-spouse were part of it. She thought that those monies formed “solely” “the propriety of British Columbia” and, therefore, she had no jurisdiction over that amount. In reality, the Statement of Claim dealt with the CPP benefit monies allocated to Z. Simon constituting a federal Crown debt owed to him. Thus, her reasoning contains palpable and overriding errors. Otherwise, s. 67. of the Financial Administration Act (1985) states,

          “Except as provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament, (a) a Crown debt is not

           assignable…” [Emphasis added].

 

Issues related to the “SCC Party” – a non-party

There was an agreement in the FCA courtroom that the Registrar had not applied (and therefore contradicted the crystal clear) s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act.  This is the key material fact and all the tree judges understood it during the hearing; none of them proposed an opposite or different interpretation. This material fact has been properly expressed in Mr. Simon’s original Notice of Claim, and during his further pleadings. The appellant’s evidence satisfies the balance of probabilities test.

 

The conspiracy of Mr. Bilodeau, Ms. Achakji, and Ms. Kincaid to block the appellant’s way to the panel of nine judges of the Supreme Court by the violation of s. 61. was a conspiracy, even if all the three of them worked in the building of the Supreme Court of Canada. The actus reus of the crime emphasizes the need to establish a meeting of the minds to achieve a mutual criminal objective. The above-mentioned three persons acted to achieve a mutual illegal objective, possibly by a discussion during their coffee break. They (Ms. Kincaid) even claimed that an appeal as of right was possible only in certain criminal cases. That is untrue because s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act is silent about such condition. Section 61. is explicit and does not need any reinterpretation. If Mr. Bilodeau or his colleagues – including any Attorney General – thought that s. 61. was impracticable [because it had no special instructions under the Rules] they were free to submit their concern to Parliament, instead of rewriting a clear section of the Act that is the foundation of the Rules. It was uncontroversial and beyond reasonable dispute. Pursuant to paragraph 3.(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, it was Mr. Bilodeaus’s right and obligation to establish a rule or wording for appeals under s. 61. Both courts awarded him large amounts in costs for neglecting or refusing to do his duties: an obvious bias.  

 

The Courts’ failure to apply any test

Justice Near’s Reasons for Judgment failed to apply a test to examine if Justice Tremblay-Lamer was correct in her order by assuming that no amendment could save the Statement of Claim. This is a bias of the FC and FCA in light of Simon v. Canada, 2011 FCA 6 (CanLII), GRI Simulations Inc. v. Pro-Dive Oceaneering Co., 2004 NLCA 74 (CanLII), and Kelly Lake Cree Nation v. Canada, [1998] 2 FC 270.

The claim based upon misfeasance in public office could have been cured, simply by typing the important words and references to the legislation by bold letters or underlined, or, by repeating the key words a few more times. For example, the essence of the claim (section 61. of the Supreme Court Act or/and its violation) is mentioned five times in the Statement of Claim. The four judges simply overlooked those five instances, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias. Was it Z. Simon’s fatal error that he did not refer to that main claim fifteen times, only five times?

Justice Near failed to realize that the Statement of Claim contained a concise statement of the material facts as is required by Rule 174., with a precise meaning at law. One cannot allege that nine pages are not concise enough to outline the basic issues, since an administrator may find a pleading of 20 or 30 pages “too lengthy” for submission or filing. In a similar case, Ms. Collins was given leave to re-amend the amended statement of claim to allege the tort of misfeasance in public office. [See Collins v. Canada, 2011 FCA 140 (CanLII).] It is patently unreasonable to punish Z. Simon just because the Crown servants committed so many errors and omissions that a long list of their details one by one would contravene the purpose of Rule 174. It is clear and obvious that the FC, the FCA, and the respondent(s) understood very well the allegations of the Statement of Claim at its first reading but pretended that it was not “concise”, without ever explaining whether it was too long or too short. Their attitude was a “fishing expedition” just like if one sued a bartender claiming that the rum and coke was too warm, contained too much rum, it was too cold, and had an excessive amount of coke. Or, if one would sue a photographer claiming that a photograph was too light and too dark.

The courts ignored and failed to apply a test to examine Mr. Simon’s claims related to some blatantly wrong motions of the Respondent that did not reveal any material facts and constituted abuse of process. Actually, the courts did not seem to examine the pleadings of both parties in this regard.

Both courts have failed to apply any test for tort of misfeasance. They simply ignored that issue. The elements of the cause of action of misfeasance in public office are: (1) A public officer must engage in deliberate and unlawful conduct in his or her capacity as a public officer. (2) The public officer must have been aware that his or her conduct was both unlawful and likely to harm the plaintiff. In this case at bar, the officers of Service Canada kept threatening the appellant deliberately by an unlawful policy that violated the legislation, including sections 7 and 12 of the Charter. From the three letters of Z. Simon, they were aware of the negative effects and harm for him and his family. The same situation, test and rules are valid to the Court’s failure to apply a test regarding Mr. Bilodeau’s misfeasance in public office. As for the breach of Charter rights, section 12, Canadians subjected to nationwide torts perpetrated by the Crown with the help of the court administration system constitute a cruel and unusual treatment.

 

Allegation of vexatious or frivolous pleadings and abuse of process                           

The appellant has clearly demonstrated that the FC judge has proceeded on wrong principles of law, she has seriously misapprehended the facts, and an obvious injustice has resulted.

The Crown Defendant’s Motion Record (to strike the Statement of Claim), page 2, did NOT seek an Order to qualify Z. Simon a vexatious litigant, or his pleading as “vexatious.” (It claimed collateral attacks – a fishing expedition – but the Court could did not support such claim.) Justice Tremblay-Lamer exceeded her jurisdiction by stating that the pleading was vexatious. One of the respondents clearly stated in the last pleadings that they did not request the FCA to declare Mr. Simon vexatious.

It was a palpable and overriding error of both courts to qualify Z. Simon’s pleadings vexatious. It is patently unreasonable to state that any pleading that defends the Parliament, the intention of Parliament, and the role of the Supreme Court of Canada would be “vexatious.” No legislation forbids a citizen to make such protecting steps it there are no official persons with such job description. For example, not a single official seems to defend the powers and interests of the panel of nine judges of the Supreme Court. The two powers mentioned above are the cornerstones of a free and democratic society in Canada (but both of them are thrown to the back burner by the Cabinet and its ministers). Judges may wish the SCC’s powers to be reduced, or that the nine judges should be prevented to see Canada’s major problems. However, until the Constitution and the laws of Canada remain unchanged, it is patently unreasonable for a judge to order a citizen to pay hefty penalties for protecting the laws, Parliament, and the Supreme Court.

The word “vexatious” practically always means “in bad faith” in common law. How could a pleading be in bad faith if its main aim is to protect order, the laws of Canada, the powers of Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, against conspirators that act by a criminal attitude? The courts below failed to show any relevant common law here. No judges of a normal country, even if all intoxicated, would make such grave error by such misclassification. The biased judges have proceeded on a wrong principle of law, seriously misapprehended the facts, and an obvious injustice resulted.

 

In Sergeant F. and Constable S. v Peters J, and Nicol (2004), the judge wrote: [30]

“If the complaint has substance, it cannot be frivolous, vexatious or unwarranted based on the character of the Complainant…”

 

Other cases stated that a goal of the doctrine of abuse of process was to preserve the reputation of the administration of justice. The onus in motion to strike is well discussed in [6] to [21] of Sweet v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 8927 (FCA), paras. [17] to [53] in Mirshahi v. Suleman, 2008 CanLII 64006 (ON SC), Litebook Company Ltd. v. Apollo Light Systems Inc., 2006 FC 399 and King v. Gross (2008).

It is a false claim in the FCA Reasons that [Mr. Simon] “did not provide particulars or expand on this ground in his memorandum of fact and law.” First, there were so many counts of procedural unfairness that the rigid rule of the 30-page limit did not allow such diversion. Second, he submitted seven motion records to this Court. Each of those talks for itself. Third, the Honourable Mr. Justice Pelletier did not allow him to express any argument or claim on that field during the hearing. He instructed the appellant to speak only about the alleged errors in Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s order. It is not the appellant’s fault that Justice Near had no time to read those seven motion records with the common law related to them and to the Statement of Claim. He refers to Mr. Simon’s alleged “failure to comply with” a Rule. In reality, the Respondent’s affidavit of service falsely equated the time of a delivery to a postmaster with that to the appellant. The judges have carefully avoided the issue. Seven “minor” torts of the court administration system, one at each procedural step, have distorted the normal procedure beyond limits, changing its outcome. The four judges ignored the tests set out in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, and Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd., 1987 CanLII 79 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110. Here Z. Simon (and the reputation of justice) suffered irreparable harm that included the devastating cumulative effects of errors and omissions, partly committed by the court administrators in Edmonton.

 

An informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically—and having thought the matter through—would obviously conclude that the judges exhibited many indicia of bias in this matter, defending the clearly unlawful conduct of every civil servant involved. Maybe Justice Near was not allowed to see all of the documents. The judges tried to help an anti-Canadian political movement of snatching away powers from Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada and shifting that power to private persons like a Registrar. The latter is not a judge. He is a Crown servant that does not have absolute immunity. No law is authorizing him to steal power from the nine supreme judges, or, to isolate those judges and leave them uninformed, in total darkness. [Not even a C.J. has such power constitutionally.] Justice Near purposefully overlooked the most essential point of the pleadings: that by violating the clear section 61. of the Supreme Court Act a private citizen keeps paralyzing the Supreme Court of Canada. It is a palpable and overriding error to identify a public servant of the Crown with the Supreme Court. (It was a trap of Counsel to create the wording “Supreme Court Party/Defendant”.)

 

In reality, the only respondent is Canada (A.G.), Her Majesty The Queen in right of Canada. It is a bias to keep referring to a second (vague) party that approved the said web site. Canada (either HMTQ or the A.G.) had a vicarious liability for the errors and omissions done by the Registrar and the managers of Service Canada. The style of cause clearly showed that the only defendant was HMTQ, represented by several civil servants. Counsels and the courts introduced an SCC party in order to shift a double financial punishment to the appellant who kept requesting that the SCC party should be dropped from the appeal and one party cannot be represented by two counsels pretending that they belong to two separate parties. The 4 December 2012 decision of Justice Stratas misrepresents the problem and it is inappropriate. Query: If a citizen showed both “HMTQ in Right of Canada” and the “A.G. of Canada” in his style of cause, would Justice Stratas’ Order mean that he could receive double punishment for such “error”? So far Mr Bilodeau has failed to reveal if he had acted on his own, or, followed the orders of his superior(s).

 

In Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, Per La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier and Iacobucci JJ., from the judgment and reasons 13-27, and 54, we find:

“…the will of the legislature as it appears therein must be respected.”

 

It seems clear that Justice Near was unfamiliar with the case and failed to instruct himself of the main points and details of the complete proceeding in an unbiased manner. He has not mentioned the centre of the issues (s. 61) at all. His attitude brings Canada’s court system into an abysmal disrepute.

During the hearing of 26 November 2013, the FCA examined thoroughly the fact that Mr. Bilodeau did not apply section 61. of the Supreme Court Act. By doing that, they acted properly and in good faith. One of the honourable judges asked in the courtroom, “Is it possible that the Registrar was negligent in observing section 61. of the Supreme Court Act? Counsel of the respondent did not have any negative answer to that question. If her answer were, “NO,” the Court would have marked down such word. However, the question remained unanswered. Instead, Ms. Cheney answered that there was no detailed provision in the legislation or the rules how to apply s. 61. Thus, she gave the impression that s. 61. was impracticable for the Registrar. Whatever the case may be, such conversation in the courtroom indicated that the superficial and hasty statement of Justice Tremblay-Lamer, “which it clearly not” reveals a situation that is not so clear at all. (It was underlined in her Order of 20 July, 2012.) If senior judges of the FCA, with integrity and good faith, ask a question from a party, a reasonable person would interpret that their question was not senseless or stupid. A judge would not ask a question that did not make sense at all. In other words, the Court was in doubt regarding the correctness in Mr. Bilodeau’s action or omission that seemed to undermine a section of the Act. This situation in itself indicates that the word “clearly” may have been incorrect in Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s order, so it was not beyond doubt that Z.Simon’s pleadings had a fatal error and would fail on the long run. (The latter judge purposefully did not mention s. 61. of the Act. Justice Near simply copied her reasoning, similarly remaining silent about s. 61.) Such attitude – remaining silent about the main issue in any judgment – clearly indicates a reasonable apprehension of bias.              

The “Supreme Court parties” sought clarification of the Court’s October 1, 2012 direction. The Honourable Mr. Justice Stratas, in his Memorandum of December 4, 2012, stated that Roger Bilodeau was no longer defendant in the FC proceeding, T-1029-12. However, the vague “federal authority that approved the [certain] website of the Supreme Court of Canada” remained as a party. It turned out that the said website had been approved by Mr. Bilodeau who was not a party but he was. This controversial hocus-pocus was the result of the Crown servants’ (including the SCC Registry) failure to reveal material facts at the beginning. Such confusion was created by the bad faith of the public servants and their counsel(s). Their main purpose of their non-revealing of material facts was to punish the plaintiff by double costs at each step, including printing, postage, and the financial loss at each court order or direction. Everybody – except the plaintiff – knew from the very beginning that there was only one party, HMTQ, who was vicariously liable for the acts and omission of her public servants involved, including the Crown servants working in the SCC Registry. So far the plaintiff has been left in total darkness regarding the nature of Mr. Bilodeau’s errors and omissions, not knowing if he acted on his own behalf as an individual, or as the Crown’s representative. This is a tort situation, and not revealing material facts, by the involvement of many persons, with the aim of ruining the plaintiff financially: an ulterior and extraneous motive. Several judges of the courts rewarded large amounts to the Crown for its tort, as costs against the appellant. There is no common law allowing a party to split into two parties, both demanding costs from the victim, while it is obvious that they represent a single party: Canada. The latest FCA order was $1,500 ($750+$750) for Canada’s civil servants, against Z. Simon. For comparison, in kisikawpimootewin v. Canada, 2004 FC 1426 (CanLII), the Court punished the Crown’s opponent only by $300 in costs, only one-fifth of Z. Simon’s costs. Worse, the courts obliged the latter to pay additional costs at almost every step, motion, etc. when he needed to defend himself.

The endless number of pleadings or motions, often for self-defence, kept causing irreparable harm and suffering for the appellant. The excessive orders in costs, always wrongfully delivered against him and never for him, are ruining his life physically: he has no money left for sufficient meals, medicine, and treatments. He would need an orthopedic insert to prevent sharp pain in his feet, major dental works, physiotherapy, and constant painkillers for his lower back problems. He cannot afford a proper medical-dental plan while spends all of his spare money on pleadings to protect Canada and its laws.

     

                Justice Near wrote in the Reasons, “Thus, with respect to the narrow issue of whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction over the alleged negligence of servants of the Crown, pursuant to the provisions of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50, the Federal Court does have jurisdiction to consider whether the Crown was vicariously liable for the actions of its servants. Counsel for the Crown respondents conceded that such was the case in submissions made before this Court at the hearing of this matter. To the extent that the judge did not consider the possibility that the individuals were being sued in their official as well as their personal capacities, which was evident from the style of cause, this constitutes an error on the part of the judge. However, in my view this error makes no difference to the result of this appeal as a viable cause of action must also be disclosed in any action taken before the Federal Court.”

 

He seems to admit that Justice Tremblay-Lamer had made an error by considering only the personal capacity. Since the latter two words are underlined in the FC Order, the Judge indicated that the wording “personal capacity” had been important for her reasoning. She simply overlooked the representative capacity of Ms. Finley and Ms. Shanks although the word was printed in bold letters in the style of cause twice: “as represented by” and “both in their public/ representative and personal capacity”. Justice Near assumed that Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s error was so minor that it could not have affected her judgment. Such reasoning is lame because if a senior judge of the Federal Court finds Crown servants innocent in their personal capacity as residents of a province, the same judge may not find them equally innocent as representatives of the federal Crown. Such arbitrary interpretation was a biased approach. Rather, Justice Tremblay-Lamer simply overlooked – intentionally or unintentionally – the circumstance that Ms. Shanks and Ms. Finley have been sued in their representative capacities as well. She wrote that “portions of the Statement of Claim … do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court… Thus, those portions of the Statement of Claim are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court[.]” She referred to alleged “emanations of provincial law relating tortious liability” in a single case law precedent. However, she failed to demonstrate that Leblanc v Canada (2003) could defeat the Federal Courts Act (and Rules) and the CLPA. It is clear that she has dealt with “portions” of the Statement of Claim but “forgot” to deal with the other portions that belonged to the Court’s jurisdiction. Justice Near cannot guess what the outcome and verdict of Justice Tremblay-Lamer may have been if she did not make such major error, also if she remembered the problem of the silenced “other portions.” Such arbitrary extrapolation by Justice Near is against natural law and reveals a reasonably apprehension of bias. Apart of ships and airplanes outside Canada, most facts, torts, errors or omissions claimed in any pleading are related to a province or territory of Canada. If a federal tort took place in a province, it did not mean that the Crown had no vicarious liability involved, or, the FC had no jurisdiction in those cases. Otherwise, the jobs of 90% of the FC and FCA judges could be terminated today by sending them to early retirement. (The registrars or prothonotaries of the registries could order that every Statement of Claim brought against the Crown is vexatious. Or, they could prevent such pleadings from being filed.) The numerous unanswered issues in Z. Simon’s pleadings may indicate a plague of senile dementia that punishes the Ottawa judges. Maybe Ottawa’s air is infested by its virus, attacking the judges living in their ivory towers, completely isolated from Canada.

 Charter rights violated

The judgments failed to deal with infringements of Mr. Simon’s Charter rights, also by the Court Administration System. Sections 7 and 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been violated by Service Canada but none of the judges paid any attention to his claim: this seemed like wilful blindness. These Charter rights are related to right to life and security, also right against unreasonable seizure (of CPP benefits).

Lack of procedural fairness

As for [19] of the FCA Reasons, it is untrue that “There has been no denial of procedural fairness to Mr. Simon that warrants the intervention of this Court.” At least seven such errors happened within the Edmonton Registry. They refused to file Z. Simon’s Reply, based on the Crown’s false affidavit that identified him by a postmaster. However, the FCA accepted the main submission of the Crown despite of a delay of 33 days. In Abdessadok v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2006 FC 236 the person’s document was refused for filing, due to a delay of 24 hours. These are signs that the courts of Canada do not try to prevent situations anymore that bring the administration of justice in disrepute. The Registry refused to file his document in January 2013, disobeying the rule about “Christmas recess.”   

The 30 May 2013 Order of Justice Dawson openly violated the clear Rule 346(2) of the Federal Courts Rules so Z. Simon has appealed it. Another judge, The Hon. Justice Trudel, ignored the pending appeal. Her 17 September 2013 Order deals exclusively with the appellant’s Motion Record for an interlocutory injunction. She did not include any reasons related to the problem of reckoning time. Nothing indicates that Madam Justice Trudel has read the appeal of the Dawson order. Maybe she was not allowed to see it. Thus, she considered Justice Dawson’s Order final, and she punished Z. Simon due to a tort that had caused her misbelief. Where is the procedural fairness in these?

The Crown Respondent’s Motion Record of 9 July 2013 sought an Order of $500 in costs. The Crown was unsuccessful but Z. Simon was not granted the same amount in costs. The 19 August 2013 Order of Madame Justice Trudel, following the Crown’s motion regarding the bankruptcy issue, promised, “costs to follow the event.” Such decision regarding costs has never been issued, or, the appellant has not been notified by the Court’s administrators. The Court “forgot” the deal with that issue: a bias probably not associated with Justice Trudel but with the administrators or the C.J. 

After the Crown’s failure to serve and file the key document in a timely manner, the appellant had to file a Requisition for Hearing, following the Rules. Despite of this, the FCA punished him by costs. The Crown has been rewarded for its 33-day delay.

The appellant learned only after the filing of his appeal at the FCA that the so-called “SCC Party” was not a party in the appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. However, counsels and the Court improperly forced him to keep the controversial and fabulous “SCC Party” besides the Crown in the style of cause.

The 22 March 2013 Order of The Honourable Mr. Justice Evans – that seems to be the only order that was formally correct and unbiased in each of its paragraphs – states, “…the panel of the Court hearing the appeal shall decide whether any of these documents to which Mr Simon wishes to refer are admissible;” However, Justice Pelletier did not allow such diversion during the hearing.

Both at the FC and the FCA, procedure governed substance: the tail was wagging the dog, so to speak. This is particularly valid for the seven plus three motions. “Procedure cannot govern substance – an order so erroneous that it results in a fundamentally flawed trial process cannot be allowed to stand” (R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 SCR 333). Occasionally, justice still prevails over injustice. For example, in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Davies, 2009 BCCA 337 (CanLII) the A.G. has lost his appeal, revealing that the provincial courts are not as corrupt as the federal court system.

The FCA Order written by Justice Near does not contain any hint or confirmation stating that the SCC Registrar’s denial to file a Notice of Appeal where error in law was alleged was an acceptable procedural step. Their Order was neutral in this regard, only claiming that the FCA had no jurisdiction over the possible errors or omissions made by the SCC Registrar.

Allegation of bias, reasonable apprehension of bias

                Here the appellant is not referring to a “mere suspicion” but to an allegation of actual bias, or, an allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias. His claims rest on substantial and serious grounds. Mr. Simon “calls into question an element of judicial integrity. Indeed an allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias calls into question not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice.” This is cited from Cory J. in R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484. The FCA failed to apply the test for reasonable allegation of bias. The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is as follows: “What would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude?” “[22] The relevant inquiry is not whether there was, in fact, either conscious or unconscious bias on the part of an adjudicator, but whether a reasonable person properly informed would apprehend that there was bias.  See Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, Li v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2004 CanLII 32260 (ON SCDC). At paragraphs 58 and 59 in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259, the Court deals with the importance of the principle of impartiality that applies well for our appeal at bar.

                In Merchant v. Law Society of Alberta, 2007 ABQB 658 (CanLII), Merchant succeeded by claiming a reasonable apprehension of bias. (Z. Simon has provided plenty of “convincing evidence” to prove his allegations of reasonable apprehension of bias.)

                In Barthe v. Huard, 42 SCR 406, the judges agreed that “an accumulation of such grave errors must have produced some substantial injustice.” In the instant appeal at bar, the extraordinary accumulation of palpable and overriding errors and the long series of unlawful or harassing steps on behalf of the court administration system caused irreparable losses for the appellant, and brought the administration of justice in disrepute repeatedly. In many cases Canada’s criminals got off the hook simply because the Crown or R.C.M.P. found an evidence or weapon during a search without search warrant. Why do courts defend such murderers based on a single paragraph while the courts ruin the lives of good Canadians that respect the laws of the country but became victims of torts?  

Z. Simon does not claim that every FCA judge was biased. In his opinion, only Justice Near was biased, from the beginning of the hearing. He has never asked a question and always avoided eye contact with everybody else. The other two judges seemed impartial during the hearing. However, – a reasonable person, say, any politician or lawyer of the opposition parties and any foreign legal expert – would conclude that later the senior judges became intimidated, possibly by a phone call from their superior(s). Maybe one of the two senior judges disagreed in their opinions but realized that one dissenting judge could not secure justice alone. Thus, perhaps both chose the convenient way by making happy their superiors. The job security of a judge is an important consideration. The appellant does not wish that either Justice Pelletier or Justice Stratas should lose his job as a judge. Both of them are excellent judges. (A pressure from the superiors or lack of judicial independence may not be called “bias” in the strict sense but it constituted real bias against the appellant.)

Finally, the following circumstance constitutes strong evidence of bias in the court procedures. Justice Tremblay-Lamer made zero effort to identify the “party” (person or authority) that authorized or approved the website shown in the style of cause. The proper identification of the parties is basic requirement for judges, the first required step for them before any trial or order. She either assumed that the said website had been approved by an order of the Supreme Court of Canada, or, she inquired and was informed that a politician or someone else at the top of the pyramid allowed such violation of the laws. Without identifying and specifying that party, it would have been impossible to deliver a verdict, except through bias. Without knowing such detail, it was bias to claim that the said party had absolute immunity, or, it was above the Court’s jurisdiction. (I.e., there was a possibility that a law firm had designed the content of that website and no government official has authorized it at all.) Justice Near fell in the same trap of bias and automatically supported such biased approach of the judge.

 

The four “Crown Party” counsels involved in the pleadings may indicate that the Crown could not find a counsel “genius” able to undertake the superhuman task of the defense. Further, the fact of an unusually long time period, almost three months between the hearing and the Order, reveals a very difficult case with many serious arguable issues. Normally, the most experienced judge or the presiding judge makes the draft of the verdict. Then the judge(s) with less seniority agree or disagree with the order. In this case, it seems for any reasonable person – I do not mean Stephen Harper or Brigette DePape – would suspect that Justice Pelletier and Justice Stratas, with their judicial integrity and knowledge, were unable to come up with any reasonable argument against the appellant while their conscience suggested them not to stain their names by such false verdict. Perhaps they did not want any other judge quote such falsity associated with their names. The weeks passed in silence and nothing happened. Probably there was pressure from the Minister and the Chief Justice to do something. The only solution may have been that a junior judge with little or no experience about this complicated case undertook the impossible: he basically repeated the words and reasons of Justice Tremblay-Lamer. Perhaps the other two judges had to take sides and they reluctantly joined the cover-up of the politicians. Or, maybe they wrote, “I DISAGREE” but an administrator removed the three letters (“DIS”) by liquid paper in the draft. Then another administrator retyped the draft nicely, in which the words appeared, “I AGREE.” It may have been an innocent misunderstanding and the judges did not want to complain about the final result.

                As once stated by Abella J.A., the assessment is difficult and requires a careful and thorough examination of the proceeding. The record must be considered in its entirety to determine the cumulative effect of any transgressions or improprieties. Z. Simon submits that the extraordinary high number of the documented irregularities, mainly bad faith errors or omissions on behalf the Court Administration System in Edmonton, produced a marked cumulative procedural unfairness for him, in mental suffering, wasted time, wasted energy, and extra costs.

                The unprofessional, vague or incomplete wording of some orders – like that of Justice Nadon – strongly contributed to such cumulative unfairness. If a judge fails to identify the motion(s) that he is dealing with, while there were several pending or overlapping motions, he is giving free hand to the court administrators to interpret his Order as they want, in order to help the Crown.

                By the order of Justice Evans (2013-03-22) certain pages of the Appeal Book were struck. The court administrators physically removed, cut out, the said pages from the Appeal Book, by truncation. This is an unprecedented procedural unfairness. Every judge knows that if a word, paragraph or a page must be “struck” it should happen by horizontal lines, not by scissors in case of a bound document.

                A reasonable, preferably foreign, person would perceive the Government’s conduct and interference as a pressure tactic in order to undermine the independence of the judiciary.                 

Order or Relief sought (and Aftermath)

The appellant seeks the reversal of the two main orders issued by the FC and the FCA, plus that of the May 30, 2013 Order of Justice Dawson – the latter two are listed under the Schedule on Page 2 – and/or any further or other order that the Court may deem appropriate. (The appellant’s reclaimed costs, as restitution payments, are $500+$500+$750+$750+$500, totalling $3,000.)

The FCA judges revealed the irreparable rottenness and corruption of the political-legal pyramid scheme over Canada. The term “reasonable person”, it is not absolute. Such person would cut out the rotten spot of an apple, not leaving it untouched till it goes to the garbage. A group of physicians that examines a patient, say a queen, with breast cancer but keeps the findings in secret from them cannot be called “doctors” or “loyal.” In any country, a group of judges that understand legal controversies ruining the country but keep their conclusions in secret from the top judges cannot rightfully call them-selves a “Court,” or “Honourable.” Courts should maintain the appearance – nay, the illusion - of justice.

The FCA’s Order of 2014-02-18 is a milestone decision that will result in ruining Canada’s structure, driving it back to the state of barbarism dominated by the rule of wolves. One day the Minister of Health could issue a policy stating that Canadians must send their golden teeth or the golden fillings to Ottawa otherwise they “may” face deportation to the gas chambers. If a citizens’ group files a Statement of Claim, the Crown would succeed, based on Simon v. Canada (2014): the Court orders all the 1000 members of the group to pay $500 in costs. The Reasons could claim that the gas chambers are still in the design stage, and the word “may” only refers to a possible future “hypothetical decision.”

For a graphic illustration of the main question of law please see our circular diagram below this text.

 

 

 

As for a happy ending, older soccer fans may recall an international match where a team (maybe Hungary) played against the Soviet Union. The players were told that if one scored a goal to the Soviet net he would lose his job. A player got into possession of the ball. He was alone, out of the goalie’s control. Then he remembered the order, stopped the ball on the goal line and walked away without scoring a goal. He lost his job anyway. Our senior judges were in the same lose/lose situation. Maybe one of them tried to prevent the moral collapse of the governing Conservative Party by a civilized manner. However, a single judge cannot stop a steamroller or could not hold up a collapsing high-rise.

 

IF YOU (THE CROWN) FAIL TO DEFEND THIS PROCEEDING (APPEAL), judgment may be given against you in your absence and without further notice to you.

Respectfully submitted on this 12th day of March, in the City of Red Deer, Province of Alberta.    

               

_________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant (self-represented)

6 Rutherford Drive, Red Deer, AB   T4P 3G9      E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com

NEW ADDRESS from April 1, 2014: 72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6 

Phone: (403) 340-2334;  Fax: (403) 341-3300; Website: www.correctingworldhistory.com

COPIES TO:          

Ms. Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel, Dept. of Justice Canada

EPCOR Tower, Edmonton, AB   T5H 0E7 [by Express Post]

 

Ms. Janice E. Cheney, Counsel, Supreme Court of Canada, Law Branch

301 Wellington Street, Ottawa, ON   K1A 0J1 [by Express Post]

 

Registrar of the Federal Court of Appeal, 635 Eighth Avenue S.W., 3rd Floor, PO Box 14, Calgary, AB   T2P 3M3     [by Express Post]

 

END OF PLEADINGS HERE. For a sharper version of the diagram as it was shown in the Notice of Appeal, please refer to the picture below the "Streamlining Canada."

SAMPLE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: For a recent submission of constitutional questions to the Supreme Court of Canada see the file below the article entitled "Streamlining Canada."  

 

*********************

Streamlining Canada: the Cabinet's evil scheme

            This article tries to defend Senator Mike Duffy.

As for the author, I was born in Hungary, in 1949. My father lost his life in the 1956 revolution when a Russian missile exploded near him. In 1976 I fled to Canada when it was still a free and democratic country, maybe the most livable country on Earth.

Thanks to Canada’s perfect library system, my book entitled Atlantis (1984) had a chapter about America’s discovery by the Norsemen. It shows the Yarmouth Stone’s inscription that reads from right to left, in the Transylvanian runes of Tyrkir [the Turk], “[Eric]son have been at this place, too, with many com[panions].” The decipherer was an old lady, at age 89. Mr. Derek Fraser, then Canada’s ambassador to Hungary, sent her a thank you letter for it. President Reagan also liked the said book. My web site www.correctingworldhistory.com gives you more ideas about a better world that is hidden from us. (“History is the lie commonly agreed upon,” wrote Voltaire.)

Returning to Mr. Duffy, his issue is minor, only a tip of the iceberg. A tip may be covered up easily by a mat but an iceberg cannot be swept under it. What I mean is the present fragile state of Canada, structurally. A huge fault line is dividing the country: Parliament and Canada’s impartial judges on one side while some Cabinet ministers and the federal public servants on the other. It seems that the Cabinet granted to our bureaucrats endless powers taken from Parliament and the judges with integrity. The latter two suffered a “short circuit” and gradually become redundant. Our federal judges are excellent but the nation’s problems simply cannot get before them. The ministers pressure the court registries not to file pleadings that would expose their torts and illegal mess.

A high percentage of Canadians feel that most of our judges are corrupt and crazy that protect the criminals but ignore the safety of the public and the police. Such view is wrong. The real reason lays at a tortious website, “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada.” In it, the Registrar (Mr. Bilodeau) simply silences s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act that would allow appeals if errors in law are claimed at the lower courts. Instead, he is raising s. 40.(1) to exclusive power. The result is devastating for Canada’s court system. A single administrator is usurping the power of the nine SCC judges.

Say, you own a big company that suffered losses in millions of dollars due to federal torts or misrepresentations. The administrators of the SCC Registry will stop your appeal as of right, since you are not a criminal. The Chief Justice needs to find only another judge who sides with the Crown. Then your firm would not get a hearing by the panel of nine impartial judges. If you file an application for reconsideration, the final verdict would come – as it happened in my case – from the Registrar saying, “I do not think that your appeal would succeed.” The Registrar is not a judge.

Maybe this whole streamlining started on His Majesty’s birthday in 2006. King Stephen maybe did not want a cake, only favours from four of his ministers to cut some corners. The four cornerstones had sharp corners, indeed. In seven years, the administrators managed to grind them into ball shape. But how could one build a fortress on such globular keystones?

One of the cornerstones was immigration. In 2006, the Crown introduced two unlawful policies named IP 2 (Processing Applications to Sponsor Members of the Family Class) and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Their purpose was, of course, streamlining. No one in the Cabinet cared that it resulted in violations of over 40 paragraphs of the legislation. These policies decided that, in case of social benefits paid to new immigrants, the fault was always at the sponsor. Thus, the immigrants and the federal or provincial administrators were always innocent. The mislead sponsors are assured that in case of default they could be heard by a Court – that does not happen in reality. The IP 2 claims that “A Sponsorship Agreement is a contract” or a “written contract” and the Undertaking “is a binding contract” but the sponsors are unaware of the trick. They have no idea if they’ve signed any contracts. It’s not in the title. Also, no one has signed those on a minister’s behalf. 132.(4) of the Regulations of the IRPA clearly states that the sponsors signed statements and declarations, instead of contracts. By misrepresentation, the ministers call them contracts because then, they pretend, the CRA can garnishee the alleged debts without a ministerial certification prescribed by s. 146 of the IRPA.

Thus, the Federal Court does not maintain a file with the certified debts of the sponsors. The governing case is Canada (Attorney General) v. Mavi (2011). The order states many times that the Crown is obliged to certify the debts before any garnishment. [The certification should happen through the Federal Court, so a hearing may be necessary.] Our ministers openly ignore such ruling and the laws of Canada. In a nutshell, this is the Cabinet’s money extortion scheme that destroys thousands of innocent families, often without gaining much. The alleged total debt of the family class sponsors is just a fraction of the security costs of our G-8 Summit 2010.

This is an open rebellion and conspiracy of Canada’s ministers and administrators against Parliament’s will. Perhaps Mr. Nicholson should propose a new retroactive paragraph, hidden in another omnibus bill, stating that the laws of Canada are only guidelines that are not applicable for ministers and public servants.

In my case, I sponsored a woman who – six months after her landing – wanted to become independent. We divorced in 2002. She found a wealthier man but, at the same time, BC paid her welfare for five years by mistake. I remarried in China in 2006. After a silence of eight years, beyond the 6-year limitation period, the CRA began to garnishee me. So far the Crown refused to grant any visa for my wife and her student son. Alberta’s workforce would need both of them but Canada’s tort prevails. Thus, I keep sending almost half of my income to China. My monies do not support our local economy but a country that is Canada’s main competitor. Now, consider the huge loss for our country when thousands of sponsors are similarly separated from their families by force. This is called cruel or unusual treatment or punishment in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Finally, Service Canada informed me that they may garnishee part (or all) of my future pensions without any court proceeding, due to my alleged debts. If I move abroad, my OAS benefits would be lost, too.

My most logical solution would be to revoke my Canadian citizenship as an official protest against our totalitarian regime. I’d have better chances to get a grant from Beijing for writing an anti-Harper book about Canada’s collapsing democracy than to file pleadings at a federal court registry. I.e., the federal Registry in Edmonton made seven errors in law at seven steps in 2012-3.

If the administrators can lead our short-circuited Canada forever, we need only King Stephen, without paid members of Parliament. If no judges can hear us, we do not need paid judges either; the ministers could pick up their paycheques. In such hocus-pocus, we should look at the south. In Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador, the extreme right regimes have lost their credibility and supremacy for good. And, yes, this shift to the centre-left has happened in the US as well. Canada could have such coalition government if our conservatives have no solutions how to behave and survive lawfully.

Now Canadians start to understand that the executive power in the country is controlled by a trio (the A.G., Chief Justice, and Registrar of the Supreme Court) supporting the Cabinet. The honourable white-collar tortfeasors effectively control the Supreme Court, also the registries of the lower courts that easily block the filing of a statement of claim against the regime. The leaders of any country may successfully copy King Harper’s perfectly evil recipe how to turn any democracy into dictatorship. Perhaps His Majesty is perfect, innocent, and has no idea about these problems, as a victim of his own wizard ministers. The Emperor’s new clothes, written by Hans Christian Andersen, may come to the readers’ mind. The picture dwarfs the issue of Mr. Duffy.

It is worthwhile to compare the modern social logic of our Canadian leaders with that of the “primitive” Aztecs. The latter were unable to understand the exact reasons of eclipses, while the West (and China) was much superior in astronomy. The Mexicans originally sacrificed captives mainly during solar eclipses, in order to give a good refreshing drink to the darkening Sun, using human blood. They believed that they were saving mankind by doing that. In contrast, Canadians sacrifice the lives of a few vulnerable sectors of their country. One of them is the innocent sponsors as victims of the government’s fraud. Canada and its government know that something illegal and immoral is happening but no one stands up for democracy and the protection of the defenceless groups of society. 

            

                                                                             Zoltan Andrew Simon (64)

                                                                                     E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com

                                          Address: 6 Rutherford Drive, Red Deer, AB   T4P 3G9

                                                            Follow me at TWITTER: @ZoltanAndrew

If you move your cursor over the diagram, a magnifying glass pops up. Left-clicking on it, you will get a large, sharp, and printable picture. Please follow me on Twitter: @ZoltanAndrew

 

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION [A SAMPLE FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS]

 

Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question

                                                                                    Court File No.: _______________

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA)

BETWEEN:

 ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON

Appellant, Applicant to this Notice of Motion

(Also appellant in the FCA)

 and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA

 

Respondent

(Also respondent in the FCA)

 


 

Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge

to state a Constitutional Question or Questions

Filed by Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant as of right pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act


 

Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel                                    Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant

Department of Justice Canada                                (Applicant to this motion)

Prairie Region, EPCOR Tower,                                 72 Best Crescent (new address)

300, 10423 – 101 St., Edmonton, AB  T5H 0E7          Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

Phone: (780) 495-7324; Fax: (780) 495-8491            Phone: (403) 342-8826 (Home/ Landlord)

E-mail: ....................                                        Phone: (403) 392-9189 (cell.)

                                                                            Fax: (403) 341-3300

                                                                            E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question        1   

Memorandum of argument of the appellant, applicant to this motion                               4

Part I: A concise overview of the appellant’s/applicant’s position with respect

to issues of public importance that are raised in the Notice of Appeal; a concise

statement of facts                                                                                                      4

Part II: A concise statement of the questions in issue                                                     6

Part III: A concise statement of argument (with paragraph numbers of legislation)             10

Part IV: Submissions in support of the order sought concerning costs                              12

Part V: The orders sought, including the order or orders sought concerning costs           13

Part VI: Table of authorities alphabetically, with paragraph numbers of law                      13

Part VII: Photocopies of relevant provisions of statutes, regulations, rules and case law     15

         Constitution Act, 1982 (Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms)                15

         Courts Administration Service Act,S.C. 2002, c.8                                                  20

         Criminal Code,R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46                                                                     22

         Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7                                                                    28

         Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106                                                                       33

         Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11                                               35

         Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of

               Canada (Print and Electronic) – an older version of the present website

               http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ar-lr/gl-ld2014-01-01-eng.aspx#D1b                          38

         Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21                                                                    44

         Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156                                            47

         Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26                                                                  53

CASE LAW:                                                                                                                

         Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Health), 2012 FCA 322 (CanLII)                                            62

         Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 (CanLII)                                                           64

         Meldrum v. Public Trustee of The Province of B.C., 1998 CanLII 5563 (BC SC)            66

         Zoltan Andrew Simon v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, [2012],

              SCC 34831                                                                                                  69

         Zoltan Andrew Simon v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada [May 30, 2013],

               Docket: A-367-12 [Federal Court of Appeal]                                                    70

APPENDIX: Documents, including an affidavit that the applicant intends to rely on           75  

      The appellant’s (here applicant’s) affidavit                                                             75

      Exhibit 1: Z.A. Simon’s Notice of Appeal cover page to the SCC, received March

         9, 2012                                                                                                           76

      Exhibit 2: Letter of Mary Ann Achakji (SCC Registry) dated March 28, 2012                  77

      Exhibit 3: Letter of Barbara Kincaid (SCC Registry) dated May 24, 2012                       79

      Exhibit 4: Zoltan A. Simon’s letter to Mr. Roger Bilodeau (Registrar) dated June 4,

         2012                                                                                                               80

      Exhibit 5: Front (style of cause) page of Applicant’s Motion of Reconsideration of

         Application for Leave to Appeal, received by the SCC Registry on Oct 25,

         2012                                                                                                               82

      Exhibit 6: Letter of Michel Jobidon (SCC Registry) dated October 30, 2012                 83

      Exhibit 7: Letter of Roger Bilodeau (SCC Registrar) dated December 18, 2012              84

      Exhibit 8: Zoltan A. Simon’s Notice of Constitutional Question(s) dated February 10,

            2013 (filed in the FCA and served on each Attorney General)                              85

      Exhibit 9: A sample reply of an Attorney General’s Office to Zoltan A. Simon’s  

            Notice of Constitutional Question(s), received from Nova Scotia                         87

      Exhibit 10: Letter of the Courts Administration Service to Zoltan Andrew Simon,

            Dated March 24, 2014                                                                                88    

      Exhibit 11: Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I

            (extracts from the guide published by the SCC Registry or the Registrar)          89

      [Note: the last numbered page of this motion is 91. A TD bank draft in the amount

            of $75.00 is attached to this document as a filing fee.]

 

 

 

Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge to state a Constitutional Question

Court File No.: _______________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

(ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA)

BETWEEN:

ZOLTAN ANDREW SIMON

Appellant, Applicant to this Notice of Motion

(Also appellant in the FCA)

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA

Respondent

(Also respondent in the FCA)

______________________________________________________________________________

 

Notice of Motion to the Chief Justice or a Judge

to state a Constitutional Question

Filed by Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant as of right pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act

______________________________________________________________________________

 

TAKE NOTICE that Zoltan Andrew Simon applies to the Chief Justice or a Judge under subrule 47. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada,SOR/2002-156, section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, subrules 60. (1) (a), (b) and (c) and – if applicable – 61. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada for an order, statement, or declaratory relief to interpret several enactments, or, any further or other order that the Right Honourable Chief Judge or an Honourable Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada may deem appropriate;

 

AND FURTHER TAKE NOTICE that the motion shall be made on the following grounds:

(a) the constitutional validity or the constitutional applicability of applying an arbitrarily and wrongfully extrapolated paragraph 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, and/or of regulations made under them, particularly the “Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Print and Electronic)” since the latter set of rules (on the official website) and the Registry’s official booklet entitled “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I, A Guide for Unrepresented Litigants” are both silent about (and therefore not harmonious with) section 61. of the same Supreme Court Act, that makes such Guidelines for Preparing Documents and the above mentioned guide (Volume I) invalid in appeals as of right where error in law is alleged; and

 

(b) the constitutional validity or the constitutional applicability of a common law rule: namely the routine policy of the Registry of the Supreme Court of Canada that – without any clear authorization by the laws of Canada – arbitrarily grants additional unconstitutional rights to the Registrar of the SCC that unreasonably reduces the power of the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, by blocking cases of high public importance from them. The administrators and the Registrar of the SCC believe and declare in writing that they have the right to refuse the filing of any appeal as of right (pursuant to s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act) where error in law is alleged; Further, their unlawful policy claims that the Registrar – albeit he is not a judge – has the right to say the last word, or, issue the final verdict in rare cases of motions for reconsideration of applications for leave to appeal, accompanied by an affidavit setting out exceedingly rare circumstances, as it happened to Zoltan A. Simon on 18 December 2012; and

 

(c) the constitutional validity of the so far unknown legal principle regarding possible future administrative decisions (or future hypothetical administrative decisions) that served as a cornerstone in the reasoning of Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer’s Order(s) of July 20, 2012 [FC], camouflaging torts of intimidation, coercion, undue pressure and money extortion; and

 

(d) the validity of the Honourable Madam Justice Dawson’ Order dated May 30, 2013 since it was patently unreasonable to reinterpret rule 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules as absurd; also the improper policy of the C.J. or the Courts Administration Service for ignoring its appeal, constituting an unfinished business that brings the administration of justice in disrepute; and

 

(e) the validity of several procedural steps, errors and omissions of the FCA administrators in the Edmonton Registry that misinterpreted the word “struck” in the verdict of the Honourable Justice Evans by physically removing or cutting out pages prom the appeal book; plus further issues.

   

Dated at the City of Red Deer, Province of Alberta this 8th day of April, 2014.

SIGNED BY

 

_______________________________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant, Applicant to the motion (Self-Represented)

New address from 1 April 2014 (as shown in the Notice of Appeal):

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

 

NOTICE: New phone number from 8 April 2014: (403) 342-8826 (Home/ Landlord)

Phone: (403) 392-9189 (cell.); Fax: (403) 341-3300

E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com

Website: www.correctingworldhistory.com

 

ORIGINAL TO: THE REGISTRAR, The Supreme Court of Canada (Ottawa)

COPIES [print and electronic] TO: Ms. Jaxine Oltean, Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, Prairie Region, EPCOR Tower,   300, 10423 – 101 St., Edmonton, AB  T5H 0E7; Phone: (780) 495-7324; Fax: (780) 495-8491; E-mail: *****************

 

NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENT TO THE MOTION: A respondent to the motion may serve and file a response to this motion within 10 days after service of the motion. If no response is filed within that time, the motion will be submitted for consideration to a judge or the Chief Judge (not to the Registrar since he is in a conflict of interest position: the motion for constitutional question is related to his actions or omissions, and the limits of his powers).

 

ATTENTION: FOR THE REGISTRAR (additional note and request)

Copies of the relevant two judgments and reasons for judgment of the FCA, the court appealed from, and copies of the certificates in Form 23A and Form 23B have already been served and filed about a day after serving and/or filing of the originating document named Notice of Appeal. The website http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ar-lr/gl-ld2014-01-01-eng.aspx prescribes the filing of 1 original set of this motion, plus one copy of it.

 

On the filing of a motion the tariff of fee to be paid to the Registrar is $75.00. A TD bank draft in the amount of $75.00 is attached to this submission for the Registrar’s perusal. However, at the end of Schedule A, it is stated: “Any person may be exempted from paying any of the above fees, in special cases, at the Registrar’s discretion.” The applicant of the instant motion respectfully requests that the Registrar to reduce the above fee, perhaps to zero dollars, preferably by returning the enclosed TD bank draft to the sender. This is a key issue of nationwide importance, about the constitutional operability of the Registry and the SCC’s administration. Individuals with low income should not pay an extra cost for the errors or omissions of the Registry’s administrators, in the mind of a reasonable person.

 

Memorandum of argument of the appellant, applicant to this motion

Part I: A concise overview of the appellant’s (applicant’s) position with respect to issues of public importance that are raised in the Notice of Appeal and a concise statement of facts:

           

This is a matter of public interest involving several important questions of law, regarding the interpretation and construction of federal statutes, particularly aimed to the lawful operation of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal.

            The instant appellant and applicant to this motion, Zoltan Andrew Simon served a Notice of Appeal to the Crown and submitted it for filing to the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. The latter Court received it on March 9, 2012. Please refer to Exhibit 1.

            A Registry Officer, Mary Anna Achakji, sent a letter to Zoltan A. Simon on March 28, 2012, informing him that his Notice of Appeal could not be processed As of Right, instructing him to file a notice of application for leave to appeal instead. See Exhibit 2.

            The May 24, 2012 letter of Barbara Kincaid, General Counsel to the SCC Registry acknowledged the receipt of Zoltan A. Simon’s application for leave to appeal. She alleged that in their letter informed the applicant “that because the judgment appealed from relates to civil proceedings for which there is no automatic right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada you must proceed by way of application for leave to appeal…” (Such claim was untrue since the May 24 letter was silent about “no automatic rights to appeal” in civil proceedings.)

            On June 4, 2012 the instant appellant sent a letter to Mr. Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada. At that point the proceeding had a file number (34831) at the Supreme Court of Canada. In the letter, Zoltan A. Simon requested an update regarding filing data and status of his payments for filing fees. Please refer to Exhibit 4.

            The October 4, 2012 judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. dismissed Zoltan Simon’s application for leave to appeal. Please refer to it under CASE LAW.

            On October 23, 2012 Zoltan A. Simon, the instant applicant, submitted a Motion of Reconsideration of Application for Leave to Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada received it on October 25, 2012 (but the Registry did not file it for a long time). Please refer to Exhibit 5.

           On October 30, 2012 Michel Jobidon, Senior Registry Officer sent a letter to Z.A. Simon, acknowledging receipt of his motion for reconsideration. His letter reveals tow interesting circumstances: (a) the note to the respondent(s) shows that the motion was not yet registered on October 30, and (b) that in the Senior Registry Officer’s mind the Registrar was the proper authority that was entitled to make a final decision, namely acceptance or rejection of the motion for reconsideration. [There is no legislative basis or authority that would assign such power to the Registrar, Mr. Bilodeau.] Please refer to Exhibit 6.

           On December 18, 2012, Mr. Bilodeau sent a short personal letter of opinion to Zoltan A. Simon. In it, he wrote: “I have reviewed your motion for reconsideration and your affidavit in support. I regret to inform you that, in my opinion, your motion does not reveal the exceedingly rare circumstances which would warrant reconsideration by this Court. Furthermore, please note that Rule 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada is not applicable to this matter. As a result, I am returning your documents.” (Please refer to Exhibit 7.) This personal letter does not contain the word “Order” and it does not indicate that it would be an order, judgment, or direction at all. However, it was the end of the game for the instant appellant, so to speak. He had no means to appeal it since the Registrar did not allow him to apply Rule 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada. [There is no legislation that would allow the Registrar to prohibit the application of Rule 78 for any appealing party.]

           In the respectful opinion of the instant appellant-applicant, the Registrar chose this unique solution in order to silence Zoltan A. Simon’s pleadings that contained unpleasant news for the government. The pleadings have disappeared without a trace from the files since the Registrar had returned all documents to the sender.

          On February 10, 2013 the instant appellant-applicant filed a “Notice of Constitutional Question(s)” and served in on the Attorney General of Canada, also on every attorneys general of each province and territory. See Exhibit 8. During the following weeks the attorneys general sent replies to him but none of them showed interest in the constitutional questions. None of them intended to be represented in that proceeding although some maintained the right to get involved at a later point. A sample reply here is written by the Office of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia. (Please refer to Exhibit 9.)

           On March 24, 2014, the Courts Administration Service returned to Zoltan A. Simon the copy of his Notice of Appeal that had been properly submitted to the FCA Registry. (For its cover letter please refer to Exhibit 10.) Thus, the administrators of the Federal Court of Appeal have violated subsection 60. (4) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. The clerk or other proper officer (that includes the Registrar) of the court appealed from – the Federal Court of Appeal in the instant case – acted against the law when he or she refused the filing of a copy of the notice of appeal (to the SCC). It is unlikely that Ms. Sinclair acted on her own, without consulting her superiors.

           Exhibit 11 demonstrates that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act is missing from the official booklet or guide published by the Registry or the Registrar of the SCC.

 

           As for other issues of law, the instant appellant-applicant claims that at least seven improper, unlawful or unconstitutional steps occurred to him during his pleadings involving the Registry of the FCA in Edmonton. Those errors and omissions of the Registry’s administrators were always aimed at him and his finances while kept punishing him by extra costs, time and work through a psychological or mental warfare. One of the typical cases was the Registry’s refusal to accept his document because the administrators included the days of the Christmas recess into the reckoning although the Rules expressly state that those days shall be excluded from the computation of time. He needed to file a motion for extension of time. Another instance was that the Registry arbitrarily removed, apparently by scissors, many pages from his appeal book, misinterpreting the word “struck” in the verdict of the Honourable Justice Evans. (If certain paragraphs or pages of a document shall be struck, it should happen by the application of horizontal lines through the text in question. For an example please refer to Krpan v. The Queen, 2006 TCC 595 (CanLII), from paragraphs [19] to [22], see under our CASE LAW.)

 

           The most disturbing development in the court administration is the “unfinished business” issue. Zoltan A. Simon, without delay, properly appealed the patently unreasonable Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Dawson, dated May 30, 2013. So far the FCC remained totally silent in the appeal matter. Since June 2013, no judge has been assigned to that case by the C.J. of the Federal Court of Appeal, or, by the Courts Administration Service.

   

Part II: A concise statement of the questions in issue:

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE STATED:

1.         Is the short, clear and express section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, absurd and never applicable, simply because Canadian judges never make any error in law?

2.         According to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis, is the express and unequivocal provision in section 61. of the Supreme Court Act a valid legislation in rare cases when error in law is alleged, in light of the entirely consistent world "automatiquement" in the French version, or when read in the context of the statute as a whole, particularly as its immediately preceding subsection 60. (4) refers only to notice of appeal and not application for leave?

3.         Is there any indication in the laws of Canada that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, should apply in criminal cases only, and not in civil or constitutional ones?

4.         Should the silence, regarding cases when error in law is alleged, be interpreted in the extremely long and complicated sentence of subsection 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act that it shall override the express and unambiguous section 61. of the same Act that deals with such cases specifically?

5.         Shall an arbitrary insertion of “including cases when error in law is alleged” (or similar words) into section 40.(1) of the Supreme Court Act (when applied in court practice) overrule or vitiate the clear and express provisions given in sections 61., 97. (3) and 40. (3) of the same Act?

6.         Does such arbitrarily extrapolated interpretation of paragraph 40. (1) of the Supreme Court Act infringe sections 7., 8., 11. (a), (b), (d), (g), 12., 15. (1) and 52. of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and section 126. (1) of the Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46?

7.         If the answer to question 6 is in the affirmative, together with the power in section 52. of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, can it be construed that such extrapolated interpretation of subsection 40. (1) has no power (and it is not applicable) in cases when error in law is alleged in the lower courts?

8.         In light of the Registrar’s rights or duties set out in section 3. (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, does the silence in the Guidelines for Preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of Canada (Print and Electronic) and the SCC Registry’s printed guide named “Representing Yourself in the Supreme Court of Canada, Volume I”, regarding errors in law and section 61. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, can it be construed that section 61. of the Supreme Court Act is wrong and invalid?

9.         Is the word “appeal” a mistake in section 40. (3) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, because it intends to mean “application (for leave to appeal)”?

10.       Is there any authority or power in Canada besides Parliament that – without Parliament’s prior approval – may grant more judicial power for the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada than for the panel of nine judges of that Court?

11.       Do the laws of Canada grant a special power for the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada to make final judgment in a personal letter in the matter of a properly filed and pleaded Motion to the SCC for Reconsideration, simply by his personal opinion claiming that paragraph 78 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada would not be applicable to the matter?

12.       Does the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada have absolute immunity because he is actually a judge, and the definitions of “judge” and “Registrar” under section 2. (1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, are incorrect?

13.       Can section 12. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156 (regarding the Registrar’s binding orders) and section 18. of the Supreme Court Act be interpreted together and construed that the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada has higher judicial authority and power than the panel of nine judges of that Court, including the Chief Judge?

14.       If the answer to question 13 is in the affirmative, can sections 3. (1) and 12. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156 and section 18. of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26, be construed that (at a certain point of time) the Registrar of the SCC alone shall deliver final verdicts in 100% of the appeals and applications for leave submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada, so the Prime Minister could disband the panel of nine judges and dissolve the SCC for good as a redundant authority and financial burden for the state?

15.       Is there a specific Canadian court – other than the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal – that has original or exclusive jurisdiction in tort cases involving the errors and omissions of the Registry’s administrators in the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly the Registrar?

16.       If the answers to questions 11, 12, 13 and 15 are in the negative, and the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada is a public servant of the federal Crown, can it be concluded in light of the 18 February 2014 judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Simon v. HMTQ in which the FCA denied jurisdiction) that sections 17. (1) and (2) (c) and (d), 17. (5) (b) and (6), and 25. of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, are invalid and not applicable in cases against (or involving) such administrators of the Crown?

17.       Can the May 30, 2013 order (Docket: A-367-12) of Madam Justice Dawson overrule section 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, at the expense of Rule 3. regarding expeditiousness resulting in delays of a month or longer by re-interpreting the word “service” as “filing”?

18.       If an (interlocutory) Order of a Judge, like in Madam Justice Dawson’s matter above, is properly appealed but no procedure or decision follows it except silence, is such “unfinished business” harmonious with the purpose – the better administration of the laws of Canada – of section 3. of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7?

19.       Is the common law principle preventing situations that would “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” still a concern of the courts of Canada?

20.       Does the liberal and remedial nature of every enactment in section 12. of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21, mean that the law always shall be remedial for the tortfeasors or criminals only, while shall not be remedial for the innocent and law-abiding victims of such torts or crimes?

21.       In light of sections 17. (1) and 17. (4) of the Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11, do court registries have any obligation to obey those rules and deposit public monies – including security deposits and filing fees – to the Receiver General’s account, particularly in cases when an appealing party’s pleadings are considered vexatious and an abuse of process, thus the disobedience of the registries would cause a financial loss for the state?

22.       Does a clerk or other proper officer (that includes the Registrar) of the court appealed from – the Federal Court of Appeal in the instant case – have the right to refuse the filing of a copy of the notice of appeal (to the SCC), by violating subsection 60. (4) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26?

23.       In similar situations where the court administrators made several errors or omissions, would this Court, the Chief Justice, or a Judge involved prefer to

      (a) Let the nine judges know about the unlawful steps of the Courts Administration Service and their cumulative negative effects on a party, and deal with them within the instant appeal, or

      (b) Keep the unlawful administrative steps in secret from the panel of nine judges, forcing the party to start a new claim against the Crown on square one (at the FC) regarding those issues?

 

Part III: A concise statement of argument:

Ms. Kincaid’s letter of May 24, 2012 alleged that there was “no automatic right to appeal” in civil cases, thus contradicting the French version of s. 61. of the Supreme Court Act. The French text prescribes an “automatic” way to appeal. Thus the application for leave to appeal stage shall be skipped is error in law is alleged in the lower court(s).

The Registrar’s failure to keep the documents on file: Pursuant to section 17. of the Supreme Court Act, the Registrar shall report and publish the judgments of the Court. Since the word “publish” means to make something available for the public – and the above mentioned personal letter of the Registrar is not available for the public in any website or printed document – it follows that the letter is not an order or judgment from the official point of view. Pursuant to section 10. of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, “The Registrar shall keep all registers necessary for recording all activities in every proceeding.” Zoltan A. Simon’s documents entitled (The Applicant’s) Motion of Reconsideration of Application for Leave to Appeal belonged to the category of “every proceeding” but the Registrar did not want to keep its copies so the matter could remain in secret forever from the panel of nine judges of the SCC.

As for Madam Justice Dawson’s Order and its pending appeal, it seems proper to humbly call the attention of the judges to the statement of the Honourable Mr. Justice I. B. Josephson in paragraph [13] of Meldrum v. Public Trustee of The Province of B.C., 1998 CanLII 5563 (BC SC). It states that “The judicial branch of government must not usurp the function of the legislative branch…”

The applicant-appellant respectfully submits that there was a palpable and overriding error in her judgment, assuming that the clear reading of Rule 346. (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 seemed illogical or absurd to her. Namely, she thought that “The Court has no cognizance of an appellant’s memorandum until it is filed…” The clear and express meaning of the wording “Within 30 days after service” cannot be changed without its violation to “Within 30 days after filing.” She overlooked the key circumstance that opposing parties are always fighting against each other, not against a Court or a Registry. Say, a delay of a week in serving an opposing party to the pleadings could cause a loss of millions of dollars to that party while such delay does not affect the Registry’s operation. Further, the term “x days after filing” shows up at least half a dozen times in the same Rules.

If a judge can overrule a clear and express provision of the legislation – here Rule 346.(2) – such judgment is against the other six instances as well. Madame Justice Dawson cited Rule 3. as well, pointing out the “most expeditious” determination of the proceeding. But, in reality, Zoltan A. Simon was punished by her Order to pay $500 for the Crown that filed its memorandum of fact and law 63 days after the service, instead of within the prescribed 30 days, a delay of 33 days on the Crown’s behalf. Thus, a party that consciously followed the Rules was punished for obeying the laws of Canada, and the Crown made $500 by disobeying the law. The fate of the $500 is still unclear because there is a valid appeal followed by a long silence, almost a year. Is her order valid and, therefore, Rule 346.(2) of the Federal Courts Rules absurd and invalid? Pursuant to section 3. of the Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court of Appeal is an additional court of law, … “for the better administration of the laws of Canada…” Does the Order of Madam Justice Dawson allow a delay of 33 days for any party in the future? For comparison, in Abdessadok v. Canada (Canada Border Services Agency), 2006 FC 236 (CanLII), the applicant exceeded the time limit only by 24 hours and he lost his case.

The instant appellant-applicant suffered irreversible loss as a result of his silenced appeal of the Dawson verdict because, pursuant to the Rules, the FCC should have disqualified the Crown’s pleadings for its long delay. The Crown did not apply for any extension of time either.

The applicant served and filed several motions in the Federal Court of Appeal. This one has limits that do not allow him to list more issues and controversies of law and court administration in the courts below. The honourable judges should feel free to look into each motion record in order to get a more complete picture regarding the widespread corruption in Canada and the lack of judicial independence, mainly in the administration of the lower courts.   

 

Part IV: Submissions in support of the order sought concerning costs:

            The instant applicant-appellant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court, Judge or Chief Judge to order costs to him for his expenses in connection with the printing, binding, serving and filing of this motion. He needs to send them by ExpressPost that is quite expensive. He is separated from her family by the government of Canada for the eighth year now; he needs to support as well his wife and stepson living in China. It would have been the duty of the Minister of Justice and the administrators of the Courts Administration Service to answer the presently submitted 24 constitutional questions. Or, rather, it belonged to their job descriptions to secure a normal administrative atmosphere in Canada in which such difficult questions would not have arisen. The instant applicant was doing their jobs for many years free of charge. The result may seem horrible for the government but rather interesting for the objective judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

            The instant applicant-appellant respectfully requests that this Honourable Court, Judge or Chief Judge to suggest the Registrar to waive the prescribed filing fee of $75.00 and/or the security deposit of $500, in forma pauperis, pursuant to sections 97. (1)(b) and 59. (4). The appellant has been working hard since 2007 in order to clean up the mess created by public servants of the Crown; also he is trying to turn Canada’s court administration from its upside-down position back to the sound and logical standards prescribed by Parliament. So far he has been repeatedly punished for his efforts but in the instant case the motion to state constitutional questions is aiming to remedy the errors and apparent corruption in the administrative methods of the courts, mainly in the registries. It is in Canada’s interest to clarify these constitutional questions. Otherwise, maintaining the dangerous imbalance in our court system, the country may be heading to confusion and anarchy or an extremist government (fascist, nazist, anarchist, communist, religious fanatic, racist, supremacist, etc.) where a single person – a Registrar of that future regime – would have complete control over the whole state, probably associated with a future Prime Minister or dictator.

 

Part V: Orders sought, including the order or orders sought concerning costs:

(A)             The instant applicant to the motion seeks an order for costs at the discretion of the Right Honourable Chief Judge or the Judge assigned to the case; and

(B)              He seeks an advice, suggestion or instruction of the Court or the Judge(s) involved towards the Registrar, requesting him to waive to filing fee of $75.00 and/or the security deposit in the amount of $500.00 in the forma pauperis; and

(C)              He seeks an instruction of this Honourable Court or Judge(s) toward the Crown Counsel, asking her that – although the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Guidelines (etc.) may not specify any limit regarding the number of pages transmitted by fax – the Crown should use that method as a last resort only since he does not have a fax machine; it should not exceed 20 pages for a transmittal, and the Crown should contact him before the transmittal; and

(D)             An Order or Direction stating the current filing status of the Notice of Appeal that was submitted for filing by Zoltan Andrew Simon on or about March 14, 2014; and,

(E)              Of course, his main request to this Honourable Court is to state the twenty-three constitutional questions proposed above, with some polishing, simplification or combination of them if required, in order to reduce their numbers. (He is apologizing for the long list of his constitutional questions and the grammatical or other mistakes in his pleadings in general.)

 

Part VI: Table of authorities, arranged alphabetically and setting out the paragraph numbers in Part III where the authorities are cited:

Constitution Act, 1982 (Part I: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms): 7., 8., 11. (a), (b), (d), (g), 12., 15. (1) and 52.;

Courts Administration Service Act, S.C. 2002, c. 8: 2. (b);                                                

Criminal Code,R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46: 126. (1), 269.1 (1) and (2); 346. (1) and (1.1) (b);          

Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7: 3., 17. (1) and (2) (c), (d); 17. (5) (b) and (6), and 25.   

Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: 346. (2);                                                                    

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-11: 17. (1), 17. (4);                                  

Guidelines for preparing Documents to be Filed with the Supreme Court of

     Canada (Print and Electronic): extracts from an older version of the present website

      http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/ar-lr/gl-ld2014-01-01-eng.aspx#D1b [in order to demonstrate

      that section 61. of the Act is missing everywhere];                                                  

Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c I-21: 12.;                                                                       

Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156: 3. (1), 10., 12., 21. (1), 22. (2), 60. (1) (a), (b), (c), 78. (1);     

Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26: 2. (1) under “judge” and “Registrar”, 3., 17., 18., 40. (1), 40. (3), 43. (1), 60. (4), 61., 97. (1) (a) to (d), 97. (2) and (3).

 

Part VII: Photocopies of relevant provisions of statutes, regulations, and rules: Please refer to pages 15 to 75.

 

APPENDIX: Documents, including an affidavit that the applicant intends to rely on, in chronological order: Please refer to pages 75 to 91.

 

All these are respectfully submitted to this Honourable Court/Chief Justice/Judge on this 8th day of April, 2014, in the City of Red Deer, the Province of Alberta.

 

______________________________________________________

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant (Applicant to this motion)

(Self-Represented)

Address:

72 Best Crescent (new address since April 1, 2014 as indicated in the Notice of Appeal)

Red Deer, AB   T4R 1H6

Telephone: (403) 342-8826 (new number of Landlord/ Home)

Telephone (cell.): (403) 392-9189      Fax: (403) 341-3300

E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com          Website: www.correctingworldhistory.com

This is the first page of Ms. Beaulieu's letter. Please read the appellant's response to it on April 28, 2014 as the text below:
Nathalie Beaulieu's letter to the appellant, Zoltan A. Simon, dated March 31, 2014. It refuses the filing of his Notice of Appeal, just like the letter of Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the SCC on December 18, 2012. (They were two independent cases, both by Notice of Appeal as prescribed by section 61. of the Supreme Court Act.)

Dear Mme/Mlle. Beaulieu,

Re: My correct contact address and the Registry’s filing dilemma

                On or about April 6, 2014 I received a letter from the Registry of the SCC, signed by Nathalie Beaulieu. It was mailed, possibly by bad intention, to my old address that was not valid anymore. I have indicated twice by bold letters in my “Notice of Appeal” in early March, both in the style of cause and near my signature, that my new address would be applicable after April 1. Your letter was dated March 31 and it was sent by regular mail but no regular mail from Ottawa could reach my old address in a day.

                The Rules of the SCC do not specify that a special Notice of Change of Address shall be filed and served in a separate motion or submission. Thus, I do not believe that I made any error in that.

                The second issue is about the Registry’s filing dilemma. My Notice of Appeal as of right has been submitted for filing correctly, under s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act. The Registry is obliged to apply a standard duty of care at the filing of any party’s pleadings. The letter of Ms. Beaulieu implies that the Registry’s employees were unwilling to file my Notice of Appeal. She wrote, “… we have determined…” without explaining the meaning of the word “we.” Did that word include Ms. Achakji, Ms. Kincaid, and Ms. Beaulieu only, and excluded the Registrar? Should that be the case, the letter of March 31, 2014 is a nullity officially and legally. Those three persons have no authority to disobey a statute. The letter failed to refer to any paragraph or legislation that would overrule section 61. of the Act, so it reflects a private opinion only. The French version of the said section clearly states that, in cases where error in law is alleged like in my Notice of Appeal, the appeal is automatic (so to file an application for leave to appeal would be an abuse of process). About two years ago, Ms. Kincaid alleged that I was not allowed to appeal as of right because I did not have a criminal case, only a civil one. (The Charter gives equal rights to criminals and civil victims. The misunderstanding seems to have originated in a single judgment that included the marginal note of the Charter. However, pursuant to the Interpretation Act, marginal notes are not part of the legislation. That false logic has been followed by many administrators, derailing the correct administrative approach and turning the justice system of Canada upside down. If you search the Act or the Rules of the SCC using the words “civil” or “criminal” you cannot find any relevant match that would support the logic of Ms. Kincaid.)     

                I call your attention to subsection 126. (1) of the Criminal Code that goes, “Every one who, with-out lawful excuse, contravenes an Act of Parliament by wilfully doing anything that it forbids or by wil-fully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless a punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”

                I am humbly requesting you to specify the names (in the word “we”) of the persons that are willing to share the cell with Ms. Beaulieu for two years in case of a two-years term of imprisonment. You are not obliged to do so under the Access to Information Act. However, the word “we” clearly indicates that Ms. Beaulieu has conspired with at least another person: her letter constitutes an evidence for conspiracy. Further, such attitude may belong to fraud as well. See ss. 380. (1) of the Criminal Code, “Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person,” etc.

                In Wikipedia, “If two or more people are directly responsible for the actus reus, they can be charged as joint principals (see common purpose). The test to distinguish a joint principal from an accessory is whether the defendant independently contributed to causing the actus reus rather than merely giving generalised and/or limited help and encouragement. Therefore, sections 122., 463., and 464. of the Criminal Code may apply for you in this case, for breach of trust and for counseling another person (Z.A. Simon and to each other) to commit an indictable offence (to violate s. 61. of the Act). Let alone that, unfortunately for the conspirators, the systematic omissions of your colleagues may qualify as a “terrorist activity.” Please refer to ss. 83.01 (1) (b) (i) (A) and (B) and (ii) (B), (C ), and (E) of the Code [since the lawful operation of the Supreme Court is an essential system or service for every Canadian, and the oppressed re-victimized sponsors and the appellants claiming errors in law at the lower courts form two segments of the society]. Finally, subsection 126. (2) states that the next (or the present) Attorney General may prosecute you for conspiracy. Also, sections 586. and 587. (1) (c) of the Code seem relevant to your situation.

              I apologize for these references. Maybe you, Ms. Beaulieu, are an innocent and uninformed person regarding these issues and got involved involuntarily into this affair just like “Pilate into the Credo” as the Hungarian proverb goes. Perhaps you, with or without the approval of the Registrar, would be the only person in the Registry that respects the legislation by filing my Notice of Appeal. (I am unwilling to apply for an extension of time and file an Application for leave to appeal.) The worst case that may happen to you is that one of your bosses would dismiss you and you would end up on EI benefits until October 2015, the fall of Mr. Harper’s fascism. Then, or even earlier, you may sue HMTQ for wrongful dismissal. Of course, you would get back your old position if you wish, with a windfall in punitive and other damages paid to you. Also, you would possibly be promoted as the new Registrar.

                Your person seems to be in the middle of a square where four powers are at the corners as follow: (a) the Prime Minister, (b) the Minister of Justice, (c) the Registrar, and (d) The Chief Justice. Your situation is not easy, considering that – apparently – the Registrar is a rival or superior to the C.J. in real life, while a similar rivalry seems to exist between the P.M. and the A.G. The Prime Minister is very experienced in throwing his colleagues, one by one, “under the bus” – so to speak. He is extremely smart. Some proofs for his wisdom are the follows: he shuffled his cabinet so every federal minister under siege – perhaps mainly due to my actions and appeals – including Ms. Finley, Mr. Kenney, and Mr. Nicholson have been removed from their old positions in order to save their faces. (This is a strategy of an ostrich that digs her head into the sand when she sees any danger.) The P.M. “saved” Mr. MacKay by throwing him in the worst battlefield: the Ministry of Justice. Mr. Harper was as smart as King David in the Old Testament when he sent Uriah in the front line where the fighting was the fiercest. (2 Samuel 11, verses 14 to 24). Of course, there is no beautiful woman between the P.M. and the A.G. The Hon. Peter MacKay may still have the illusion that he is the most powerful man of Canada but he is just one of the next victims of the fascist regime: he must be the next sacrificial lamb to save face for the P.M. The P.M. must sweep out ministers that cannot give an impression for the public that their department operates according the laws of Canada. It is needless to say that the end of Mr. MacKay career could coincide with the fall of the Conservative Party on the long run, unless he is wise enough to save it alone, as the only or best candidate to do that enormous work. In my humble opinion, a single good politician cannot save a rotten party. Mr. Kenney, with pending court cases and RCMP investigation against him, would not be an ideal candidate. In my humble opinion, the resignation of one or two persons out of the four (that form the 4 corners of the power square) – before being terminated by the P.M. – may save face for the Conservative Party (and their own future careers as Canadian officials).

                You should be informed that, due to the sabotage of the Registry, I have shifted my main actions to the Internet. My web site is www.correctingworldhistory.com and my Twitter account is @ZoltanAndrew. In late November, I filed a complaint against the federal Cabinet at the RCMP [that is still investigating it]. In the meantime, I keep informing the leaders of every political party of the opposition, with growing interest and success. Should you and your colleagues be adamant to contravene the acts of Parliament and refuse to file my Notice of Appeal and my Motion to the Chief Judge or a judge to state constitutional questions, I would launch a campaign on the Internet by a huge blog named www.change.org by collecting signatures to request all the political parties to demand the P.M. to terminate the employment of the Registry’s administrators that keep disobeying s. 61. of the Act. Thus, unless someone of the Registry would send me a PDF or a letter showing the front pages of the two documents with the “FILED” stamp on them, I would post such revealing blog at www.change.org on May 15, 2014 that, without my intention, may result in an irreversible moral collapse of the Conservative Party even before October 2015. I am an insignificant person alone, but with the help of all of you we can achieve that: “Yes, together we can!” (I feel quite sad because, after my immigration, I used to be a conservative and a number one supporter of a strong united Canada.)

               The two powers listed in the preamble of the Charter are hiding but still working. Day by day, more and more persons read my website and follow me: their number increased almost exponentially since I started to use the Twitter frequently. In a few days I received notes that three organizations, amongst many others, are following me: the anti-terrorist ICLMG, a congressional newspaper (The Hill), and @SPBILF (St. Petersburg International Legal Forum) at http://spblegalforum.com. Your bosses seem to live in the 19th century, being unfamiliar with the powers of the Internet. I referred the readers of this international forum to my website and pray that one of Mr. Putin’s advisors would make the Resident of Russia defend openly Canada’s democracy by condemning Harper’s fascism. Thus, while the P.M. sends six F-18 fighter jets to scare the Russians, Mr. Putin may send six MIG jets to patrol along Quebec’s shores, in order to scare Mr. Nicholson. But why to trigger a war when any citizen can do more effective things on the Internet? Our P.M. is using the same trick that Argentina did by the Falkland War, in order to divert the public’s attention from the failing internal policies of the government.

               Finally, I humbly call your attention to my previous political actions. One of them was the issue of The Hon. Marc Nadon at the SCC. About two months before the scheduled hearing, I sent e-mail messages to many politicians and parties, mainly those of Quebec. My messages pointed out that – in case of a verdict confirming the position of Mr. Nadon as a judge of the SCC – the politicians of Quebec would have a narrow window of opportunity, say till the end of February 2014, to declare officially that Quebec “may not” submit to the orders of the SCC in the future. No doubt that one or more politicians reported my suggestion to the Cabinet of Canada. The result was – as it seemed – that the C.J. as a good Canadian patriot informed her seven or eight colleagues of such possibility. Thus, considering the real possibility of losing Quebec and breaking up Canada, the judges – except the Hon. Mr. Justice Moldaver – made the right choice and disapproved the unlawful decision of Mr. Harper. (Again, the Internet has more power than one may think.)

Thank you for your precious time and attention in this matter of nationwide importance.

 

Sincerely,

 

Zoltan Andrew Simon, Appellant

72 Best Crescent, Red Deer, AB  T4R 1H6

Phone: (403) 342-8826 (Landlord); (403) 392-9189 (cell.)

E-mail: zasimon@hotmail.com   URL: www.correctingworldhistory.com

Roger Bilodeau, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada, usurps the last word and final verdict in this personal letter - not by an Order - assuming that he is above the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.
So far this letter of Elizabeth May, Leader of the Green Party of Canada, was the only indication that about 8% of Canadians disapproved Harper's dictatorship and wanted our democracy back.
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